Pramanavarttikasvavritti 1: pramāṇavarttikasvavrittiṭīkā

He who has destroyed the course of all bondages, is thoroughly established in mastery, / whose continuous manifestation of immaculately pure knowledge extends over all knowables, / and whose mind is eternally intent on the welfare of sentient beings—the glorious Mañjunātha, the lord: / having bowed to him repeatedly, I wish to explain a little of what is contained in the Vārttika today. / That we and others can speak here even on this abstruse subject is entirely the merit of the commentator: / when the uneven ground has been leveled by the pestles of the tusks of Dignāga, elephant calves advance with ease. / Whoever, proud of his own qualities, looks down on me, he knows something; this effort is not aimed at him. / Someone, at some time, will have a need for this; for there is no end to the variety of minds among embodied beings in the world.

For although at the beginning of a treatise, even without setting forth a verse of homage, the completion of the treatise without obstacles is achieved through the accumulation of merit by paying homage to one's chosen deity with body, speech, and mind, nevertheless, considering that action preceded by praise produces an excess of merit for both commentators and listeners, that it serves the welfare of others, and that it preserves good custom, the Teacher presented a verse of veneration to a distinguished deity: "vidhūtakalpana..." [whose web of conceptual constructions is shaken off] and so on.

When the word 'Samantabhadra' is not taken by conventional usage as referring to the bodhisattva, then this is veneration of the blessed Buddha. And that [veneration] is twofold: through praise and through salutation. It is through salutation by the word 'namaḥ' (homage), and through praise by the remaining words. The praise also is threefold: by virtue of the perfection of one's own welfare, by virtue of the perfection of the welfare of others, and by virtue of the means to the perfection of the welfare of others. And since one who has attained the perfection of one's own welfare is capable with respect to the welfare of others, first, by the first half [of the verse], the perfection of one's own welfare is stated. And the perfection of one's own welfare, characterized by the three bodies, is expressed as qualified by three particular distinctions: by the particular distinction of the abandonment of obscurations, by the particular distinction of profundity, and by the particular distinction of vastness.

Among these, conceptual construction is the minds and mental factors of the three realms operating with the cognitive aspects of 'I' and 'mine' and so on, and operating with the cognitive aspects of the object grasped and the subject grasping. That itself is a web, because it consists in bondage. Those forms (mūrti) for which that has been shaken off—destroyed along with latent imprints and made into states whose nature is non-arising again—are spoken of as such. By this, the particular distinction of the abandonment of obscurations has been stated. The particular distinctions of profundity and vastness, however, are stated by the words 'profound' (gambhīra) and 'vast' (udāra). Their web of conceptual construction shaken off, they are profound because they are not an object of the hearers, solitary buddhas, and so on; they are vast because they pervade all knowables and the welfare of all sentient beings. The Blessed One who has these forms—the three bodies: the essential nature body, the enjoyment body, and the emanation body—is 'he whose forms are profound and vast, with the web of conceptual constructions shaken off'. 'Auspicious' (bhadra) means beneficial, characterized by higher rebirth and the supreme good. Since that arises completely from all sides for those who seek it from him, in accordance with their fitness, he is 'entirely auspicious' (Samantabhadra). By this, the perfection of the welfare of others has been stated. And of this perfection of the welfare of others, the means of attainment is stated by [the expression] 'whose brilliance shines all around' (samantasphuraṇatviṣ). 'Brilliance' means rays, but here, by analogy with grasping things as they really are, it means the teaching of the Dharma. They are called 'brilliance' as it were, because they have as their domain the realization of higher rebirth and the supreme good. By which rays the means of realizing the welfare of others is completely, without remainder, spread and diffused through comprehensive proclamation to those to be guided, such are those that shine all around; he who possesses such brilliant rays that are the teaching of the Dharma is 'he whose brilliance shines all around'. And due to connection with the word 'namaḥ', the dative case is used everywhere. But when conventional usage is intended, then, since this word 'Samantabhadra' is conventionally used in the Mahāyāna for a specific bodhisattva, this is veneration of that bodhisattva. The meaning of the words is to be applied as before. This, however, is the distinction: the state of having shaken off the web of conceptual constructions is to be understood from the abandonment of the obscurations belonging to the bodhisattva stages; profundity from not being an object of the hearers, solitary buddhas, and ordinary persons; and vastness from the greatness of a bodhisattva. The three bodies also certainly exist in an appropriate manner for bodhisattvas, but they are established for buddhas by having reached preeminence.

For good people who will receive this treatise called the Vārttika certainly exist; nevertheless, making the help [it offers], though real, seem non-existent on account of the prevalence of faults in listeners, he shows the mere cultivation of his mind through the repeated practice of well-spoken words to be the reason for commencing the treatise. And in order to express through indirect statement that 'this faulty cause of the loss of great meaning is proper to be abandoned', he speaks the second verse:

"prāyaḥ prākṛta..." [Mostly ordinary...] and so forth. Here, a fourfold fault of listeners is pointed out: poor intellect, ignorance, lack of interest, and lack of impartiality. The word 'prāyaḥ', ending in the letter 'o', expresses prevalence: 'mostly people' means the majority of people. 'Attached to the ordinary' (prākṛtasaktiḥ) means: one whose attachment is to ordinary, external treatises. Due to making the sense clear, it is an exocentric compound with different case-relations (vyadhikaraṇa-bahuvrīhi). Or: one whose attachment is ordinary—thus an exocentric compound with identical case-relations (samānādhikaraṇa) only; and attachment is ordinary because its object is ordinary. By this, poor intellect is stated as a fault of listeners.

'One whose discerning insight is incompetent' (apratibalaprajñaḥ) means one whose discerning insight is incapable of comprehending the treatise; 'mostly people' is the syntactic connection. By this, ignorance is stated. 'Not only has no interest in well-spoken words, but even hates the speaker of well-spoken words, being encompassed by the taints of jealousy': the meaning is that he is uninterested and he hates. By this, lack of interest and lack of impartiality are stated, respectively. Here too, 'mostly people' is to be connected.

Others, however, explain: There is also a particle 'prāyaḥ' ending in an a-sound. And by its very nature it occurs in the third-case sense of 'for the most part' (bāhulyena). Envy (īrṣyā) is the mind's irritation at another's excellence. That [envy] itself is an impurity (mala) because it defiles the mind. The plural is used on account of the distinction between individual instances. For this very reason, by this cause, this work called the Vārttika was undertaken. 'Benefit to others' (paropakāraḥ) is the benefit of others. It takes the affix ghañ in the instrumental sense: 'that by which [someone] is benefited.' Or it takes the affix aṇ in the objective sense: 'one who benefits others' (Pāṇini 3.2.1). With regard to 'benefit to others', we do not even have such a thought. 'How then did engagement in composing the treatise arise?' [To this] he says: 'mind... for a long time' and so on. For a long time—for an extended period—a passion (vyasana), an attachment, a dedication has been intensified by the practice of well-spoken words; that mind of which the passion has been intensified by the practice of well-spoken words is so described. For this reason, the mind has an attached desire—an arisen yearning—in this composition of the Vārttika. Thus some explain.

Others, however, [explain] differently: On the occasion of the question, 'Why does this Master Dharmakīrti compose an explanation of the Pramāṇasamuccaya in the manner of a commentary (vārttika), and not rather an independent treatise?', he stated: 'For the most part...' and so on. This is the summary meaning of this verse: 'Out of reflection and compassion, my mind has formed a desire to explain the Pramāṇasamuccaya.' The reflection and compassion [arise] because the treatise composed by Master Dignāga is of little benefit; and its being of little benefit is due to the fault of the audience. The word-by-word meaning is stated: 'For the most part' (prāyaḥ), meaning largely; the construction is 'people have vulgar attachment' (prākṛtasaktirjanaḥ). In common parlance, a 'vulgar person' (prākṛtaḥ) is called low-born, one whose lineage is corrupted. Likewise, the treatises of non-Buddhist philosophers, composed by others, which refute the treatises of the Master's doctrine, are vulgar because they originate from distorted cognition and have a corrupted lineage. One who has an attachment (sakti), an affection, for them is so described. 'Why, again, do they have vulgar attachment?' [To this] he says: 'having inadequate discerning insight' (apratibalaprajñaḥ). Therefore, taking even what is poorly spoken to be well-spoken, he attaches to the vulgar. And precisely because of having inadequate discerning insight, being incapable of comprehending the Master's well-spoken words for himself as they truly are, and grasping them as faulty, he has no need for those well-spoken words of the Master; and he becomes hateful toward the Master. [To this] he says: 'only...' and so on. Not only does he have no need for the Master's well-spoken words, but enveloped by the impurities of envy he even hates Master Dignāga. Of what kind is he? 'Having an intensified passion through the practice of well-spoken words.' A connection [of words] indeed occurs even with an intervening word,

according to the maxim: 'that with which something has a syntactic connection is connected with it, even if situated far away.'

What is spoken well is 'well-spoken' (sūkta), the teaching of the Blessed One; the practice of that, the passion intensified therein, the excessive dedication to that very thing—he who has that is Master Dignāga, so described. By this, he speaks of Master Dignāga's accumulated merit and knowledge; for only those whose merit and knowledge are accumulated have their passion intensified through the practice of well-spoken words. Because people have inadequate discerning insight, have no need for the Master's well-spoken words, and have vulgar attachment, for that reason this Pramāṇasamuccaya does not have supreme benefit (paropakāra). 'Benefiting' is benefit (upakāra), with the affix ghañ in the abstract sense (Pāṇini 3.3.18). Considering that supreme (para), excellent benefit does not arise from it, it is not of supreme benefit; but there certainly is small benefit, and that is indicated by the word 'for the most part' (prāyaḥ). The word 'iti' denotes cause. From this cause arises our reflection, having the form: 'Although this treatise is of great significance, it has not turned out to be beneficial to many; so how might I make it exceedingly fruitful?' And hatred toward the Master, who is equal to a bodhisattva, even if slight, is a cause of harm; therefore, by revealing the Master's doctrine without error and generating respect toward the Master, I will turn people away from that cause of harm—in this way, compassion also has the form of wishing for separation from suffering, indicated by the word 'api' ('even'). 'For this reason the desire is attached'—by this second word 'iti', he states that reflection and compassion are the causes. Thus, through these two—reflection and compassion—the mind has for a long time—for an extended duration—an attached desire, a continuous wishing, directed toward the composition of the Pramāṇavārttika here, which is an explanation of the Pramāṇasamuccaya.

If Master Dharmakīrti wished to compose an explanation of the Pramāṇasamuccaya, why does he establish inference independently? Removing this doubt, he says: 'discriminating between benefit and harm...' and so on. Benefit (artha) is the wholesome, harm (anartha) is the unwholesome; discriminating (vivecana) between the two. 'Because it has that as its basis' means that of which inference is the basis (āśraya); this is the analysis of the compound. For having determined benefit and harm by means of inference, through a cognition arising subsequently to the inference and proceeding continuously, one systematically establishes benefit and harm in terms of acquisition and avoidance respectively. Therefore, discrimination between benefit and harm has inference as its basis. 'Because of disagreement regarding that' means because of disagreement regarding that inference, for the sake of establishing it—thus some explain.

Here, however, this should be considered:

If, first of all, it is restricted in this way: 'only because the discrimination between benefit and harm has inference as its basis'—that is not correct. For the discrimination of a third object of awareness, which is other than benefit and harm, namely that which is to be disregarded, also has inference as its basis; and because the discrimination between benefit and harm is not restricted [solely to inference]. Its having direct perception as its basis is unobstructed; so what special excellence of inference has been proclaimed on account of which it is explained first? Now, if it is restricted in this way: 'precisely because the discrimination between benefit and harm has inference as its basis'—even so, the restriction is improper, because the discrimination between benefit and harm also has direct perception as its basis. For benefit and harm appear in direct perception in an already differentiated form. And that direct perception, by virtue of the sharpness acquired through extraordinary repetition, having removed the cause of error, generates the subsequent conceptual construction discriminating benefit and harm. For this alone is direct perception's being the basis of the discrimination between benefit and harm: having experienced benefit and harm distinctly, generating ascertainment in that regard in accordance with the experience.

Nor can one say that the beneficial and the harmful are distinguished solely by subsequent [thought]. For a conceptual construction does not grasp the intrinsic nature of a real entity; or, if it does grasp it, it would lose its nature as conceptual construction, because it is contradictory for a cognizer bound to conceptual construction to have a clear appearance of the object.

However, where direct perception, in some object, lacks expertise and is incapable of removing the cause of error, it is there that ascertainment is sought through inference, not everywhere. Therefore, ascertainment of validity in direct perception occurs both intrinsically and extrinsically. And this point will be established in the second chapter, so it is not elaborated here.

And necessarily, one must accept that direct perception—whose cause of error has been removed by the force of habituation—intrinsically serves as the basis for distinguishing the beneficial and the harmful, because it produces ascertainment in accordance with experience. Otherwise, even inference would have no stable establishment, since the probative mark, such as smoke, would not be ascertained. If smoke and the like were also understood through inference, there would be an infinite regress, because there too another probative mark would have to be ascertained through another inference.

And if direct perception were not the basis for distinguishing the beneficial and the harmful, then what was stated by the author of the treatise in another section—namely, "Because the attainment of the beneficial and the avoidance of the harmful are invariably preceded by correct knowledge," and so on—would be contradicted; likewise, "For without having determined the object in this [perception]...", and so forth; and again it is stated, "Memory and the like occurring by the power of awareness regarding seen [objects]...", and so on.

Therefore, others explain [it] differently: What was composed by the teacher Dignāga, such as the definitions of the means of valid cognition, is beneficial because it is reasonable. What was composed by non-Buddhist philosophers is harmful because it is not reasonable. The distinction between the two is established in terms of reasonableness and unreasonableness, because it is based on inference. For it is only by relying on inference that the statements of definitions are established as reasonable or unreasonable, not direct perception, since it is non-investigative.

That too is incorrect. For statements of definitions are not reasonable or unreasonable in their own form, but rather by way of their meaning. And just as that meaning is apprehended as reasonable by inference, so too is it [apprehended] by direct perception. And so he will state:

"That direct perception is devoid of conceptual construction is established by direct perception itself." (PV III.123) Likewise:

"The ascertainment of the property of the subject [arises] from direct perception," and so forth.

As for anyone who thinks: "It is true that the distinction between the beneficial and the harmful is indeed made by both direct perception and inference; however, the reason why distinguishing the beneficial and the harmful is said to be based on inference is that, even when a dispute arises regarding an object of direct perception, there is no cause for a definitive determination other than inference; therefore, because inference is primary, it is spoken of as the basis for that distinction"—

This too is incorrect. For only that object of direct perception is established which has been ascertained, and no dispute can arise regarding what has been ascertained; hence this is incorrect.

Another, however, says: Distinguishing the beneficial and the harmful comes only from inference, not from direct perception. For those beneficial and harmful things whose fruit has been experienced or is being experienced are not objects of purposive action, because the fruit has already been accomplished. Therefore, purposive action toward beneficial and harmful things capable of that [fruit] is for the sake of future causal efficacy. And that capacity in them is not apprehended by direct perception such that it could be the object of purposive action, because the causal efficacy to be achieved by purposive action lies in the future, and therefore its active state of that capacity also lies in the future. Therefore, the ascertainment of fitness for a future fruit, even in perceived real entities, does not arise from direct perception, owing to their similarity with a real entity that was previously experienced as an instrument of causal efficacy; hence distinguishing the beneficial and the harmful is solely from inference.

That too is incorrect. For if that fitness, the active state, were present in real entities at the present time, then it would be ascertained even by direct perception endowed with intense habituation, like a probative mark. If, on the other hand, it lies entirely in the future, then it could not be ascertained even by inference, as he will state: "Because there is no inference regarding a future object."

By this, that which is asserted—that bringing about the real entity that is the object of purposive action is non-distinct between direct perception and inference—must also be regarded as refuted. For the object of purposive action is capable of future causal efficacy, and that capacity is not ascertained by direct perception or inference, as has been stated. And the object of purposive action is accepted to be delimited, but a continuum is not delimited by a single moment of direct perception or the like; so how could it be the object of purposive action?

Now, if [one argues that] direct perception, though operating on a single moment, has by virtue of ascertainment a universal of moments as its object, and thus has a single continuum as its object—that is incorrect. For it is only through the appearing object that direct perception is established, by virtue of ascertainment, as having a universal as its object, not in the ultimate sense, because its [actual] object is a particular; just as direct perception having a probative mark as its object. To explain: this appearing particular of smoke may be from grass, from leaves, or from something else. And there, through the non-determination of specific differences and through the ascertainment of the mere moment, direct perception, though having a particular as its object, is established as having a universal as its object, because the ascertainment that occurs immediately following direct perception conforms to the object of direct perception. But direct perception whose object is a single moment cannot be established in this manner, because that moment which appears in direct perception has not been ascertained, nor can it have the form of a previous moment or a subsequent moment, due to difference in time. How, then, through non-determination of specific differences and through ascertainment of the mere moment, could direct perception be established there as having a universal of moments as its object? Even though the ascertainment occurring immediately following direct perception—"this is that very same [thing]"—has a universal as its object, it does not have a continuum as its object, because, by taking as its object only what has been known and is being known, it does not ascertain future moments, and because its object is a form excluded from dissimilar classes; for this very reason, even when a [single] moment appears, there is the cognitive ascertainment: "this is a jar."

Now, if a continuum of real entities capable of purposeful action is not determined by direct perception and inference, how then do the two stimulate action? We reply: because of determining merely the intrinsic nature of the real entity. For, when one determines by direct perception that a real entity such as fire, acting as a continuous series in one place, is capable of purposeful action such as burning, one also determines that this, when observed elsewhere in another place and so forth, produces an effect of such a kind only by acting as a continuous series. That very same person, desiring the result at another time, seeking its intrinsic nature, having seen the fire and so forth by means of direct perception and inference, acts preceded by the determination: "This is precisely that." Therefore, this is the meaning: the operation of the means of valid cognition pertains to determining merely its intrinsic nature, not to determining the continuity of its activity, nor to determining its capacity for purposeful action, since all of this was already determined previously. Therefore, that direct perception and inference are stimulators of action is entirely proper. How then was it stated that discrimination of the advantageous and the disadvantageous is grounded in inference? […] Here, indeed, "advantage" is not intended [merely empirically]; rather, it is the four Noble Truths. For we are seekers of liberation, and the Blessed One stated that liberation occurs from seeing the four Noble Truths. And that vision is accomplished through repeated cultivation, and engagement in cultivation comes from determining the four Noble Truths. And since they are imperceptible, their determination comes solely from inference; thus, the foundation of the discrimination of the advantageous and the disadvantageous is inference alone.

The advantageous consists of cessation and the path because they are to be adopted; the disadvantageous consists of suffering and the origin [of suffering] because they are to be abandoned. Alternatively, the advantageous is ultimate truth and the disadvantageous is conventional truth; since their discrimination—which is their establishment in terms of their own nature—is grounded in inference. And all cognition that carries out the discrimination of the advantageous and the disadvantageous does not apprehend a particular; rather, it conceptualizes, and thus it is entirely erroneous. Hence, if cognition from verbal testimony and the like were accepted as the foundation of the discrimination of the advantageous and the disadvantageous, that too would be a non-means of valid cognition because it is erroneous. For this very reason, there is no occasion here for its detailed exposition. Inference, however, even though it is erroneous, has validity by virtue of a causal or essential connection. But if validity were accepted in this manner for cognition from verbal testimony and the like, since it is subsumed under inference, and because what is not a property of the subject is not indicative, the foundation of the discrimination of the advantageous and the disadvantageous is inference alone.

[Objection:] If the validity of inference were due to a connection, then the conceptual construction of permanence and the like would also have validity, because of its connection to momentary and other entities. If [you say] validity is due to a connection with the object conceptually determined, then the cognition of a jewel with respect to the radiance of a jewel would be valid, for that too is connected with the conceptually determined jewel. Therefore, even when a connection exists, it is inferential cognition that delivers that object—by conceptually determining the unity of the continuum as having a connection with that place and so forth, in accordance with the fact that the object was conceptually determined as having a connection with that place and so forth—that is a means of valid cognition, not all cognition.

And the discrimination of the advantageous and the disadvantageous has the nature of comprehension, and this cognitive aspect is inference because it is a means of valid cognition. Or, inference is just the probative mark; hence, discrimination of the advantageous and the disadvantageous is grounded in inference. "Due to misconception regarding it" means due to bewilderment regarding that inference. In order to establish it, to establish that inference by removing misconceptions, the author of the sūtras said:

"A property of the subject..." and so forth.

If inference is what is to be established, why does he establish solely the logical reason with the words "A property of the subject..." and so forth? There is no fault in this. Since misconception regarding inference occurs through misconception regarding the logical reason, its establishment occurs precisely through the explanation of the logical reason. Moreover, inferential cognition arising from a three-characteristic probative mark is well known to ordinary people; hence, the misconception is eliminated through that very ordinary understanding.

Alternatively, when solely the probative mark is spoken of by the word "inference", then because there is misconception regarding it, he establishes solely the logical reason; thus there is no fault.

In this verse, the definition of the probative mark, the restriction of the number, the cause for the restriction of the number, and the exclusion of the opposite are stated. "A property of the subject, pervasively related to its part" is the definition.

"A part of that subject" is the property intended to be proved; "pervasively related only to that" is the restrictive specification. "Only threefold" is the restriction of the number. "Because of the restriction of invariable concomitance" is the cause for the restriction of the number; the meaning is: because invariable concomitance is restricted to three alone. "Pseudo-reasons are other than that" is the exclusion of the opposite: pseudo-reasons are those other than the triad of logical reasons.

[Objection:] If the pervasion by a part of that [subject] is apprehended only in an example, then inference would not arise, because the pervasion of the logical reason by the property to be proved is not apprehended in the subject possessing the property to be proved. And then the definition, "A logical reason is a property of the subject," is futile, because it is not indicative. Even if pervasion is apprehended by all-inclusive subsumption, inference would have no validity, because it would have the nature of memory, having as its object that which has already been apprehended by the means of valid cognition that grasps the pervasion. And "A logical reason is a property of the subject" should not be said, because it is already understood merely by stating its pervasion by a part of that [subject]. Furthermore, the logical reason's indicativeness is due to the force of its pervasion by a part of that [subject], not merely due to its existence in the subject; for a donkey or the like standing there is not indicative. Therefore, "A logical reason is a property of the subject" should not be stated as a separate definition.

So it has been said:

"Where there is inexplicability otherwise, what is the use of the triad there? / Where there is no inexplicability otherwise, what is the use of the triad there?"

Moreover, first of all, non-apprehension cannot be a property of the subject, because another's apprehension is a property of a person. And the logical reason of essential nature has the form of the subject itself, while an effect-reason is also independent and does not depend on the subject. And an imagined property of the subject cannot be an effect-reason or an essential-nature reason, nor can it have pervasion by the probandum; therefore, "A logical reason is a property of the subject" should not be said.

Likewise, if being a logical reason is pervaded by threefoldness, then since being a logical reason would not be restricted, being a logical reason would remain unprevented elsewhere too, in conjuncts and the like; thus the restriction "only threefold" is not tenable.

If, on the other hand, being a logical reason is pervaded by threefoldness [in reverse: threefoldness is pervaded by being a logical reason], then since threefoldness is not restricted to the logical reason, effects and the like would also not be logical reasons; and consequently, that only effects and the like are logical reasons does not hold.

Moreover, if non-apprehension has no connection with the probandum, then an unconnected reason would also be indicative; thus the restriction that "it is only threefold" does not hold.

If [the opponent says] there is an ontological connection, then because [non-cognition] is subsumed under effect and intrinsic nature alone, it is still not correct that 'that logical reason is of three kinds only.' And it was incorrectly stated that '[logical reasons] other than that are pseudo-reasons,' because an alternative logical reason, being utterly imperceptible, does not have its absence ascertained by direct perception and so forth.

[The root text:]
'The logical reason is a property of the subject and is pervaded by a part of it; it is of three kinds only,
because of the restriction of invariable concomitance; [reasons] other than that are pseudo-reasons.'

To this it is said: Although the pervasion between the probandum and the means of proof is understood by encompassing all [instances], still, from the mere apprehension of pervasion there is no determination with particularity such as 'here in the subject possessing the probandum, at this time, there is the property to be proved'; rather, it arises from inference. Therefore, inference is indeed a means of valid cognition because it brings about understanding of an uncomprehended probandum related to a specific place and so forth; and this occurs only when there is the state of being a property of the subject, not otherwise. For a probative property located in a different place and so forth is not connected to a subject possessing the probandum located in another place and so forth. Therefore, inference is precisely the cognition of a probandum delimited by a specific place and so forth, solely through the power of understanding a means of proof delimited by a specific place and so forth. But it is not the cognition of fire in general from smoke in general, because that is the result of the means of valid cognition that grasps pervasion. Nor, even when it is understood without particularity that 'wherever there is the probative property, there is the property to be proved,' is the means of proof established as a property of the subject, because it is stated in general without being cognized with particularity as a property of the subject possessing the probandum. Therefore, in order to cognize the probandum as delimited by a specific place and so forth, the state of being a property of the subject must be shown.