釋摩訶衍論 5.30

5.30

All sentient beings from the beginningless past all possess original awakening without ever parting from it; why is it that sentient beings have those who became Buddhas before, those who will become Buddhas later, and those who become Buddhas now? There are also those who practice diligently and those who do not, those who are clever and those who are dull, with immeasurable differences. Having the same single awakening, they should all arouse the mind simultaneously, cultivate practice, and attain the unsurpassed path. Are such differences because original awakening and Buddha-nature differ in being strong or weak? Are such differences because the afflictions of avidyā differ in being thick or thin? If one says it is like the former, this matter is not so. Why is that? Because original awakening and Buddha-nature are perfect in merits exceeding the sands of the Ganges, without increase or decrease. If one says it is like the latter, this matter is also not so. Why is that? Because the meaning of severing at one stage is not established. Such various and immeasurable differences are all maintained relying on avidyā, and they are simply irrelevant to the ultimate principle. If this is so, when all practitioners sever all evil, cultivate all good, transcend the ten grounds, arrive at the unsurpassed ground, perfect the three bodies, and become endowed with the four virtues, are such practitioners illumination or avidyā? Such practitioners are in the state of avidyā, not in the state of illumination. If so, pure original awakening from the beginningless past does not depend on cultivation, is not obtained by other-power, its nature's virtues are perfect, its innate wisdom is complete, it transcends the four propositions and is free from the five extremes; the word 'spontaneity' cannot make it spontaneous, the mind of purity cannot make it pure, completely severed and separated—is such an original place illumination or avidyā? Such an original place is within the territory of avidyā, not the state of illumination. If so, the mind of the one dharmadhātu is not the hundred negations, rejects the thousand affirmations, is not the middle nor not the middle, rejects the celestial and is not celestial. The talk of expounding water stops when one's feet are cut off; the measure of deliberation stays when one's hands perish. Is such one mind illumination or avidyā? Such one mind is within the territory of avidyā, not the state of illumination. The Mahāyāna dharma of the three-self one mind: the 'one' cannot be one, but can provisionally enter oneness; the 'mind' cannot be mind, but can provisionally enter mind; it is not truly my name yet designates me; it is not self-proclaimed yet accords with the self. Just as the name of 'self' is established yet is not the real self, and just as 'self' is proclaimed yet is not the real self, profound upon profound, distant upon distant. Is such an exalted place illumination or avidyā? Such an exalted place is within the territory of avidyā, not the state of illumination. The non-dual Mahāyāna dharma is solely the non-dual Mahāyāna dharma; is such non-dual Mahāyāna dharma illumination or avidyā?