金剛般若疏 3.6

3.6

「當何名此經」下，若依開善，從上已來並是說波若體，此之一章明波若名，即是名說也。今明名說體說，非無此義，但此文猶屬格量段也。前格量中開為二別：第一、正舉二種財施格量稱嘆；第二章、辨於經名。所以辨經者，上舉二施格量及稱歎，經在處則處貴、居人則人尊。時眾聞經有斯勝德，咸欲受持，但未識名字，是故此中辨名也。就文為二：初問，次答。問中有二：一、問經名；二、問受持也。「佛告須菩提：是經名為金剛波若」下，第二、答經名。前問有二：一、問經名；二、問受持。今具答二問，開為二別：第一、正答二問；第二、釋成答問意。今前答二問即為二：初、答名；二、答受持。今前答。「名金剛般若」者，波若未曾法譬，非譬不譬假設譬名，非法不法強作法名，非名不名強為立名，名金剛波若耳。「以是名字」下，第二、答持經問。「所以者何」下，第二、釋成答問意。他云：答名中三段：一、標金剛之名，即辨堅利之義；第二、遣於體堅；第三、遣其用利。上答名即標堅利義竟，此下即是遣其體堅。就遣體堅中二句：初明佛說波若，即非般若，明心行斷也；下如來無所說，明絕言語也。今問：上不可取不可說，已明心行斷、語言絕，今何因緣更復明絕？今依論判此二句，初句明下有所異，次句明上有所同。問：何故明下有所異、上有所同耶？答：下同二乘、上異諸佛，則波若不足可尊敬受持。良由下異二乘、上同諸佛故可尊敬。以勸物之意，故作此說也。下有異者，上標此經名為金剛，但二乘斷惑之智亦名金剛，未知此經名金剛者，是何金剛耶？故釋云佛說波若者，此是佛波若、佛金剛也。則非般若者，非是二乘智慧、非二乘金剛也。「須菩提！於意云何」下，他云前明斷心行，今辨絕語言。今依論意不然，前文明下有異，今句明上有所同。時會疑云：但釋迦作此說般若，餘佛亦作此說耶？故佛牒時眾疑，問善吉如來有所說不？此問意明釋迦獨有此說，餘佛不作此說耶？「須菩提云：如來無所說」者，此明釋迦無別有說，還同十方三世佛說，離三世佛說外無別有說也。故《大品．無作品》云「說是波若時，十方各千佛現，同說是波若經，難問者皆號釋提桓因，解釋波若者皆名須菩提。天主更問：但現在十方佛作此說，未來諸佛亦作此說？佛答：當來彌勒亦作如是說。」故知十方三世佛同作此說，《大品》廣故廣明同，今文略故略明同。所以同者，明波若只是一正觀，正道豈當有異耶？「須菩提！於意云何」下，他云：此是第三遣於用利。波若能斷假實二惑、得假實二解，故是波若之用。今此中明假實兩境皆空，豈有兩惑可斷、二解能斷？故是遣其用利也。他就此中為二：初明依果空，次「身相」下，明正果空。初中又兩：一者、舉微塵明實法空；二者、舉世界辨假名空也。今依論第二釋成格量優劣所以。時眾疑：何故持經小而福多、布施多而福少耶？故今釋云：布施雖多，是煩惱塵染因，還得顛倒生死果。譬如大千世界微塵雖多，還成世界塵土之果。明四句雖小，此是不顛倒因，還得不顛倒果，故持經雖少而得福多，布施雖多而福小也。文云「諸微塵」者，明微塵有兩種：一者、塵染之塵；二者、成世界無記之塵。以兩塵相濫，故今簡之。「諸微塵」者，是成地微塵也。「非微塵」者，非塵染微塵也。「是名微塵」者，結是成地微塵也。「如來說世界」下，前明因，今辨果，如文。次舉三十二相者，他云：前明依果空，今明正果空，依果空中有假實，今正果空有問答。今明前云不可以身相見如來，已明正果空，此中何因緣復明耶？故不同常說。依論猶是釋成上格量意，明何但布施塵染之福不及持經，只相好之業亦不及持經。又持經之福尚勝相好之業，豈不勝布施耶？故有此文來。此中直明二果優劣，即顯二因優劣也。何者？法身之果勝相好之果，顯法身因勝相好因，以持經是法身法，故持經福勝相好業也。「於意云何？可以身相見如來不」者，可以相好身見法身以不？作此問也。「須菩提答云：不可以身相見如來」者，不可以相好見法身也。「如來所說身相則非身相」者，此明所說身相非法身也。「是名身相」，是相好身也。「須菩提！以恒河沙身命」下，第二、明內施格量。上外施格量中有二：初、捨三千世界七寶；次捨恒沙世界七寶。今內施格量中亦二：初、捨恒沙身命，次、舉日三時捨恒沙身命布施。今初。所以有此文來者，上明外施格量，此未足稱易；今捨內身命，方乃為重也。又上明外施是下施格量，今明內施是中施格量。何以知之？《大論》呵迦旃延以內施為上，若是財施此明名下施，內施名中施。若無依無得施方是上施，汝何得以中為上耶？故知內施是中施。故從下施格，次至中施格也。此文為二：初、正明格；第二、領解釋疑。初復為二：初、正明捨恒沙身；第二、正格。今初。云「捨恒沙身」者，今生捨一身命施，次生復捨一身命布施，如是捨恒沙身命布施也。就受施中具有三句：一、須身不須命，如止須食肉；二、須命不須身，如怨家止欲得命；三、身命俱須，通上二句也。「若復有人」下，第二、正格量。然持說俱得功德，如文。

From “By what name should this sūtra be known?” downward: according to Kaishan, from the beginning up to this point has all been explaining the essence of prajñā; this section clarifies the name of prajñā, which is explaining the name. Now we clarify that although explaining the name and explaining the essence is not without this meaning, this text still belongs to the section on comparative evaluation. Within the preceding comparative evaluation, it opens into two distinctions: first, directly adducing the two kinds of material dāna for comparative evaluation and praise; second, distinguishing the name of the sūtra. Why the sūtra is distinguished: above, the two dānas were adduced for comparative evaluation and praise, [showing that] where the sūtra is present, the place is noble, and in whom it abides, the person is venerable. When the assembly heard that the sūtra possessed such supreme virtues, all wished to uphold it, but they did not yet know its name; therefore, its name is distinguished here. As for the text, it has two parts: first, the question; second, the answer. In the question there are two: first, asking about the sūtra's name; second, asking about upholding it. From “The Buddha told Subhūti: This sūtra is named the Vajraprajñā” downward is second, answering the sūtra's name. The preceding question had two parts: first, asking about the sūtra's name; second, asking about upholding it. Now both questions are fully answered, opening into two distinctions: first, directly answering the two questions; second, explaining the intent of answering the questions. Now, first, answering the two questions has two parts: first, answering the name; second, answering about upholding. Now first, the answer. Regarding “named the Vajraprajñā”: prajñā is never dharma nor metaphor; being neither metaphor nor non-metaphor, a metaphorical name is provisionally assumed; being neither dharma nor non-dharma, a dharmic name is forcibly made; being neither name nor non-name, a name is forcibly established; it is merely named the Vajraprajñā. From “With this name” downward is second, answering the question about upholding the sūtra. From “Why is this?” downward is second, explaining the intent of answering the questions. Others say: in answering the name there are three sections: first, indicating the name vajra, which distinguishes the meaning of hardness and sharpness; second, negating the hardness of its essence; third, negating the sharpness of its function. Above, answering the name completed the indication of the meaning of hardness and sharpness; from this point downward is negating the hardness of its essence. Within negating the hardness of the essence there are two sentences: first, clarifying that the prajñā spoken by the Buddha is immediately not prajñā, which clarifies the cessation of mental activity; below, that the Tathāgata has nothing spoken, which clarifies the transcendence of speech. Now we ask: above, [the statement that it is] ungraspable and unspeakable has already clarified that mental activity is severed and speech is transcended; due to what cause and condition are transcendence and cessation clarified once again? Now, relying on the treatise, we judge these two sentences: the first sentence clarifies that there is a difference with what is below; the next sentence clarifies that there is an identity with what is above. Question: Why clarify a difference with what is below and an identity with what is above? Answer: If it were identical below with the two vehicles and different above from the Buddhas, then prajñā would not be worthy of reverence and upholding. It is precisely because it is different below from the two vehicles and identical above with the Buddhas that it is worthy of reverence. With the intention of encouraging beings, this explanation is made. That there is a difference with what is below: above, this sūtra was designated with the name vajra, but the wisdom of the two vehicles that severs afflictions is also named vajra; it was not known, regarding this sūtra being named vajra, what kind of vajra it is. Therefore it is explained that the prajñā spoken by the Buddha is the Buddha's prajñā, the Buddha's vajra. That it is “not prajñā” means that it is not the wisdom of the two vehicles, not the vajra of the two vehicles. From “Subhūti! What do you think?” downward, others say that previously the cessation of mental activity was clarified, and now the transcendence of speech is distinguished. Now, relying on the treatise's meaning, this is not so: the preceding text clarified that there is a difference with what is below, and this sentence clarifies that there is an identity with what is above. The assembly at the time doubted: Does only Śākyamuni speak this prajñā, or do the other Buddhas also speak it? Therefore the Buddha took up the doubt of the assembly at the time and asked Subhūti whether the Tathāgata has anything spoken. The intent of this question was to clarify: Does Śākyamuni alone have this exposition, while other Buddhas do not make this exposition? That “Subhūti said: The Tathāgata has nothing spoken” clarifies that Śākyamuni has no distinct exposition; he is still identical with what is spoken by the Buddhas of the ten directions and the three periods of time, and apart from what is spoken by the Buddhas of the three periods of time, he has no distinct exposition. Therefore the “Chapter on Non-arising” in the Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā says: “When this prajñā was spoken, a thousand Buddhas in each of the ten directions manifested, all speaking this Prajñā Sūtra, and those who raised difficult questions were all named Śakra Devānām Indra, while those who explained prajñā were all named Subhūti. The Lord of the Devas further asked: Do only the present Buddhas of the ten directions make this exposition, or will future Buddhas also make this exposition? The Buddha answered: The future Maitreya will also speak thus.” Hence we know that the Buddhas of the ten directions and the three periods of time all make this exposition. Because the Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā is extensive, it clarifies the identity extensively; because the present text is concise, it clarifies the identity concisely. The reason they are identical is to clarify that prajñā is just one correct contemplation; how could the correct path ever differ? From “Subhūti! What do you think?” downward, others say: this is the third, negating the sharpness of its function. Prajñā can sever the two afflictions of the conventional and the real, and attain the two understandings of the conventional and the real; hence it is the function of prajñā. Now, here it clarifies that both the conventional and real realms are empty; how could there be two afflictions to be severed or two understandings capable of severing? Therefore it is negating the sharpness of its function. Others divide this into two: first, clarifying the emptiness of the dependent fruition; next, from “bodily marks” downward, clarifying the emptiness of the direct fruition. Within the first there are again two: first, adducing motes of dust to clarify the emptiness of real dharmas; second, adducing worlds to distinguish the emptiness of nominal conventions. Now, relying on the treatise, this is second: explaining the reason for the superiority and inferiority in the comparative evaluation. The assembly at the time doubted: Why is it that upholding the sūtra is little yet the blessing is great, while dāna is great yet the blessing is little? Therefore it is now explained: although dāna is great, it is a cause defiled by the dust of afflictions, which in turn obtains the inverted fruition of saṃsāra. For instance, although the motes of dust in the great trichiliocosm are numerous, they still form the fruition of the dust and dirt of the worlds. It clarifies that although four lines are small, this is an un-inverted cause, which in turn obtains an un-inverted fruition; hence, although upholding the sūtra is little, the blessing obtained is great, and although dāna is great, the blessing is small. As for the text saying “all motes of dust”, it clarifies that motes of dust are of two kinds: first, dust that is defilement; second, morally indeterminate dust that forms worlds. Because the two kinds of dust may be confused, they are now distinguished. “All motes of dust” are the motes of dust that form the earth. “Are not motes of dust” means they are not motes of dust of defilement. “Are called motes of dust” concludes that they are motes of dust that form the earth. From “The Tathāgata speaks of worlds” downward, previously the cause was clarified, and now the fruition is distinguished, as in the text. Next, adducing the thirty-two marks: others say that previously the emptiness of the dependent fruition was clarified, and now the emptiness of the direct fruition is clarified; within the emptiness of the dependent fruition there are the conventional and the real, and now the emptiness of the direct fruition has questions and answers. Now we clarify: previously, stating that the Tathāgata cannot be seen by bodily marks already clarified the emptiness of the direct fruition; due to what cause and condition is it clarified again here? Hence it is not like the ordinary explanation. Relying on the treatise, it still explains the intent of the preceding comparative evaluation, clarifying that not only is the blessing of defiled dāna inferior to upholding the sūtra, but even the karma of the marks and characteristics is also inferior to upholding the sūtra. Furthermore, since the blessing of upholding the sūtra surpasses even the karma of the marks and characteristics, how could it not surpass dāna? Therefore this text comes. Here it directly clarifies the superiority and inferiority of the two fruitions, thereby revealing the superiority and inferiority of the two causes. How so? The fruition of the dharmakāya surpasses the fruition of the marks and characteristics, revealing that the cause of the dharmakāya surpasses the cause of the marks and characteristics; because upholding the sūtra is the dharma of the dharmakāya, the blessing of upholding the sūtra surpasses the karma of the marks and characteristics. “What do you think? Can the Tathāgata be seen by bodily marks or not?” asks: Can the dharmakāya be seen by the body of marks and characteristics, or not? Such is the question asked. That “Subhūti answered: The Tathāgata cannot be seen by bodily marks” means that the dharmakāya cannot be seen by the marks and characteristics. “The bodily marks spoken of by the Tathāgata are not bodily marks” clarifies that the bodily marks spoken of are not the dharmakāya. “Are called bodily marks” means the body of marks and characteristics. From “Subhūti! If with bodies and lives as numerous as the sands of the Ganges” downward is second, clarifying the comparative evaluation of internal dāna. In the preceding comparative evaluation of external dāna there were two parts: first, renouncing the seven treasures of three thousand worlds; next, renouncing the seven treasures of worlds as numerous as the sands of the Ganges. Now, in the comparative evaluation of internal dāna there are also two parts: first, renouncing bodies and lives as numerous as the sands of the Ganges; next, adducing the renunciation of bodies and lives as numerous as the sands of the Ganges three times a day in dāna. Now the first. The reason this text comes: above, the comparative evaluation of external dāna was clarified, but this is not yet worthy of being called difficult; now, renouncing one's internal body and life is what is truly weighty. Furthermore, above, external dāna was clarified as a comparative evaluation of inferior dāna; now, internal dāna is clarified as a comparative evaluation of middling dāna. How is this known? The Mahāprajñāpāramitopadeśa rebuked Kātyāyana for taking internal dāna to be superior: if it is material dāna, this is clearly named inferior dāna, while internal dāna is named middling dāna. Only dāna without reliance and without apprehension is superior dāna; how could you take the middling to be superior? Hence we know that internal dāna is middling dāna. Therefore, from evaluating inferior dāna, it proceeds next to evaluating middling dāna. This text has two parts: first, directly clarifying the evaluation; second, understanding the explanation and resolving doubts. The first again has two parts: first, directly clarifying the renunciation of bodies as numerous as the sands of the Ganges; second, the direct evaluation. Now the first. Stating “renouncing bodies as numerous as the sands of the Ganges” means renouncing one body and life in dāna in this life, again renouncing one body and life in dāna in the next life, thus renouncing bodies and lives as numerous as the sands of the Ganges in dāna. Regarding the recipients of dāna, there are three alternatives: first, needing the body but not needing the life, such as merely needing to eat flesh; second, needing the life but not needing the body, such as an enemy merely desiring to take a life; third, needing both body and life, which encompasses the preceding two alternatives. From “If, moreover, there is a person” downward is second, directly evaluating. Indeed, both upholding and explaining obtain merit, as in the text.