金剛般若疏 4.2

From "At that time Subhūti, having heard this sūtra expounded" below is the second [section]: expressing understanding and resolving doubts. The text has two parts: first, expressing understanding; next, resolving doubts. Within expressing understanding there are two parts: first, expressing understanding; second, the Buddha's approval and confirmation. The first part, expressing understanding, has four sections: first, expressing one's own understanding; second, clarifying the understanding of others; third, explaining that one's own understanding is easy; fourth, explaining that others' understanding is difficult. The first part, expressing understanding, further has two parts: first, the compiler of the sūtra prefaces the outward marks of his awakening and understanding; second, directly clarifying the expression of understanding. The initial preface of the outward marks has four aspects: first, identifying the person who expresses understanding; second, clarifying the Dharma that is understood; third, directly clarifying the expression of understanding; fourth, the outward marks of the expression of understanding. Question: Upon attaining understanding, one should rejoice; why then does he weep in sorrow? Answer: The outward marks of expressing understanding differ; there are generally three alternatives: first, attaining understanding with joy, as in the Lotus Sūtra where Śāriputra leaps up in great joy; second, attaining understanding with weeping, as in this text; third, attaining understanding with both joy and weeping, as with King Good Assembly whose joy and sorrow intermingled: joy means rejoicing in present awakening, sorrow means lamenting past delusion—combining both matters of sorrow and joy. From "Rare, World-Honoured One" below is the second [part], clarifying the attainment of understanding. Regarding "from the past until now, with the wisdom eye I have attained, I have never before heard [such a sūtra]": from ancient times, explanations of the sequence of the sūtras have differed. One master says: this sūtra was preached at the beginning of the Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā Sūtra, taking this passage as proof; since it says he had never before heard prajñā, we know it came before. A second master says: this sūtra was preached after the Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā Sūtra. If it was after the Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā Sūtra, how could Subhūti say that from the past until now he had never before heard it? His explanation says: previously, in the Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā Sūtra, although Subhūti had already awakened, people of middling and lower faculties had not awakened; now he identifies with their non-awakening, and thus says he had never before heard it; people of middling and lower faculties attain awakening now, so he identifies with their attaining awakening, and thus says he only now gets to hear it. This matter has already been clarified previously. Now we open another perspective: above, after the external giving was evaluated and compared, the Tathāgata personally praised the sūtra and exhorted beings to accept and uphold it; now, after the internal giving is evaluated and compared, Subhūti personally praises the sūtra and exhorted beings to accept and uphold it; therefore master and disciple mutually alternate textually to exhort conditions [for beings] to have faith and awaken. From "If, moreover, there is a person who gets to hear this sūtra" below is the second [section]: stating the attainment of understanding by others. Regarding "then gives birth to dharmatā": others say that the conventional truth is produced, while the ultimate truth is unproduced; one then asks: dharmatā is precisely the ultimate truth—since it gives birth to dharmatā, why would it not give birth to the ultimate truth? Their explanation says: it is merely giving birth to the wisdom of dharmatā. Dharmatā cannot be produced, but wisdom takes its name from its object and is called true wisdom; the object takes its name from wisdom, so producing wisdom is spoken of as producing the object. We now clarify that both of the two truths are both produced and unproduced, as explained in the theoretical analysis; this passage is precisely the proof. However, one master holds the doctrine of contemplation evoking the middle and the middle evoking contemplation: this clarifies that giving birth to dharmatā is contemplation evoking the middle; when correct contemplation is clear, then dharmatā appears before one, hence it is named "giving birth to dharmatā". This is discussed in terms of delusion and awakening: for the deluded it does not appear before them, which is called dharmatā not being produced; for the awakened it appears before them, which is called giving birth to dharmatā. Making dharmatā arise being like this, Buddha-nature and the like follow the same pattern; reaching the ultimate discourse, dharmatā has never been produced nor unproduced. Regarding "this dharmatā is then not dharmatā": others again explain this text by means of the two truths, as is routinely critiqued. We now explain, relying on the treatise, to differentiate and establish the meaning of dharmatā: "is dharmatā" means that exclusively the Buddha-Dharma's Mahāyāna possesses this dharmatā, hence it is called dharmatā. "Is then not dharmatā" means that heavenly māras and non-Buddhists lack dharmatā, hence it is called non-dharmatā. Regarding "is named dharmatā": the treatise sūtra has an extra phrase saying "dharmatā, dharmatā"; this phrase differentiates the two kinds of dharmatā of the two vehicles: first, Mahāyāna dharmatā; second, Hīnayāna dharmatā. We now clarify that it is Mahāyāna dharmatā, not the dharmatā of the two vehicles, hence it says "dharmatā, dharmatā". The preceding phrase differentiates the external dharmatā; this phrase differentiates the internal dharmatā. The reason for these two differentiations is that because exclusively the Buddha-Dharma has dharmatā, and exclusively the Mahāyāna has the wisdom that gives birth to dharmatā, it is truly rare. From "World-Honoured One, I now get to hear" below is the third [section]: stating that his own awakening was easy. The reasons it was easy: first, it clarifies that in the past he had long planted the three abundancies; second, in the present he personally met the Buddha; with internal causes and external conditions complete, his believing and accepting was easy. Furthermore, discussed from the trace, Subhūti is a great arhat, as the Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā Sūtra says: "Prajñā is extremely profound; who can believe and understand it? The answer says: persons who have accomplished right view, arhats who have exhausted outflows, are able to believe." Now Subhūti is already an arhat, so believing and understanding was not difficult. If discussed in terms of the fundamental, Subhūti inwardly conceals the bodhisattva practice, or perhaps was a Tathāgata of antiquity who manifested as identical to deluded beings, which is why awakening and understanding was easy. From "If in a future era" below is the fourth [section]: stating that others' awakening is difficult. The reason it is difficult is truly due to being born in the latter age, in the final five hundred years. Dharma Master Rui said: "In the first five hundred years, those who attain the Way are many, and those who do not attain the Way are few; in the latter five hundred years, those who do not attain the Way are many, and those who attain the Way are few. In the first five hundred years, those who have faith in non-arising are many, and those who do not have faith are few; in the latter five hundred years, those who do not have faith are many, and those who have faith are few. Therefore, the first five hundred years are called the true Dharma, and the latter five hundred years are called the semblance Dharma." Being able to have faith within the semblance Dharma is the reason it is difficult. Furthermore, it clarifies that sentient beings at this time have not long planted the three abundancies and have not long met the Buddha, lacking internal causes and external conditions; that they can generate faith within this is therefore difficult. From "Why is this?" below, this explains the sense in which faith is difficult. If one says there is a person who can believe and prajñā that is believed in, this is the view of persons and dharmas, and is not named faith; such faith is also not difficult. It clarifies that if one does not see oneself as the believer, this is the emptiness of persons, which is the absence of any view of a person; not seeing prajñā as that which is believed in is the emptiness of dharmas, which is the absence of any view of dharmas. Regarding "Why is this? The mark of a self is then non-mark": the reason one does not grasp the mark of a self and so forth is not that there exists a mark of a self and therefore one does not grasp it; rather, because there is truly no self, there is nothing to grasp, hence it says "the mark of a self is then non-mark." Furthermore, in principle, if there truly existed the mark of a self or a person, it could not be departed from; because in principle there is truly no mark of a self or a person, and sentient beings merely falsely take them to exist, the mark of a self can be departed from, hence it says "the mark of a self is then non-mark."

The Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā Sūtra says: 'If what sentient beings attach to had even the size of the tip of a fine hair of real existence, it could not be relinquished; it is because the locus of attachment lacks even as much existence as a tip of hair that it can be relinquished.' Others say: 'The so-called self-view is non-existent, but the mind capable of predicating it is existent; this is not non-existent. Just as the so-called mirage is non-existent, but the mind capable of predicating it is existent.' We now explain that the mind capable of predicating it is not different from what is predicated. If one relies on the treatise to explain it, this clarifies the twofold emptiness of persons and dharmas. Previously, [the sūtra] said there is no lakṣaṇa of a self or a person; this is the emptiness of persons. Now it says that the lakṣaṇa of a self is immediately a non-lakṣaṇa; this clarifies the emptiness of dharmas. Question: If you say this clarifies the emptiness of dharmas, it should say that the lakṣaṇa of dharmas is immediately a non-dharmic lakṣaṇa; why does it say that the lakṣaṇa of a self is immediately a non-lakṣaṇa? Answer: Non-self is of two kinds: first, the non-self of persons; second, the non-self of dharmas. Here it is the non-self of dharmas. As for 'Why? One who is free from all lakṣaṇas is called the Buddhas': this explains again the reason for non-lakṣaṇa. If there were lakṣaṇas, the Buddhas would perceive them; because being free from all lakṣaṇas is what is called the Buddhas, one knows that dharmas lack these lakṣaṇas. Question: Why is the Buddha free from all lakṣaṇas? Answer: Having all lakṣaṇas is apprehension; lacking all lakṣaṇas is non-apprehension. Because of apprehension, one is an ordinary person in saṃsāra; non-apprehension is named nirvāṇa and named the Buddhas. From 'The Buddha told Subhūti' onward is the second [part], the Buddha's endorsement. In the preceding expression of understanding there were four sections; here he endorses only the fourth, setting forth the difficulty of others' awakening. This explains that since beginningless time, the habituation to apprehension has been prolonged, and formerly they received the Hīnayāna teachings of apprehension; suddenly hearing that prajñā has no person and no dharmas, they mostly give rise to fear and dread. Therefore, it is now explained that being able not to fear or dread is what is difficult. As for the words 'not alarmed and not terrified': being startled and dazed at first glance is called 'alarmed'; having an inner mind of timidity is called 'afraid'; intensely loathing what is before one throughout is called 'terrified'. As for 'The Tathāgata speaks of the foremost pāramitā': others say that prajñā is the foremost among the six pāramitās, hence it is called foremost; 'is not the foremost' means the ultimate truth dispels the foremost; 'is called foremost' means it is called foremost by conventional designation in the conventional truth. Relying on the treatise's explanation, this single sūtra of prajñā surpasses the other sūtras, therefore this sūtra is named the foremost pāramitā; 'is not the foremost pāramitā' means the other sūtras are not the foremost; 'is called foremost' concludes again that this sūtra is the foremost. As for why this text appears, it has two senses, near and far: the near one accomplishes the above statement about rarity, because this sūtra is foremost, only having faith in this sūtra is rare. If this sūtra were not foremost, having faith in it would not suffice to be called rare. What accomplishes the above in the far sense is that the aforementioned internal and external dānas do not equal upholding a four-line verse of this sūtra, because this sūtra is the foremost dharma among all sūtras. From 'Subhūti! Forbearance' onward is the second [part], resolving doubts and thoughts. Question: For what reason is forbearance explained next to prajñā? According to the enumeration of the six pāramitās, the before and after are not in sequence; by what sequence does this text arise now? Answer: Master Kaishan explained: prajñā is taught through three gates. Previously, it was fully explained in terms of the two gates of essence and name; now it is explained next in terms of the third gate of functional efficacy, clarifying that the functional efficacy of prajñā is inexhaustible: it can give birth to the Buddhas, it can manifest in the world, and it can sever afflictions. Moreover, the functions of gathering, guiding, and forgetting functions are not single; now this clarifies the function of forbearance in forgetting mental attachment, because by obtaining this function, when encountering suffering one does not grieve, and when meeting with joy one is not glad. Its efficacy is paramount, so it is specifically explained. Another explanation says: forbearance and prajñā are both wisdom, having the same essence as wisdom, so they are explained together. We now explain that the unconstrained intention does not conflict with this meaning; but if we follow the treatise's intention, it comes to resolve doubts. The reason the assembly had doubts stems distantly from the preceding comparison with relinquishing bodily life: above it said that relinquishing one's body in dāna does not equal upholding a four-line verse of the sūtra. The reason it does not equal it is that relinquishing the body is a cause of inverted suffering with apprehension, which still yields a suffering fruition with apprehension; therefore it does not equal upholding the sūtra. The assembly immediately doubted: the Buddha's various ascetic practices of the past must also have been inverted causes and should have yielded inverted fruitions, failing to attain bodhi. Therefore it is now resolved by saying: when the Buddha practiced austerities in the past, this was a mind of forbearance of the non-arising of dharmas; although he relinquished his body, he was not afflicted with suffering; not only was there no suffering, but there was even further joy. Hence the treatise's verse says: 'In suffering and joy there is compassion; such is the fruition of ascetic practice.' Because he cultivated forbearance of non-apprehension, he attained bodhi; thus it says 'The Tathāgata speaks of the pāramitā of forbearance.' 'Is not forbearance' means it is not the forbearance of relinquishing the body with apprehension. Furthermore, 'is not forbearance' means this forbearance of non-apprehension cannot be measured; hence the treatise says, 'The shore of that forbearance is difficult to measure.' As for 'Why? At that time I had no lakṣaṇa of a self': this comes about for two reasons. First, an explanation in reverse of the meaning of having no anger: if there were a lakṣaṇa of a self, one should give rise to anger; because there is no lakṣaṇa of a self, whom would it cause to be angry, and who would be angry? Second, clarifying the meaning of having no forbearance: that is, neither forbearing nor being angry is the pāramitā of forbearance. If there were a person capable of forbearing, then anger should arise; now when one does not even see a person capable of forbearing, on what basis could there be an other who gives rise to anger? This is an explanation by leaping over intermediate stages. As for 'King Kali': it cites an event to prove the causes and conditions. King Kali was the former birth of Kauṇḍinya; formerly he harmed the sage, and the sage made a vow: 'You now harm me without guilt; when I attain the Way, I will certainly cross you over first.' As it appears in the text of the *Vibhāṣā*. From 'Therefore, Subhūti, a bodhisattva should be free from all lakṣaṇas' onward: the reason this text appears is to accomplish the preceding meaning of forbearance. When newly resolved bodhisattvas hear of cultivating forbearance across lifetimes to attain bodhi, since they perceive body and mind, they might give rise to regression, just as Śāriputra practiced the bodhisattva path for sixty kalpas and subsequently regressed to become a śrāvaka because of relinquishing his eyes. Therefore, it now exhorts: those who wish not to regress from bodhicitta should be free from all lakṣaṇas and generate the mind of sambodhi. Question: From above, non-abiding has been explained in three places; what is the difference? The explanation says: the first non-abiding is to accomplish the meaning of the pāramitā of dāna, exhorting the practice of dāna without apprehension. The next non-abiding is to accomplish the meaning of the cause of a pure land: if the mind has an abode, the mind has defilement; because the mind is defiled, the land is defiled. Because the mind has nowhere to abide, the mind is pure; because the mind is pure, the land is pure. Now non-abiding is explained to accomplish bodhicitta, exhorting the generation of the mind without abiding.

If the mind has an abiding, it deviates from the correct path—how could it be the mind directed to the path? Bodhi is the correct path; here, arousing the mind directed to the path is precisely called "bodhicitta." As for "if the mind has an abiding, that is non-abiding": if the mind has an abiding, it abides in inversion, which is non-abiding—it does not abide in prajñā. As the Great Sūtra states: "Not abiding in any dharma is abiding in prajñā; not placing faith in any dharma is called having faith in prajñā." The meaning regarding arousing [the mind] is also like this. Below, from "Therefore, the Buddha says that the bodhisattva's mind should not abide...", earlier he explained exhorting the arousal of bodhicitta without abiding, and now he exhorts practicing the bodhisattva deeds without abiding, like the words of Sudhana. Question: At the beginning of the sūtra, arousing the mind and practicing were already explained; why is it explained again here? Answer: Earlier, establishing the four minds, such as the vast mind, was called arousing the mind, and practice was explained in terms of the meaning of non-abiding; now, here, it generally draws on non-abiding to explain both arousing the mind and practicing together. Thus, earlier they were explained separately, whereas now they are distinguished together. As for only mentioning dāna: dāna stands at the head of the six pāramitās, and furthermore, the meaning of dāna subsumes all six, as the verse of the treatise states. As for "Subhūti, a bodhisattva, to benefit all sentient beings...": since earlier he explained arousing the mind without abiding and practicing without abiding, people might say: since there is nothing to abide in, why arouse the mind? Why practice? It is immediately explained: for the sake of benefiting sentient beings, one arouses the mind and practices. Furthermore, only practice without abiding can truly benefit sentient beings; practice with abiding can benefit neither oneself nor others. Below, from "The Tathāgata says that all lakṣaṇas...", this is to accomplish the aforementioned practice and [benefiting] sentient beings. When one speaks of practice, there would be practice to be cultivated; when one speaks of benefiting sentient beings, there would be sentient beings to be benefited—which would simply be the views of persons and dharmas. Therefore, it is now explained that what the Tathāgata speaks of as all lakṣaṇas are precisely not all lakṣaṇas; thus, though one cultivates the myriad practices, there is no practice to be cultivated; though one benefits sentient beings, there are in truth no sentient beings to be benefited. Furthermore, it cites the Buddha's true words to exhort the bodhisattva to practice as spoken. The Buddha said that sentient beings and dharmas are both unapprehendable; the bodhisattva must also train in this way. Below, from "Subhūti, the Tathāgata speaks truth...", this text has both a proximate and a distant purpose. The distant intention is to accomplish the meaning of the comparative evaluation of the two kinds of giving, internal and external, discussed earlier. How so? Earlier it was explained that although one gives away both internal and external gifts, in the end it does not equal upholding four lines of this sūtra. Hearing this, people harboured doubts: "The dharmatā of all dharmas is beyond words; how could names, words, and sentences express dharmatā, such that upholding four lines suddenly brings such merit?" Therefore, it is now explained: although dharmatā is beyond words, words are the cause for wordlessness; because of words, one can express wordlessness; therefore, the merit of upholding these words is immeasurable. Question: This explains how words can express the path; how is it an explanation of the passage on the five types of speech? Answer: Because words can certainly express the path, the Buddha's words are true; because they can express the path, the merit of upholding them is great. As for the proximate intention: above, it cited the Buddha's words that "all lakṣaṇas are precisely non-lakṣaṇas" and that "all sentient beings are precisely non-sentient-beings," exhorting the bodhisattva to practice as spoken; now, it re-explains why one must believe what the Buddha says, which is precisely because the Buddha's words are not false. "Speaker of truth" (bhūtavādin) means speaking in accord with the ultimate truth. "Speaker of the real" (satyavādin) means speaking in accord with the conventional truth. The reason two kinds of speech are cited is that the Tathāgata always preaches the Dharma based on the two truths. "Speaker of thusness" (tathāvādin) means that, like the Buddhas of the ten directions and the three times who preach the Dharma based on the two truths, this accords with the Buddhas above. "Speaker of non-deception" means that the Buddha does not deceive sentient beings, as the Great Sūtra says: "For what reason would I deceive those I regard as my children and cause them to fall into hell?" "Speaker of non-difference" comes in order to resolve doubts. People doubt: "If he does not deceive sentient beings, how is it that a single Buddha gives various different teachings—first the three [vehicles] and later the one [vehicle], or even permanence now and impermanence formerly?" Therefore, it is explained: although there are various teachings, they serve to accomplish the single path, and are therefore not different. As the sūtra says: "The wise will never say that I have two kinds of speech; toward such people, neither do I speak doubly." The Lotus Sūtra says: "Though I preach various vehicles, they are all for the sake of the one vehicle." Next, according to the explanation of the treatise, there are only four kinds of speech; hence the verse says: "Real wisdom and the Hīnayāna, / preaching the Mahāyāna Dharma, / and prophesying matters of the three times— / these are called the four kinds of speech." "Real wisdom" is "speaking truth," referring to speaking of the Buddha's bodhi; "and the Hīnayāna" speaking of the four truths is "speaking the real." Preaching the Mahāyāna Dharma as bodhi is precisely "speaking of thusness." Prophesying matters of the three times combines the latter two into "speaking without difference." These four kinds of speech encompass Hīnayāna and Mahāyāna, principle and phenomena, cause and effect: speaking truth is the effect, and speaking of thusness is the cause; these two are Mahāyāna, while speaking the real is Hīnayāna; prophesying the three times is phenomena, and the [other] three speeches are principle. As for "Subhūti, the Dharma attained by the Tathāgata...": regarding why this passage appears, from the above down to here, there are three passages in all citing the Buddha's words to exhort faith: first, citing that the Tathāgata speaks of all lakṣaṇas as non-lakṣaṇas and speaks of all sentient beings as non-sentient-beings, which exhorts the bodhisattva to abandon the views of persons and dharmas and causes him to believe in the teaching of non-abiding. Next, citing the five speeches proves that the Buddha's words are not false, exhorting the bodhisattva to believe the teaching of non-abiding spoken by the Buddha. Now, the third cites the Dharma realized and attained by the Buddha, again exhorting faith in the teaching of non-abiding; because the Buddha personally relied on the teaching of non-abiding to realize and attain bodhi, the bodhisattva must believe in the doctrine of non-abiding. In the treatise text, there is an extra phrase: "the Dharma attained by the Tathāgata, the Dharma spoken by the Tathāgata." "The Dharma attained by the Tathāgata" has already been explained as above. As for "what the Tathāgata speaks is neither real nor false": above, he exhorted faith in words three times, but fearing that those of dull faculties would grasp at words and abide in them, he now explains that the Buddha's words are neither real nor false. Because the correct path is beyond words, if one grasps at words one loses the path, so words are not real; yet it is not that words do not express the path, so words are not false; the analogy of pointing to the moon is precisely this matter. This runs through the intention of his entire lifetime of teaching; how could it be confined to a single chapter of the sūtra? Below, from "Subhūti, just as a person entering darkness...", according to Bodhiruci's twelve sections, the preceding section on comparative evaluation is finished, and this is now the section on revealing the nature. I now critique this in three ways: First, the section on revealing the nature has no textual basis in the sūtra or treatise; therefore it is not used. Second, if one determines the section on revealing the nature by taking dāna to clarify gain and loss, the earlier explanation of cultivating the practice of patience should also be a section. Third, within the internal and external comparative evaluations, there are two comparisons in each; now, within the internal comparison, only one chapter is finished, and one comparative evaluation still remains; how could one combine and take the latter comparative evaluation as the section on revealing the nature?

Now it is explained that this text comes forward due to two intentions: First, proximate: from above up to this point, there are altogether three places exhorting the cultivation of non-abiding and the abandoning of the meaning of abiding; not knowing what fault abiding has and what gain non-abiding has, why are we exhorted to cultivate non-abiding and abandon abiding? Therefore, here at the end, their gains and faults are explained. If the mind has apprehension, it is like having no light outside and having darkness inside, and thus one does not see the correct path; if the mind has nothing upon which it abides, it is like having light outside and having eyes inside, being able to see the correct path. Because of these gains and faults, there are the three exhortations above. Relying on the teaching of non-abiding is like having light outside; attaining the contemplative understanding of having nothing upon which to abide is like having eyes inside; such a person sees the correct path. The fault of having an abiding can be understood by reversing this. According to the treatise's origination, it says: "Tathatā is in all places and at all times constantly present"; why is it that sentient beings sometimes attain tathatā and sometimes do not attain tathatā? The treatise master says: "Tathatā is precisely buddha-nature; all sentient beings, ordinary and noble, possess buddha-nature; why do the noble see it while the ordinary do not see it?" It is then explained using the sūtra text. Although a form is constantly present, if there is light outside and eyes inside, it is seen; without these inside and outside, it is not seen. Although there is constantly tathatā and buddha-nature, if the mind has nothing upon which it abides, it is seen; if it has an abiding, it is not seen. The words revealing the nature find their substance in this. Now it is explained that taking this meaning also does not err regarding the doctrine. The Mahāprajñāpāramitopadeśa says: "It is called either tathatā, or dharmatā, dharmadhātu, or nirvāṇa." It is only with reference to sentient beings' awakening and delusion that there are attainment and non-attainment; coming to the ultimate discourse on buddha-nature and nirvāṇa, there has never been any gain or loss, concealment or manifestation. Question: The treatise specifically explains seeing tathatā and not seeing tathatā, which seems to lack sequence, making this text arise in isolation. Answer: This text directly follows from the preceding gains and faults of dāna; therefore, dāna with abiding does not see tathatā, while dāna without abiding directly sees tathatā, so it does not lack sequence. It is only that commentators on the treatise do not see its proximate [connection], and thus say it arises in isolation as the section revealing the nature. Although sūtra lecturers see the gains and faults of the two dānas in the proximate text, they fail to see that from the gains and faults of dāna, it distantly clarifies that all possess buddha-nature, and that because of having upāya or lacking upāya, there is the difference of seeing or not seeing. If one takes both the proximate and distant meanings, then both sūtra and treatise are fulfilled. From "Subhūti! If in future times" onward: that this single section comes forward also fulfills the preceding meaning of abandoning the fault and following the gain. If a bodhisattva abandons the fault and follows the gain, they must accept, uphold, read, and recite prajñā. Question: In the section on faith and acceptance, it has already been explained that if one produces a single thought of pure faith, one is known and seen by the Buddha's wisdom and attains immeasurable merit; why is it now restated that one is known and seen by the Buddha's wisdom and attains immeasurable merit? Answer: In this Prajñā Sūtra, there are three gateways explaining merit: first, the gateway of one's own faith; second, the gateway of oneself accepting, upholding, reading, and reciting, and again explaining it for others; third, the gateway of solely oneself accepting, upholding, reading, and reciting. The initial explanation that a single thought of faith is known and seen by the Buddha's wisdom and attains immeasurable merit is the merit explained in the gateway of one's own faith. From the dāna of the three thousand [worlds' worth of] seven treasures up to the dāna of one's body and life [countless as] the sands of the Gaṅgā, this is the merit explained in the gateway of one's own practice and transforming others. Now, this section explains the merit of the gateway of one's own practice in accepting, upholding, reading, and reciting; therefore, it is not a restatement. These three gateways encompass all the explanations of merit in the Prajñā Sūtra. From "the initial part of the day" onward, is secondly the comparative assessment of the merit of relinquishing the body at the three times, which has two parts: first, explaining the comparative assessment; second, praising and exhorting cultivation. Within the comparative assessment there are two parts: first, directly adducing the relinquishing of the body; second, the comparative assessment. As for differing from the earlier relinquishing of the body, there are two meanings: first, the generosity is great, meaning relinquishing the body three times a day, which refers to the initial part of the day, the middle part of the day, and the latter part of the day, not taking three days as three parts. Second, the duration of time is long, meaning constantly practicing the matter of relinquishing the body for immeasurable thousands of myriads of koṭis of kalpas. Next, comparatively assessing prajñā, it directly explains that if one has faithful mind without opposition, one's blessing already surpasses that, so how much more so if one personally accepts, upholds, reads, recites, and explains it for others? This means the comparative assessment turns even higher and the blessing of prajñā becomes even weightier. Moreover, the reason this text comes forward is that in the preceding section on faith and acceptance, it only directly explained that faithful mind is known and seen by the Buddha and attains immeasurable merit, but had not yet comparatively assessed whether the merit of faithful mind is little or much; now, wishing to comparatively assess whether the merit of faithful mind is little or much, this text comes forward. Question: Why is it necessary to comparatively assess the merit of faithful mind? Answer: Since there are three gateways explaining merit, there are three gateways explaining comparative assessment. Above, the gateway of merit for one's own practice and transforming others has already been comparatively assessed in three places—namely, the three-thousand dāna, the Gaṅgā-sands dāna, and the relinquishing-body dāna, which are all the gateway of one's own practice and transforming others—but the gateway of faithful mind had not yet been comparatively assessed; therefore, it is now explained. Question: Why does the comparative assessment of the merit of the gateway of one's own faith surpass the aforementioned practice of one's own practice and transforming others? Answer: Since the merit of the gateway of one's own faith in the comparative assessment is already so great, that of one's own practice and transforming others is immeasurable; therefore, the present text says: "If with a faithful mind one does not oppose it, their blessing surpasses that; how much more so accepting, upholding, reading, reciting, and explaining it for others?" Thus, this text comes forward with a profound purport; those who wish to lecture and recite it should rely on this intention. From "Subhūti! In brief" onward is secondly praising and exhorting cultivation. The text is divided into four: first, praising the Dharma; second, praising the person; third, repeatedly praising the Dharma; fourth, repeatedly praising the person. Now, the first is praising the Dharma. After the previous comparative assessment was completed, there was praise; now that this comparative assessment is completed, there is also praise. From "The Tathāgata speaks this for those who set out in the Great Vehicle" onward is secondly praising the person. Question: What is the difference between the Great Vehicle and the Supreme Vehicle? Answer: Speaking generally, they are not different; these are various praises. Distinguishing them: "great" contains the meaning of broad and vast; "supreme" is taken in the sense of lofty and peerless, surpassing the two vehicles; "broad and vast" and so forth are precisely the meaning of attainment; surpassing the two vehicles is the meaning of departure. Furthermore, "great" is the meaning of its beginning, based on people of shallow practice; "supreme" is the meaning of its end, based on people of deep practice. As for "the Tathāgata fully knows these people": Question: Since knowing and seeing have already been explained above in two places, now that it is explained again, what is the difference? The explanation says: first was knowing and seeing the merit of one's own faith; next was knowing and seeing the merit of oneself accepting, upholding, reading, and reciting; now it is knowing and seeing the merit attained by accepting, upholding, and again explaining it for others; therefore, the three knowings and seeings are different. "If there are those who take delight in lesser dharmas": this explains adducing faults to reveal gains; in praising, two types of persons are adduced here. "Those who take delight in lesser dharmas" are the Hīnayāna. "Those attached to the view of self" are the non-Buddhists. These two persons are unable to listen and receive.

The reason persons of the Hģnayāna are unable to listen to and accept [this sţtra] is that, because they have apprehension, they do not believe in non-apprehension. Furthermore, this sţtra clarifies that the Tathāgata's dharmakāya is permanently abiding; persons of the Hģnayāna claim that the Buddha is impermanent and ultimately extinguished, and therefore they do not believe. Thus the Mahāprajñāpāramitopadeőa says: "In the five hundred years, when the five hundred sects heard the Mahāyāna teachings explaining ultimate emptiness, it was like a knife wounding their hearts." Master Sengrui's Yu yi lun states: "In foreign countries, all thirty-six states study the Hģnayāna and do not believe in the Mahāyāna." Question: The Hģnayāna also clarifies emptiness, and the Mahāyāna also clarifies emptiness; why do persons of the Hģnayāna not believe in the Mahāyāna? Answer: The Mahāprajñāpāramitopadeőa states: "There are two kinds of emptiness: first, mere emptiness; second, not-mere emptiness. The Hģnayāna only attains mere emptiness and does not attain not-mere emptiness." Since this sţtra clarifies not-mere emptiness, they do not believe in [this] emptiness. Furthermore, persons of the Hģnayāna only attain the emptiness of sentient beings and do not attain the emptiness of dharmas. The Mahāprajñāpāramitopadeőa states: "After the Buddha's extinction, they divided into two groups: first, those who believe in the emptiness of sentient beings but do not believe in the emptiness of dharmas; second, those who believe in both emptinesses together." Now this sţtra fully clarifies the twofold emptiness, so persons of the Hģnayāna do not believe it. That non-Buddhists cling to the view of self and do not believe is easily understood. Next, from "Subhţti, wherever this sţtra is" onwards, is the third part: reiterating praise of the Dharma. Question: How is this praise of the Dharma different from the initial one? Answer: The initial one directly praised the sţtra's Dharma, while this one praises the place where the Dharma resides; hence they are different. Question: Above, it already praised that wherever the sţtra resides, that place is precious, just like a stţpa or shrine; why now praise it again as being like a stţpa? Answer: The former was a brief praise, while this is an extensive praise. The former directly said "like a stţpa or shrine", so it was brief; now it says "various kinds of offerings", so it is extensive. The former briefly praised the person, while now it extensively praises the person; the former briefly praised the place, while now it extensively praises the place. Furthermore, the former praised that wherever the sţtra resides, the place is precious; now it praises that not only is the place where the sţtra resides precious, but the places where a person who upholds this sţtra walks, stands, sits, or lies down are all like stţpas and shrines, and all should be revered and made offerings to. As the Lotus Sţtra says: "In whichever direction the person who upholds the Lotus Sţtra resides, all should pay homage to them." The commentary's intention makes this explanation; do not disbelieve it. Next, from "Furthermore, Subhţti, if a good man or good woman upholds this sţtra and is despised by others" onwards, is the fourth part: reiterating praise of the person. Question: How is this praise of the person different from the former? Answer: Above, the praise was in terms of the gateway of attainment; now, it is in terms of the gateway of liberation. How is this known? The previous text said that upholding the sţtra attains boundless merit; now it says that upholding the sţtra brings liberation from evil destinies—this is precisely the vajra's ability to destroy all adversities and hardships. The next intention for its occurrence is to resolve doubts: from above onwards, it has consistently clarified the boundless merit of a person who upholds the sţtra; why then do we see persons who uphold the sţtra having various hindrances, namely illness, suffering official misfortune, and meeting with being beaten, reviled, and other unpleasant matters? In order to resolve this doubt, it clarifies that this person's sinful karma from past lives should have caused them to fall into the eight difficulties, but due to the power of upholding the sţtra, they experience it lightly in the present life. Next, from "I recall in the past" onwards, is the third part: citing Śākyamuni's past causes to make a comparative evaluation. The previous internal and external givings both cited the present life; now it clarifies past causes, evaluating the present life in terms of past lives. Previously it evaluated in terms of the merit of those who are transformed; now it evaluates in terms of the merit of the one who transforms—only evaluating like this reaches the utmost limit of comparative evaluation. Question: Why is it that the merits of both the transformer and the transformed are cited in comparative evaluation, yet neither equals upholding the sţtra? Answer: These are ultimately merits with apprehension, and do not equal upholding the sţtra. Question: How is it known that these are all comparative evaluations of merits with apprehension? Answer: Both the sţtra and treatise have proof. The treatise's explanation of the initial giving of three thousand worlds states: "Two are able to approach bodhi; merit does not approach bodhi." The "two" referred to are being able oneself to uphold it and also explaining it for others; these two can approach bodhi. The merit of giving has outflows; having apprehension, it cannot approach bodhi. As for proof from the sţtra, this takes [the time] before Dīpaṃkara Buddha: before that was with apprehension, so he had not yet attained non-arising; hence we know it takes giving with apprehension. Moreover, another intention for citing Śākyamuni's past causes to make a comparative evaluation is that merit is clarified through three gateways: above, it has already finished evaluating the merits of two gateways, but had not yet evaluated the merit of personally upholding, reading, and reciting; now, to praise and evaluate the merit of personally upholding, reading, and reciting, this passage appears. Question: In evaluating personal upholding, reading, and reciting, why does the merit become increasingly weighty? Answer: The blessing of personally upholding, reading, and reciting is already so weighty; how much more so when possessing both one's own practice and transforming others—how could it be measured? This is to reveal the weightiness of the merit, so it evaluates one's own practice. Lecturers and reciters must examine the sţtra closely; otherwise they will not realize this. Question: In clarifying merit through three gateways, how do the three gateways of comparative evaluation differ? It is answered: In the gateway of one's own practice and transforming others, the merit is itself the comparative evaluation—from the three thousand worlds to physical bodies and lives numerous as the sands of the Ganges, this is it. In the gateway of one's own faith and the gateway of one's own upholding, these two gateways first clarify the merit and afterwards make the comparative evaluation; hence the texts differ in being separate or combined. Question: How do the merits clarified through the three gateways differ? Answer: They are precisely the three grades. Merely generating faithful resolve is the lower grade; upholding, reading, and reciting without explaining for others is the middling grade; next, upholding and also explaining for others is the upper grade. Furthermore, the former two are one's own practice, while the latter one possesses both self and other.