金剛般若疏 4.2.2

4.2.2

《大品》云「眾生所著，若有一毫末之可有，則不可離，以所著處無如毛髮許有可離也。 」他云所謂之我見是無耳，能謂之心是有，此不無也。 如所謂陽炎是無，能謂之心是有。 今明能謂之心，如所謂不異也。 若依論釋者，此明人、法兩空。 前云無我人相，此是人空； 今云我相即是非相，此則明法空。 問：若言此明法空，應云法相即是非法相，何云我相即是非相耶？ 答：無我有二種：一者、人無我； 二、法無我。 今法無我也。 「何以故？ 離一切諸相則名諸佛」者，此重釋無相所以也。 若有諸相，佛應見之； 以離一切諸相名為諸佛故，則知諸法無此相也。 問：佛何故離一切相耶？ 答：有一切相則是有所得，無一切相則是無所得。 有所得故，是生死凡夫； 無所得名為涅槃，名為諸佛也。 「佛告須菩提」下，第二、佛述成。 前領解有四章，今但述第四、陳他悟難。 明無始以來習有所得久，昔日又稟小乘有所得教，忽聞般若無人無法，多生怖畏； 是故今明能不怖畏，此則為難。 所言「不驚不怖」者，一往怛愕謂之為驚，內心怯弱名之為畏，一向深惡前事稱之為怖也。 「如來說第一波羅蜜」者，他云般若是六度中第一，故言第一則非第一者，真諦遣第一也。 「是名第一」者，世諦假名說第一也。 依論解，此般若一經勝餘修多羅，故名此經為第一波羅蜜。 「非第一波羅蜜」者，餘修多羅非第一。 「是名第一」，還結此經為第一也。 所以有此文來者，是近遠二義：近者成上希有之言，以此經第一故，信此經方是希有耳。 此經若非第一，信之不足稱為希有也。 遠成上者，上來所明內外二施不及持經四句者，由此經是諸經中之第一法也。 「須菩提！ 忍辱」下，第二、釋疑念也。 問：何因緣故，次般若明忍辱耶？ 依六度數，前後並非次第，今有何次第生此文耶？ 答：開善解云：三門說般若，前就體、名，二門說竟，今次第三功用門說，明般若功用無窮，能生諸佛，能示世間能斷煩惱。 又攝用、導用、忘用諸用非一，今此明忘懷忍辱之用者，以得此用故，則逢苦不憂、值樂不喜，其功最要，故偏明之。 又解云：忍與般若俱是慧，與慧同體，故共明也。 今明無方之意，不妨此義； 若依論意，釋疑故來。 眾所以疑者，遠從前捨身命格量生上云捨身施不及持經四句。 所以不及者，為捨身是有所得顛倒苦因，還得有所得苦果，故不及持經。 眾即疑：佛昔來種種苦行，亦應是顛倒之因，應得顛倒之果，不得菩提也。 故今釋云：佛昔行苦行，此是無生忍心，雖復捨身而不苦惱，非但無苦而還更有樂。 故論偈云「苦樂有慈悲，如是苦行果」，以修無所得忍故得菩提也，故云「如來說忍辱波羅蜜」也。 「非忍辱」者，非是有得捨身忍辱也。 又非忍辱者，此無所得忍不可稱量也。 故論云「彼忍辱岸難量」也。 「何以故？ 我於爾時無我相」者，此二義故來：一者、反釋無瞋義，若有我相則應生瞋； 以無我相故，令誰瞋耶？ 復瞋者誰耶？ 二者、明無忍義，即是不忍不瞋為忍波羅蜜。 若有能忍之人則應生瞋，今尚不見能忍之人，何由有他起瞋之者？ 此是跨節釋也。 「歌利王」者，引事證因緣。 歌利王即是陳如本身，昔曾害仙人，仙人發願：「汝今無罪害我，我得道時要前度汝。 」如出《毘婆娑》文。 「是故須菩提！ 菩薩應離一切相」下，所以有此文者，為成前忍辱義。 新發意菩薩既聞歷世修忍得於菩提，彼既見有身心或生退轉，如身子六十劫行菩薩行，後因捨眼遂退成聲聞。 故今勸云：欲不退菩提心者，應離一切相發三菩提心也。 問：從上來三處明不住，何異？ 釋云：初不住為成檀度義，勸行無得施也。 次不住為成淨土因義，若心有住則心有穢，心穢故則土穢； 以心無所住故心淨，心淨故土淨也。 今明不住為成菩提心，勸不住發心。

The Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā Sūtra says: 'If what sentient beings attach to had even the size of the tip of a fine hair of real existence, it could not be relinquished; it is because the locus of attachment lacks even as much existence as a tip of hair that it can be relinquished.' Others say: 'The so-called self-view is non-existent, but the mind capable of predicating it is existent; this is not non-existent. Just as the so-called mirage is non-existent, but the mind capable of predicating it is existent.' We now explain that the mind capable of predicating it is not different from what is predicated. If one relies on the treatise to explain it, this clarifies the twofold emptiness of persons and dharmas. Previously, [the sūtra] said there is no lakṣaṇa of a self or a person; this is the emptiness of persons. Now it says that the lakṣaṇa of a self is immediately a non-lakṣaṇa; this clarifies the emptiness of dharmas. Question: If you say this clarifies the emptiness of dharmas, it should say that the lakṣaṇa of dharmas is immediately a non-dharmic lakṣaṇa; why does it say that the lakṣaṇa of a self is immediately a non-lakṣaṇa? Answer: Non-self is of two kinds: first, the non-self of persons; second, the non-self of dharmas. Here it is the non-self of dharmas. As for 'Why? One who is free from all lakṣaṇas is called the Buddhas': this explains again the reason for non-lakṣaṇa. If there were lakṣaṇas, the Buddhas would perceive them; because being free from all lakṣaṇas is what is called the Buddhas, one knows that dharmas lack these lakṣaṇas. Question: Why is the Buddha free from all lakṣaṇas? Answer: Having all lakṣaṇas is apprehension; lacking all lakṣaṇas is non-apprehension. Because of apprehension, one is an ordinary person in saṃsāra; non-apprehension is named nirvāṇa and named the Buddhas. From 'The Buddha told Subhūti' onward is the second [part], the Buddha's endorsement. In the preceding expression of understanding there were four sections; here he endorses only the fourth, setting forth the difficulty of others' awakening. This explains that since beginningless time, the habituation to apprehension has been prolonged, and formerly they received the Hīnayāna teachings of apprehension; suddenly hearing that prajñā has no person and no dharmas, they mostly give rise to fear and dread. Therefore, it is now explained that being able not to fear or dread is what is difficult. As for the words 'not alarmed and not terrified': being startled and dazed at first glance is called 'alarmed'; having an inner mind of timidity is called 'afraid'; intensely loathing what is before one throughout is called 'terrified'. As for 'The Tathāgata speaks of the foremost pāramitā': others say that prajñā is the foremost among the six pāramitās, hence it is called foremost; 'is not the foremost' means the ultimate truth dispels the foremost; 'is called foremost' means it is called foremost by conventional designation in the conventional truth. Relying on the treatise's explanation, this single sūtra of prajñā surpasses the other sūtras, therefore this sūtra is named the foremost pāramitā; 'is not the foremost pāramitā' means the other sūtras are not the foremost; 'is called foremost' concludes again that this sūtra is the foremost. As for why this text appears, it has two senses, near and far: the near one accomplishes the above statement about rarity, because this sūtra is foremost, only having faith in this sūtra is rare. If this sūtra were not foremost, having faith in it would not suffice to be called rare. What accomplishes the above in the far sense is that the aforementioned internal and external dānas do not equal upholding a four-line verse of this sūtra, because this sūtra is the foremost dharma among all sūtras. From 'Subhūti! Forbearance' onward is the second [part], resolving doubts and thoughts. Question: For what reason is forbearance explained next to prajñā? According to the enumeration of the six pāramitās, the before and after are not in sequence; by what sequence does this text arise now? Answer: Master Kaishan explained: prajñā is taught through three gates. Previously, it was fully explained in terms of the two gates of essence and name; now it is explained next in terms of the third gate of functional efficacy, clarifying that the functional efficacy of prajñā is inexhaustible: it can give birth to the Buddhas, it can manifest in the world, and it can sever afflictions. Moreover, the functions of gathering, guiding, and forgetting functions are not single; now this clarifies the function of forbearance in forgetting mental attachment, because by obtaining this function, when encountering suffering one does not grieve, and when meeting with joy one is not glad. Its efficacy is paramount, so it is specifically explained. Another explanation says: forbearance and prajñā are both wisdom, having the same essence as wisdom, so they are explained together. We now explain that the unconstrained intention does not conflict with this meaning; but if we follow the treatise's intention, it comes to resolve doubts. The reason the assembly had doubts stems distantly from the preceding comparison with relinquishing bodily life: above it said that relinquishing one's body in dāna does not equal upholding a four-line verse of the sūtra. The reason it does not equal it is that relinquishing the body is a cause of inverted suffering with apprehension, which still yields a suffering fruition with apprehension; therefore it does not equal upholding the sūtra. The assembly immediately doubted: the Buddha's various ascetic practices of the past must also have been inverted causes and should have yielded inverted fruitions, failing to attain bodhi. Therefore it is now resolved by saying: when the Buddha practiced austerities in the past, this was a mind of forbearance of the non-arising of dharmas; although he relinquished his body, he was not afflicted with suffering; not only was there no suffering, but there was even further joy. Hence the treatise's verse says: 'In suffering and joy there is compassion; such is the fruition of ascetic practice.' Because he cultivated forbearance of non-apprehension, he attained bodhi; thus it says 'The Tathāgata speaks of the pāramitā of forbearance.' 'Is not forbearance' means it is not the forbearance of relinquishing the body with apprehension. Furthermore, 'is not forbearance' means this forbearance of non-apprehension cannot be measured; hence the treatise says, 'The shore of that forbearance is difficult to measure.' As for 'Why? At that time I had no lakṣaṇa of a self': this comes about for two reasons. First, an explanation in reverse of the meaning of having no anger: if there were a lakṣaṇa of a self, one should give rise to anger; because there is no lakṣaṇa of a self, whom would it cause to be angry, and who would be angry? Second, clarifying the meaning of having no forbearance: that is, neither forbearing nor being angry is the pāramitā of forbearance. If there were a person capable of forbearing, then anger should arise; now when one does not even see a person capable of forbearing, on what basis could there be an other who gives rise to anger? This is an explanation by leaping over intermediate stages. As for 'King Kali': it cites an event to prove the causes and conditions. King Kali was the former birth of Kauṇḍinya; formerly he harmed the sage, and the sage made a vow: 'You now harm me without guilt; when I attain the Way, I will certainly cross you over first.' As it appears in the text of the *Vibhāṣā*. From 'Therefore, Subhūti, a bodhisattva should be free from all lakṣaṇas' onward: the reason this text appears is to accomplish the preceding meaning of forbearance. When newly resolved bodhisattvas hear of cultivating forbearance across lifetimes to attain bodhi, since they perceive body and mind, they might give rise to regression, just as Śāriputra practiced the bodhisattva path for sixty kalpas and subsequently regressed to become a śrāvaka because of relinquishing his eyes. Therefore, it now exhorts: those who wish not to regress from bodhicitta should be free from all lakṣaṇas and generate the mind of sambodhi. Question: From above, non-abiding has been explained in three places; what is the difference? The explanation says: the first non-abiding is to accomplish the meaning of the pāramitā of dāna, exhorting the practice of dāna without apprehension. The next non-abiding is to accomplish the meaning of the cause of a pure land: if the mind has an abode, the mind has defilement; because the mind is defiled, the land is defiled. Because the mind has nowhere to abide, the mind is pure; because the mind is pure, the land is pure. Now non-abiding is explained to accomplish bodhicitta, exhorting the generation of the mind without abiding.