金剛般若疏 4.7
金剛般若疏 4.7
- Language
- Classical Chinese
4.7
「須菩提!於意云何?佛可以具足色身」下,第六章經。上來至此三處明色身,何異?答:初為明相好身異法身,相好身有三相,法身無三相也。次文為成兩因優劣義,二身兩果既優劣,二身兩因亦應優劣,成格量經義故來。今文為破二身一異見故來,上兩處明二身異,尋語之流即云有相好身與法身異,如從來本迹異、三佛異義,故此章經破一異見。論有二偈,上半云「法身畢竟體,非彼相好身」,此即破其二身一見,明相好身有相好、法身無相好,二身有異,何得一耶?次偈上半云「不離於法身,此二非不佛」,此破異見,何處離相好有別法身耶?故云此二非不佛也。問:二身定一定異、非一非異耶?答:諸法無有定相,而具有三句。昔日明相好身亦生滅、五分法身亦生滅,故二身同生滅則是一義。次此經上來兩處開二身之異,相好身有生滅、法身無為無生滅,此是異義。今此一章雙破一異,故佛具有三種方便。問:昔何故說一方便,乃至今何故說不一不異?答:昔為破常見故,明佛二身皆生滅無常,故二身是一,小乘人便作一解,故經初開二身生不生異,時會便云小乘二身是一、大乘二身是異,故今具破一異。得意者,三俱會道利物;不達者,皆是顛倒戲論也。破二身一異見既爾,破法身有色無色亦然。論云「此亦無亦有法身絕相,不可言有相好;離相好無別法身,不可言法身無相好也。」所言「具足色身」者,唯佛一人盡形相之美,故言具足;餘人乃至輪王,相不明了,故不具足也。「如來說具足即非具足」者,破一見,明色身非法身,何得為一?「是名具足」,此破異見,何處離相好別有法身也?「可以諸相見不」下,意與前同,但身總相別相為異耳。
From "Subhūti, what do you think? Can the Buddha [be seen] by means of the complete form body?" onward is the sixth section of the sūtra. Coming from the above up to here, the form body is explained in three places; what is the difference? Answer: The first was to explain that the body of marks and signs is different from the dharmakāya—the body of marks and signs has the three characteristics, whereas the dharmakāya has no three characteristics. The next text was to establish the meaning of the superiority and inferiority of the two causes: since the two results of the two bodies are superior and inferior, the two causes of the two bodies should likewise be superior and inferior; it was introduced to establish the meaning of the comparative evaluation in the sūtra. The present text is introduced to refute views of the identity or difference of the two bodies. The previous two places explained that the two bodies are different; those who pursue words then say that there is a body of marks and signs that is different from the dharmakāya, like the traditional doctrines of the difference between origin and trace, or the difference among the three Buddhas. Therefore, this section of the sūtra refutes views of identity and difference. In the commentary there are two verses; the first half [of the first] says: "The dharmakāya is the ultimate substance; it is not that body of marks and signs." This refutes their view of the identity of the two bodies, clarifying that the body of marks and signs has marks and signs while the dharmakāya has no marks and signs—the two bodies being different, how could they be identical? The first half of the next verse says: "Not separate from the dharmakāya, these two are not non-Buddha." This refutes the view of difference: where apart from marks and signs is there a separate dharmakāya? Thus it says that these two are not non-Buddha. Question: Are the two bodies definitely identical, definitely different, or neither identical nor different? Answer: Dharmas have no fixed characteristics, yet they possess all three propositions. In the past it was explained that the body of marks and signs is subject to arising and ceasing, and the five-part dharmakāya is also subject to arising and ceasing; thus, the two bodies sharing arising and ceasing is the sense of identity. Next, in the preceding two places, this sūtra opened up the difference between the two bodies: the body of marks and signs has arising and ceasing, while the dharmakāya is unconditioned, without arising and ceasing—this is the sense of difference. Now, this one section refutes both identity and difference simultaneously; therefore the Buddha possesses three kinds of skillful means. Question: Why in the past was the skillful means of identity taught, up to now teaching neither identity nor difference? Answer: In the past, in order to refute the eternalist view, it was explained that both of the Buddha's bodies are impermanent, arising and ceasing; hence the two bodies are identical, and people of the Hīnayāna then formed an understanding of identity. Therefore, at the beginning of the sūtra, the difference between the arising and non-arising of the two bodies was opened up, and the assembly then said that in the Hīnayāna the two bodies are identical, while in the Mahāyāna the two bodies are different. Thus now both identity and difference are completely refuted. For those who grasp the meaning, all three accord with the Way and benefit beings; for those who do not comprehend, all are inverted prapañca. Just as it is with refuting views of identity and difference regarding the two bodies, so it is with refuting the dharmakāya having form or lacking form. The commentary says: "This is also neither non-existent nor existent: the dharmakāya transcends marks, so one cannot say it has marks and signs; yet apart from marks and signs there is no separate dharmakāya, so one cannot say the dharmakāya lacks marks and signs." What is meant by "complete form body": only the Buddha alone exhausts the beauty of physical form, and is therefore called "complete"; other persons, up to wheel-turning kings, do not have distinct marks, and are therefore not complete. "The Tathāgata speaks of completion as not completion": this refutes the view of identity, clarifying that the form body is not the dharmakāya—how could they be identical? "Is called completion": this refutes the view of difference—where apart from marks and signs is there a separate dharmakāya? From "Can [the Tathāgata] be seen by means of all the marks?" onward, the meaning is the same as the preceding, differing only in general marks versus specific marks of the body.
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- English (machine translation) — English, machine translation