金剛般若疏 3.2

English (machine translation) 3.2

Language: English

3.2.1

Regarding "Subhūti said to the Buddha, 'Could there be sentient beings...'": below this is the second section, which clarifies the meaning of faithful acceptance of prajñā. As for why faithful acceptance is explained: above, prajñā was explained as the teaching that is able to address [beings]; here, faithful acceptance is explained as the capacity that is addressed. This is precisely the correspondence between capacity and teaching. If the capacity were not the capacity for the teaching, this teaching would not correspond to the capacity; if the teaching were not the teaching for the capacity, this capacity would not receive the teaching. Because the capacity here is the capacity for the teaching, this capacity receives the teaching and gains benefit; because the teaching is the teaching for the capacity, it is not expounded in vain. For this reason, capacity and teaching correspond to each other. Furthermore, the Buddha expounds prajñā through various approaches; above, he has already finished expounding prajñā through the approach of cause and effect; now, he expounds prajñā through the approach of faithful acceptance. Because one completely awakens to non-reliance and non-attainment, it is called faithful acceptance. Expounding this faith of non-reliance and non-attainment is precisely expounding the meaning of prajñā. Within this approach, there are two parts of questions and answers: first is precisely Subhūti raising the question. The reason he asks: above, the clarification of the cause and the determination of the effect were already complete and exhaustive, and therefore he now asks about people who faithfully accept [it]. However, the cause is a cause of non-apprehension, and the effect is an effect of non-apprehension. The cause being a cause of non-apprehension means that although one practices the myriad practices, in truth there is nothing practiced; the effect being an effect of non-apprehension means that although one attains bodhi, in truth there is nothing attained. This matter is difficult to believe. If there were truly myriad practices to be practiced and truly a Buddha-effect to be attained, believing it would be easy; if there were truly no myriad practices to be practiced and truly no Buddha-effect to be attained, completely believing it would also be easy; if one were to say that the conventional truth inherently has cause and effect while the ultimate truth inherently lacks cause and effect, with existence and non-existence taking separate tracks, believing it would also be easy. Now, neither is the case: although one cultivates the myriad practices, one does not see a bodhisattva able to practice, nor does one see myriad practices that can be practiced; relying on nothing, one cultivates the myriad practices and delivers sentient beings. This matter is rare, and therefore difficult to believe. It is like planting a tree in empty space: not relying on the ground, yet through irrigation and cultivation it produces flowers and fruit. This matter is difficult; therefore, he now asks to clarify whether there are those who have faith. If one were to say that the Buddha's body is the same as that of the two vehicles, being a conditioned dharma of arising and ceasing, it would also be easy to believe; if one were to say that the Buddha's body is an eternally abiding dharma, solidly remaining in the final thought of the vajra[-samādhi], this would also be easy to believe; if one were to say that the response body is inherently impermanent while the dharmakāya is inherently permanent, this would also be easy to believe. Now it is made clear that although the Tathāgata arises, he is ultimately unarisen; although he ceases, he is ultimately unceasing. Although there is neither arising nor ceasing, through the skillful means of arising and ceasing he benefits sentient beings. This matter is rare, and therefore difficult to believe; hence he asks. Question: Does this ask about faith in the present, or does it ask about faith in the future? Answer: Sentient beings of the present have deep and thick merit and wisdom, being fully endowed with the "three abundances"; receiving the path at Jetavana, upon hearing they will certainly generate faith; therefore he does not ask about the present. But after the Buddha's parinirvāṇa, in the final five hundred years entering the semblance Dharma, sentient beings at this time have meager merit and dull faculties; although they search the sūtra texts, they cannot penetrate and understand them, so upon hearing they do not generate faith. The Da zhidu lun, explaining the text of the chapter on faith and revilement, says: "Five hundred years after the Buddha's parinirvāṇa, there will be five hundred sects all grasping the Buddha's words without knowing the Buddha's intention was for liberation; so hearing ultimate emptiness will be like a knife wounding their hearts." Hence we know that in the future those able to believe will be few; thus we know he asks about the future era. Furthermore, this adduces the existence of faith in the future to illustrate by comparison the present: the future is an evil age, where outwardly one does not encounter a Buddha and inwardly one has meager merit and dull faculties, yet they still believe in prajñā; how much more so should people of the present age not generate faith upon hearing it? From "The Buddha told Subhūti" below, this second chapter clarifies the Tathāgata's answer. In the text there are two parts: first, an answer refuting non-existence; second, an answer clarifying that there is faith. "Do not say such a thing" is precisely the answer refuting non-existence. [Meaning:] "Do not say that there are people of faithful acceptance only in the present, and say that [none] will give rise to faithful acceptance in the future;" hence he says, "Do not say such a thing." From "In the final five hundred years after the Tathāgata's passing" below, this is the second, an answer clarifying that there is faith. In the text there are broadly seven distinctions: first, clarifying the time of faith; second, clarifying the persons able to believe; third, clarifying the dharma that is believed; fourth, directly presenting the faithful mind; fifth, clarifying the source of faith; sixth, clarifying the benefit of faith; seventh, broadly explaining the meaning of faith. This is the first. Regarding the "final five hundred years": someone says, "The five hundred years of the correct Dharma are the initial five hundred; the next five hundred years of the semblance Dharma are the middle five hundred; the next five hundred years after the semblance Dharma are named the final five hundred. Now adducing the very last five hundred, this is the time when the semblance Dharma is about to perish and decay, yet there are still those who believe in prajñā; how much more so could the preceding two periods of five hundred years lack people of faith?" We say now that this is not so: regarding the "final five hundred years," it is as the Da zhidu lun explains: after the five hundred years. In the first five hundred years, those who attained the path were many and those who did not were few, hence it is called the correct Dharma. In the next five hundred years, those who attained the path were few and those who did not were many, hence it is called the semblance Dharma. When the correct Dharma has already perished and one subsequently enters the semblance Dharma, it is named the final five hundred years. Although here many do not believe, like the case of the five hundred sects, nevertheless there are still people of faithful acceptance; hence the Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā says: "After the Buddha's parinirvāṇa, this prajñāpāramitā will spread from the south to the north." Among them, the fourfold assembly must certainly have those who faithfully uphold and even make offerings to it. Another explanation says: One thousand years after the Buddha's passing, to sever doubts it is said: "Because the first five hundred years were the correct Dharma, upon hearing there was faith; because the final five hundred years are the semblance Dharma, upon hearing there is no faith." If that were so, in the final five hundred years no one would believe in prajñā; hence the Buddha now answers that in the final five hundred years there are also those who believe, and one should not say there are none who believe. At this time there are also those who faithfully uphold and even make offerings to it. From "there will be those who keep the precepts and cultivate merit" below, this is the second, clarifying that there are persons able to believe. Master Kumārajīva's translation of the sūtra clarifies only two kinds of persons: first, precept-keepers; second, merit-cultivators. Precept-keepers are mostly renunciant bodhisattvas; merit-cultivators are mostly lay bodhisattvas. The Da zhidu lun says: "For renunciant bodhisattvas, śīla is foremost; for lay bodhisattvas, dāna is foremost." Therefore, the present text clarifies only two persons. However, these two persons completely span both the Mahāyāna and Hīnayāna. If they are the two persons of the Hīnayāna with apprehension, then they do not believe in prajñā; hence the text below says: "If they delight in inferior dharmas, they cannot listen to, accept, read, or recite this sūtra." If they are the two persons of the Mahāyāna who delight in non-apprehension, then they believe in this dharma; hence the text below says: "This sūtra is spoken for those of the Great Vehicle, spoken for those of the Supreme Vehicle." If it were the commentary's version of the sūtra, there would be three persons.

3.2.2

The treatise says: "Because it is not empty, it possesses reality; the bodhisattva is complete in the three virtues." The third is precisely a person of wisdom. The previous two persons are designated as possessing faith from hearing; as for the person of wisdom, this is faith through realization. Furthermore, because a person capable of faith is already an exceptional person, [the sūtra] cites the two kinds of goodness—cessation and practice—which are esteemed by ordinary sentiments, in order to praise and extol them so that [others] may accept it with faith. Upholding precepts is the goodness of cessation, and cultivating merit is the goodness of practice. These two encompass all goodness entirely, so that "none of the evils are committed, and all goods are put into practice"; therefore, it cites these two to encompass all people. Below "in these verses and phrases," the third part clarifies the Dharma that is believed, namely the aforementioned Dharma gate of cause and effect, which is designated as "verses and phrases." Below "can generate faith," this fourth part directly explains generating faith in the sūtra. "Regarding this as true" refers to the true faith of non-apprehension. If it is faith involving apprehension, although it differs from the unbelief of the Hīnayāna, if viewed from the perspective of faith of non-apprehension, it still constitutes non-faith. Therefore the Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā Sūtra contains a chapter on faith and slander; it intends to clarify that faith involving apprehension turns out to be slander. Now this is the correct faith in the dharmatā of non-apprehension, which is why it says "regarding this as true"; it also means believing that prajñā is the dharmatā of phenomena, and thus it is said to "regard this as true." Below "one should know that this person," this fifth part clarifies the origin of such faith. Why is it that, upon hearing the sūtra, they are definitely able to believe? It is precisely because they have planted causes and accumulated them for a long time that they are able to accept it with faith. Therefore the Nirvāṇa Sūtra says: "Only after having generated bodhicitta under as many Tathāgatas as the sands of the Hiraṇyavatī River can one then refrain from slandering this sūtra in an evil age." Here it is also like this: having long planted [causes] under the three [periods], they are able to believe without slandering. The text has two clauses: the preceding clause clarifies that they have not encountered merely a few Buddhas; below "because," the second clause clarifies that they have encountered many Buddhas. Below "hearing these verses and phrases, even giving rise to a single thought of pure faith," the sixth section clarifies the benefits gained through faith. In all, there are two benefits: first, externally, being known and seen by all Buddhas; second, internally, attaining boundless merit. Now, the benefit of faith in prajñā is difficult to measure; here, citing faith for a single thought still attains boundless merit, so faith from beginning to end is all the more difficult to describe. The Tathāgata possesses distant perception, knowing both faith and slander; yet the reason he single-mindedly cites people of faith here roughly has three meanings: First, this sūtra is the mother of all Buddhas and is protected by the Buddhas; therefore, if one generates aspiration toward it, one is recorded by the Buddha. Hence the Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā Sūtra says: "The Buddha constantly observes this sūtra scroll with the Buddha eye, and if someone receives and upholds it, they are protected and kept in mind by the Buddha." To be acknowledged and recorded by the Tathāgata—leaving aside the worldly realm where one would already rejoice at being recognized and befriended by a heavenly king or noble personage—how much more so to be intimately cherished by the Tathāgata! Second, this merit is equal to empty space; how could those of lower bhūmis know it? Only the Buddha fully plumbs its limits and depths. Third, the Buddha has no deceitful words, and his words are certainly trustworthy; now, clarifying that faith yields abundant merit, that merit is certainly known to be vast. Question: For what reason is it called "knowing and seeing"? Answer: The treatise says: "The Tathāgata knows through the power of the cognition of vows, not through inferential cognition. It is seen by the Buddha eye, not by the fleshy eye." Furthermore, the Buddha knows that this person is practicing the cause of bodhi, and sees that this person will attain the fruit of bodhi; thus it is called "knowing and seeing." Below "Why is this?", this is the seventh part, an extensive explanation of the meaning of pure faith. If following the treatise master's explanation, what came before broadly clarified the faith of the three kinds of persons, whereas this specifically explains the faith of the third, the person of wisdom. Now it is clarified that these words broadly connect to the preceding explanation that one who has faith attains boundless virtue and merit; here it explains the reason why it is boundless, which is precisely because having attained faith in non-arising, one's merit is boundless. Yet faith in non-arising itself comprises two kinds: first, faith from hearing; second, faith through realization. Within this explanation, there are three parts. Why are there broadly three divisions? First, clarifying attainment; second, clarifying loss; third, exhorting to abandon loss and follow attainment. This is the first. It naturally has two clauses: the first clause clarifies the emptiness of sentient beings, and the next clause clarifies the emptiness of all dharmas. Why are these two emptinesses clarified to explain the meaning of faith? The Mahāprajñāpāramitopadeśa says: "Knowing that sentient beings and dharmas do not arise is called the forbearance of the non-arising of dharmas." Although one liberates sentient beings, sentient beings are ultimately unapprehendable, which is the absence of sentient beings. Although one practices the myriad practices, all dharmas are ultimately unapprehendable; this is the forbearance of the non-arising of dharmas. Therefore, it now explains these two emptinesses as the pure faith of non-arising. Furthermore, because of the emptiness of sentient beings, there is no affliction of result; because of the emptiness of all dharmas, there is no affliction of cause. Why is this? Because phenomena assemble to constitute the person. Dharmas are the cause and the person is the result; when the two afflictions of cause and result are both abandoned, one's merit is boundless. Furthermore, because of the absence of a view of a person, one transcends the bhūmi of ordinary people. Ordinary people cling to a self and do not know non-self; now, explaining non-self, one departs from the bhūmi of ordinary people. Furthermore, because of knowing the emptiness of dharmas, one departs from the bhūmi of the two vehicles. Persons of the two vehicles only attain the non-self of persons, and do not attain the non-self of dharmas. Furthermore, through the absence of a person, one is freed from the affliction obstacle; through the absence of dharmas, one is freed from the cognitive obstacle. Transcending the ordinary and surpassing the noble, both obstacles are completely exhausted; therefore, one's merit is boundless. In departing from the view of a person, there are fully sixteen absences; here, for brevity, it merely mentions the absence of four. Generating the thought of "self" and "mine" within the five aggregates is called "self." Existing continuously without break or severance in the world is called "sentient being." Conceiving that there is a continuous single faculty of life, still having a self, is called "living soul," and also called "person." Non-Buddhists conceive that there is a spiritual self that dies here and is born there, wandering through the six destinies; thus it is called "life-span." "No lakṣaṇa of dharmas and no lakṣaṇa of non-dharmas": the second clause clarifies the emptiness of dharmas. Although one does not see a self, one still sees the dharmas of the five aggregates; thus it now clarifies that there is also no lakṣaṇa of dharmas. Since the dharmas of the five aggregates are absent, the fundamental absence of the five aggregates is called "non-dharma"; the illness of emptiness is also empty, hence it says "no lakṣaṇa of non-dharmas." This should correspond to the three stages in the Vimalakīrtinirdeśa: first, not seeing a self is the emptiness of sentient beings; next, not seeing dharmas is called the emptiness of dharmas; not seeing non-dharmas is also called the illness of emptiness being empty. Why are these three emptinesses clarified? The view of self is the root of all fetters, which is why it clarifies the view of self. Next, the view of existence and the view of non-existence are again the roots of annihilation and eternity, which deeply diverge from the Way; hence it clarifies the view of existence and non-existence. Some say: cultivating goodness and departing from evil takes goodness as dharma and evil as non-dharma. Others say: expelling existence by means of emptiness takes emptiness as dharma and existence as non-dharma.

3.2.3

If one relies on the treatise and the [translated] sūtra, within the emptiness of persons there are four propositions, and within the emptiness of dharmas there are also four propositions. Therefore the treatise verse says, 'Relying on the distinction of eight and eight meanings.' The eight and eight meanings mean that four regarding persons and four regarding dharmas are called one eight, and refuting the four regarding persons and refuting the four regarding dharmas—not [falling into] these eight illnesses—constitute another eight; hence it says 'eight and eight.' The four regarding dharmas are: first, the lakṣaṇa of dharmas; second, the non-lakṣaṇa of dharmas; third, lakṣaṇa; fourth, non-lakṣaṇa. These four are illnesses. Question: When non-Buddhists impute a self, that may well be an illness, but now when we see dharmas arising as existing and ceasing as non-existing, why is that called an illness? Answer: One who asks this question has not yet read the Mahāyāna sūtras and treatises. Refuting the first proposition, the lakṣaṇa of dharmas, by speaking of the non-lakṣaṇa of dharmas [means that] dharmas such as the aggregates, realms, and sense fields are unobtainable; therefore it says there is no lakṣaṇa of dharmas. Refuting the second proposition by speaking of not having no lakṣaṇa of dharmas [is because] confused people, hearing that the aggregates, sense fields, and realms are deceptive and therefore empty, then claim that the dharmatā of all dharmas is also empty. As the Great Sūtra [Nirvāṇa Sūtra] says, 'Having heard that saṃsāra is deceptive, they claim that nirvāṇa is also deceptive.' To refute this clinging [it teaches that] saṃsāra is inherently deceptive and empty, while dharmatā-nirvāṇa is not empty; hence it says, 'What is empty is the twenty-five states of existence; what is not empty is Mahāparinirvāṇa.' Refuting the third proposition by speaking of marklessness [is because] confused people say: if the dharmatā of nirvāṇa cannot be empty, it must be the same as existence; if it cannot be existent, it must be empty. Therefore it now says that nirvāṇa cannot be said to still be a mark of existence or non-existence. That the dharmatā of nirvāṇa cannot be spoken of as a mark of existence or non-existence refutes the fourth proposition. Confused people, having heard that dharmatā cannot be existent or non-existent, [think that] it should be inexpressible. Therefore it now explains that although it transcends existence and non-existence, for the sake of sentient beings, through non-speaking it is spoken. How could it be said to be inexpressible? It is only that the older translation's text is concise, merely saying 'neither non-lakṣaṇa of dharmas.' Below '[What is the reason? ] If the mind grasps lakṣaṇas', this is the second [section], explaining the fault in contrast to attainment, which is also adducing the fault to reveal the attainment. Within this there are two parts: first, explaining the imputation of persons as a fault; next, explaining the imputation of dharmas as a fault. The present fault is the first. If the mind grasps lakṣaṇas, it grasps the lakṣaṇas of sentient beings, which is the same as non-Buddhists imputing an ātman or person; therefore it is a fault. Below 'If it grasps the lakṣaṇas of dharmas', this second [part] explains that imputing dharmas is a fault. Within this there are two parts: first, explaining that viewing dharmas is a fault; next, explaining that viewing non-dharmas is a fault. Question: If imputing dharmas is a fault, one should say that one is attached to the lakṣaṇas of dharmas; for what reason does imputing dharmas as a fault mean being attached to the lakṣaṇa of an ātman? Answer: In principle, it should indeed be so: imputing persons leads to attachment to persons, and imputing dharmas leads to attachment to dharmas. Now, in order to reveal the gravity of this fault and affliction, one who imputes dharmas not only gives rise to views of dharmas, but also reverts to giving rise to views of an ātman, because dharmas are the causal condition for an ātman. The Tattvasiddhi-śāstra says, 'When charcoal and ashes are not extinguished, the conception of a tree arises again.' Furthermore, the Sarvāstivādins [hold that] grasping all existent marks is not an illness, but grasping the mark of an ātman is an illness. The Tattvasiddhi-śāstra says, 'Having the two truths is not an illness; grasping an ātman or person is the only illness.' Now it is clarified that this is not so: as long as one gives rise to a thought or stirs the mind, the fault is the same as [grasping] an ātman or person. Why is this? Below 'If it grasps the non-lakṣaṇa of dharmas', this second [part] explains that attachment to non-dharmas is also a fault. Having heard that imputing dharmas is a fault, some people then suppose that non-existence of dharmas is attainment. Therefore it now says that if one imputes non-dharmas, this is also a fault. Why is this? Imputing non-dharmas inevitably gives rise to views of dharmas; if there are views of dharmas, then there are views of an ātman. Moreover, if there were no ātman, there would be nothing imputed; because there is something imputed, one knows there is an ātman. Therefore, imputing non-dharmas also entails attachment to an ātman. Below 'Therefore one should not grasp non-dharmas', this third section exhorts relinquishing faults and following attainment. This text has two parts: first, directly exhorting the relinquishing of faults; second, adducing proof. This is the first, exhorting the relinquishing of faults. Since dharmas and non-dharmas must themselves be relinquished, how could views of ātman and person not be relinquished? Therefore, bringing up dharmas to illustrate persons, it only exhorts the relinquishing of dharmas and does not exhort the relinquishing of persons. By this meaning, below 'The Tathāgata constantly teaches', the second part adduces proof. In the Āgama sūtras, the Buddha spoke the raft parable for the monks: for example, a person pursued by bandits takes grass to make a raft to cross over to the other shore. Having reached the other shore, he then abandons the raft. Initially he takes the raft to cross the river; having reached the other shore, both the river and the raft are abandoned. The meaning of the parable is that initially one abandons evil through good, and later both good and evil are doubly abandoned. Initially one abandons persons through dharmas and abandons existence through emptiness; next, persons and dharmas are both eliminated, and emptiness and existence are both doubly purified. Saṃsāra, nirvāṇa, and the ten thousand goods are all like this. If one relies on the treatise and the [translated] sūtra, the general idea is roughly the same, though the text differs slightly; the treatise sūtra also has three 'What is the reason?', which agrees in meaning with the older sūtra. The third 'What is the reason?' says 'one should neither grasp dharmas nor not grasp dharmas'; this clarifies the meaning of principle and teaching. Because realizing principle means forgetting the teaching, and seeing the moon means relinquishing the finger, it says 'one should not grasp dharmas.' Yet, relying on teaching to awaken to principle, and by means of the finger seeing the moon, it says 'nor not grasp dharmas.' Just as upon reaching the shore one abandons the raft, 'one should not grasp.' Because the raft was for crossing the river, 'one does not not grasp the raft.' Question: The raft parable is from a Hīnayāna sūtra; how can it serve as proof for the Mahāyāna? Answer: The raft in the lesser [vehicle] is called lesser; in the great [vehicle] it is called great. Furthermore, it adduces the lesser to illustrate the greater: if in the Hīnayāna Dharma both are already explained as abandoned, how much more so in the Mahāyāna? Just as the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā quotes the Kātyāyanāvavāda, where even Hīnayāna abandons existence and non-existence, how much more so the Mahāyāna? 'Dharmas should still be relinquished, how much more so non-dharmas': it clarifies that existence is what ordinary feelings settle into, yet it still must be relinquished; non-existence is not what the six senses confront, so how could one cling to it? Below 'Subhūti! What do you think?', this text appears for two reasons: first, it appears to verify faith. Above, faith without reliance and without apprehension was explained, up to relinquishing both dharmas and non-dharmas; now it clarifies that all āryas and sages make this same awakening, so one knows that this Dharma can be believed and accepted. Second, it appears in order to resolve doubts according to the treatise. The treatise master, up to this section, resolves three doubts in total: first, adducing that the dharmakāya is not conditioned to resolve the doubt of examining the cause through the fruit; next, the section on those with faith doubly resolves doubts regarding cause and fruit, which assumed that when the Dharma approach of cause and fruit is taught, no one would believe—the above explanation that there are those with faith resolves this doubt. Now, this section of the sūtra resolves examining the fruit through the fruit; the doubt [related to] the previous section that the dharmakāya is not conditioned stated that the lakṣaṇas of arising, abiding, and ceasing are not the unconditioned dharmakāya, and therefore one cannot see the Tathāgata's dharmakāya by means of these three lakṣaṇas.

3.2.4

The doubter says: "If one says that the three lakṣaṇas are not the Buddha, then Śākyamuni would also not have attained bodhi and would not expound the Dharma for beings; yet now, beneath the king of trees, Śākyamuni truly realized bodhi, went to Mṛgadāva, and expounded the Dharma for beings. If that is so, then his birth in the royal palace would be real, and his extinction between the twin trees would be real, and one should not say that the three lakṣaṇas are not the Buddha." Now, this doubt is refuted directly. In the text there are two parts: first, the Buddha raises the doubts of the assembly to question Subhūti; second, Subhūti respectfully replies to refute the assembly's doubts. Now this is the first: the Buddha's question. "What do you think?" and so forth: Do you say that the Buddha truly attained bodhi beneath the king of trees? That he dwelt in the world for fifty years and truly expounded the Dharma for [beings]? In Subhūti's reply there are broadly two distinctions: first, he directly refutes the doubt concerning real realization and real exposition; second, he further refutes another doubt. This is the first. Subhūti says: There is no real attainment of bodhi, and there is no real exposition of the Dharma. The verse of the treatise says: "The nirmāṇa is not the true Buddha, nor is it the expounder of the Dharma." This explains that there are three kinds of Buddhas: first, the dharmakāya Buddha, which takes the correct Dharma as its body; second, the saṃbhogakāya Buddha, which is the arising of the fruit in recompense for the cause when the cultivation of causes is complete, hence called the recompense Buddha; third, the nirmāṇakāya Buddha. Now, in saying that there is no real realization and no real exposition, Śākyamuni is precisely the nirmāṇakāya Buddha, not the true Buddha; that is, his realization was a manifested realization and his exposition was a manifested exposition, not a real realization and not a real exposition. By analogy with what preceded, Śākyamuni's birth was an apparition birth and his extinction was an apparition extinction, not a real birth and real extinction. Therefore, the Tathāgata's body is unconditioned. Thus it says: "There is no fixed dharma called bodhi, nor is there any fixed dharma that the Tathāgata can expound." "Why? The Dharma expounded by the Tathāgata..." and so forth: below this is the second, refuting the doubt concerning no exposition. When deluded people hear above that Śākyamuni is a nirmāṇakāya Buddha without real realization and without real exposition, they then claim that there is no manifested exposition and no manifested realization. Therefore it is now clarified that although there is no real realization, there is manifested realization; although there is no real exposition, there is manifested exposition. Thus "the Dharma expounded by the Tathāgata" means the manifested exposition. The preceding refuted the doubt concerning real exposition; this now refutes the doubt concerning the absence of manifested exposition. "Cannot be grasped and cannot be expounded": this phrase further refutes a doubt. When deluded people hear that there is a manifested exposition, they then claim that there is a dharma that can be expounded; if the Buddha has an exposition, then the listener must have a grasping. Because there is an exposition, language is uninterrupted; because the listener has a grasping, mental activities are not extinguished. Now, because language is extinguished, it cannot be expounded; because mental activities are extinguished, it cannot be grasped. The Mahāprajñāpāramitopadeśa says: "The prajñāpāramitā is the true dharma, non-perverted; when the contemplation of conceptual marks is eliminated, the dharma of language is also extinguished." This is precisely the meaning. "Is neither dharma nor non-dharma": this phrase establishes the meaning above of being ungraspable and unexpoundable. The dharmatā of all dharmas is neither existent nor non-existent: because it is not existent, it is not a dharma; because it is not non-existent, it is not a non-dharma. Since it is apart from both existence and non-existence, how could it be expounded? Since it is apart from both existence and non-existence, how could it be grasped? This is just as explained in the Vimalakīrtinirdeśa and the Kāruṇikarājā: the one who expounds the Dharma neither speaks nor demonstrates; the listener neither hears nor attains. "All noble ones and sages are distinguished by the unconditioned dharma": the reason this statement appears is to establish the preceding meaning of neither dharma nor non-dharma, neither existence nor non-existence. Because all noble ones and sages personally realize the unconditioned, and the unconditioned has neither existence nor non-existence, one must therefore know that the dharmatā of all dharmas is neither existent nor non-existent—how could it be grasped or expounded? The treatise says: "The reason why the Buddha can expound the unconditioned dharma of dharmatā is solely because he has personally realized the unconditioned dharma." Therefore, the unconditioned is the cause of exposition. Furthermore, what all the sages have realized cannot even be expounded—how could the listener grasp it? Here, not only is the Buddha mentioned, but the many sages are also broadly cited, because the intent is to verify that all noble ones and sages equally realize this Dharma, so one must know that this Dharma can definitely be accepted in faith. Question: Why does it say that all noble ones and sages are distinguished by the unconditioned? Answer: This is again to resolve a doubt. Since it is said that they equally realize the unconditioned, then the sages would have no difference, and there would be no stages of the ten bhūmis or degrees of depth among the four fruits. Therefore it is now clarified that although they equally realize the unconditioned, what they realize is not the same; thus there are differences among the three classes of sages. The three birds escaping the net and the three beasts crossing the river—where soaring into the sky has near and far, and wading the water has shallow and deep—are precisely instances of this. Question: The three Buddhas are an explanation of the Dilun masters; why do you now use this doctrine? Answer: One who asks this does not have a comprehensive perspective. Now, as one master explains, not a single hair can be apprehended, and all are meanings, just as the Viśeṣacintābrahmaparipṛcchā says: "All dharmas are correct, all dharmas are erroneous." If one has a mind of apprehension, not only are three Buddhas unattainable, but even one Buddha or two Buddhas are entirely prapañca. If, with a mind of realization free from apprehension, one speaks in accordance with conditions of one Buddha, two Buddhas, three Buddhas, ten Buddhas, up to immeasurable Buddhas, all are completely unimpeded. Why rigidly hold to two bodies and doubt three Buddhas? Question: Why must three Buddhas be posited? Answer: Essentially, the meaning has three aspects: because there is the dharma Buddha, there is the recompense Buddha; because there is the recompense Buddha, there is the manifested Buddha. The dharma Buddha is the Buddha-nature; relying necessarily on the Buddha-nature, the cultivation of causes is fulfilled, bringing about the recompense body. These two are personal virtues; then, transforming sentient beings is the virtue of transforming others, so there is the manifested Buddha.

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金剛般若疏 — Classical Chinese