金剛般若疏 3.2.3

3.2.3

If one relies on the treatise and the [translated] sūtra, within the emptiness of persons there are four propositions, and within the emptiness of dharmas there are also four propositions. Therefore the treatise verse says, 'Relying on the distinction of eight and eight meanings.' The eight and eight meanings mean that four regarding persons and four regarding dharmas are called one eight, and refuting the four regarding persons and refuting the four regarding dharmas—not [falling into] these eight illnesses—constitute another eight; hence it says 'eight and eight.' The four regarding dharmas are: first, the lakṣaṇa of dharmas; second, the non-lakṣaṇa of dharmas; third, lakṣaṇa; fourth, non-lakṣaṇa. These four are illnesses. Question: When non-Buddhists impute a self, that may well be an illness, but now when we see dharmas arising as existing and ceasing as non-existing, why is that called an illness? Answer: One who asks this question has not yet read the Mahāyāna sūtras and treatises. Refuting the first proposition, the lakṣaṇa of dharmas, by speaking of the non-lakṣaṇa of dharmas [means that] dharmas such as the aggregates, realms, and sense fields are unobtainable; therefore it says there is no lakṣaṇa of dharmas. Refuting the second proposition by speaking of not having no lakṣaṇa of dharmas [is because] confused people, hearing that the aggregates, sense fields, and realms are deceptive and therefore empty, then claim that the dharmatā of all dharmas is also empty. As the Great Sūtra [Nirvāṇa Sūtra] says, 'Having heard that saṃsāra is deceptive, they claim that nirvāṇa is also deceptive.' To refute this clinging [it teaches that] saṃsāra is inherently deceptive and empty, while dharmatā-nirvāṇa is not empty; hence it says, 'What is empty is the twenty-five states of existence; what is not empty is Mahāparinirvāṇa.' Refuting the third proposition by speaking of marklessness [is because] confused people say: if the dharmatā of nirvāṇa cannot be empty, it must be the same as existence; if it cannot be existent, it must be empty. Therefore it now says that nirvāṇa cannot be said to still be a mark of existence or non-existence. That the dharmatā of nirvāṇa cannot be spoken of as a mark of existence or non-existence refutes the fourth proposition. Confused people, having heard that dharmatā cannot be existent or non-existent, [think that] it should be inexpressible. Therefore it now explains that although it transcends existence and non-existence, for the sake of sentient beings, through non-speaking it is spoken. How could it be said to be inexpressible? It is only that the older translation's text is concise, merely saying 'neither non-lakṣaṇa of dharmas.' Below '[What is the reason? ] If the mind grasps lakṣaṇas', this is the second [section], explaining the fault in contrast to attainment, which is also adducing the fault to reveal the attainment. Within this there are two parts: first, explaining the imputation of persons as a fault; next, explaining the imputation of dharmas as a fault. The present fault is the first. If the mind grasps lakṣaṇas, it grasps the lakṣaṇas of sentient beings, which is the same as non-Buddhists imputing an ātman or person; therefore it is a fault. Below 'If it grasps the lakṣaṇas of dharmas', this second [part] explains that imputing dharmas is a fault. Within this there are two parts: first, explaining that viewing dharmas is a fault; next, explaining that viewing non-dharmas is a fault. Question: If imputing dharmas is a fault, one should say that one is attached to the lakṣaṇas of dharmas; for what reason does imputing dharmas as a fault mean being attached to the lakṣaṇa of an ātman? Answer: In principle, it should indeed be so: imputing persons leads to attachment to persons, and imputing dharmas leads to attachment to dharmas. Now, in order to reveal the gravity of this fault and affliction, one who imputes dharmas not only gives rise to views of dharmas, but also reverts to giving rise to views of an ātman, because dharmas are the causal condition for an ātman. The Tattvasiddhi-śāstra says, 'When charcoal and ashes are not extinguished, the conception of a tree arises again.' Furthermore, the Sarvāstivādins [hold that] grasping all existent marks is not an illness, but grasping the mark of an ātman is an illness. The Tattvasiddhi-śāstra says, 'Having the two truths is not an illness; grasping an ātman or person is the only illness.' Now it is clarified that this is not so: as long as one gives rise to a thought or stirs the mind, the fault is the same as [grasping] an ātman or person. Why is this? Below 'If it grasps the non-lakṣaṇa of dharmas', this second [part] explains that attachment to non-dharmas is also a fault. Having heard that imputing dharmas is a fault, some people then suppose that non-existence of dharmas is attainment. Therefore it now says that if one imputes non-dharmas, this is also a fault. Why is this? Imputing non-dharmas inevitably gives rise to views of dharmas; if there are views of dharmas, then there are views of an ātman. Moreover, if there were no ātman, there would be nothing imputed; because there is something imputed, one knows there is an ātman. Therefore, imputing non-dharmas also entails attachment to an ātman. Below 'Therefore one should not grasp non-dharmas', this third section exhorts relinquishing faults and following attainment. This text has two parts: first, directly exhorting the relinquishing of faults; second, adducing proof. This is the first, exhorting the relinquishing of faults. Since dharmas and non-dharmas must themselves be relinquished, how could views of ātman and person not be relinquished? Therefore, bringing up dharmas to illustrate persons, it only exhorts the relinquishing of dharmas and does not exhort the relinquishing of persons. By this meaning, below 'The Tathāgata constantly teaches', the second part adduces proof. In the Āgama sūtras, the Buddha spoke the raft parable for the monks: for example, a person pursued by bandits takes grass to make a raft to cross over to the other shore. Having reached the other shore, he then abandons the raft. Initially he takes the raft to cross the river; having reached the other shore, both the river and the raft are abandoned. The meaning of the parable is that initially one abandons evil through good, and later both good and evil are doubly abandoned. Initially one abandons persons through dharmas and abandons existence through emptiness; next, persons and dharmas are both eliminated, and emptiness and existence are both doubly purified. Saṃsāra, nirvāṇa, and the ten thousand goods are all like this. If one relies on the treatise and the [translated] sūtra, the general idea is roughly the same, though the text differs slightly; the treatise sūtra also has three 'What is the reason?', which agrees in meaning with the older sūtra. The third 'What is the reason?' says 'one should neither grasp dharmas nor not grasp dharmas'; this clarifies the meaning of principle and teaching. Because realizing principle means forgetting the teaching, and seeing the moon means relinquishing the finger, it says 'one should not grasp dharmas.' Yet, relying on teaching to awaken to principle, and by means of the finger seeing the moon, it says 'nor not grasp dharmas.' Just as upon reaching the shore one abandons the raft, 'one should not grasp.' Because the raft was for crossing the river, 'one does not not grasp the raft.' Question: The raft parable is from a Hīnayāna sūtra; how can it serve as proof for the Mahāyāna? Answer: The raft in the lesser [vehicle] is called lesser; in the great [vehicle] it is called great. Furthermore, it adduces the lesser to illustrate the greater: if in the Hīnayāna Dharma both are already explained as abandoned, how much more so in the Mahāyāna? Just as the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā quotes the Kātyāyanāvavāda, where even Hīnayāna abandons existence and non-existence, how much more so the Mahāyāna? 'Dharmas should still be relinquished, how much more so non-dharmas': it clarifies that existence is what ordinary feelings settle into, yet it still must be relinquished; non-existence is not what the six senses confront, so how could one cling to it? Below 'Subhūti! What do you think?', this text appears for two reasons: first, it appears to verify faith. Above, faith without reliance and without apprehension was explained, up to relinquishing both dharmas and non-dharmas; now it clarifies that all āryas and sages make this same awakening, so one knows that this Dharma can be believed and accepted. Second, it appears in order to resolve doubts according to the treatise. The treatise master, up to this section, resolves three doubts in total: first, adducing that the dharmakāya is not conditioned to resolve the doubt of examining the cause through the fruit; next, the section on those with faith doubly resolves doubts regarding cause and fruit, which assumed that when the Dharma approach of cause and fruit is taught, no one would believe—the above explanation that there are those with faith resolves this doubt. Now, this section of the sūtra resolves examining the fruit through the fruit; the doubt [related to] the previous section that the dharmakāya is not conditioned stated that the lakṣaṇas of arising, abiding, and ceasing are not the unconditioned dharmakāya, and therefore one cannot see the Tathāgata's dharmakāya by means of these three lakṣaṇas.