金剛般若疏 4.14

4.14

From “Subhūti, if [a good man or good woman were to] pulverise the trichiliocosm into minute particles of dust” onward is the fourteenth chapter of the sūtra. Minute particles of dust have already been explained above; now that they are explained again, what is the difference? Explanation: There are both similarities and differences. As for the similarity, they are both taken as an analogy; as for the differences, the underlying reasons for their introduction are distinct. Previously, adducing the minute particles of dust served to illustrate giving with apprehension, introduced to establish the superior and inferior measures [of merit]. It explained that giving with apprehension is a cause tainted by defilement and brings about a result tainted by defilement in return; hence it is inferior to upholding a four-line verse of the sūtra. Now, adducing the analogy of the minute particles of dust serves to refute doubts regarding the oneness and difference of the dharmakāyas of the Buddhas of the ten directions. Just as when a world is pulverised into dust, it cannot be said to abide in a single place, because the particles are individually scattered; nor are they in different places, for since there is no aggregation, how could there be scattering? The dharmakāyas of the Buddhas of the ten directions cannot abide in a single place, nor can they abide in different places. Because they cannot abide in a single place, they are not blended into a single dharmakāya; because they cannot abide in different places, there cannot be individually distinct dharmakāyas for each. Therefore, the verse in the commentary says: “In this realm of the dharmadhātu, they are neither one nor different.” This refutes two conventional interpretations: either that the Buddhas of the ten directions are blended into a single dharmakāya, or that there are individually distinct dharmakāyas for each. Question: Why is the analogy of the minute particles of dust adduced to refute doubts regarding the oneness and difference of the dharmakāya? Answer: Just as the minute particles of dust are scattered and destroyed, so that they cannot be said to be in one place or different places, in the same way, because the afflictions of the Buddhas of the ten directions have been exhausted, their dharmakāya cannot be said to abide in one place or different places. Therefore, the verse in the commentary says: “The minute particles of dust are pulverised into powder / to demonstrate the exhaustion of afflictions.” Question: For what reason are doubts regarding the oneness and difference of the dharmakāya refuted? Answer: Above, it was explained that the nirmāṇakāya comes and goes, whereas the dharmakāya has no coming and going. Because the dharmakāya has no coming and going, doubts arose in the assembly at that time: Since the dharmakāyas of the Buddhas of the ten directions are alike in having no coming and going, do they form a single dharmakāya abiding in the same place? Or does each have its own dharmakāya abiding in different places? Furthermore, previously the view of the oneness and difference of the two bodies was extensively refuted in order to lead them to recognise the primary fruition; now the view of the aggregation and scattering of the minute particles of dust and the worlds is refuted in order to lead them to recognise the dependent fruition, thereby causing them to awaken to the meaning of ultimate emptiness that is neither dependent nor primary. Hence this passage has been introduced. In this passage, by first citing that doubt and immediately adducing the minute particles of dust of the trichiliocosm, [the Buddha] wishes to explain the meaning of the identity and difference of the dharmakāyas of all Buddhas of the ten directions. The reply saying “Very many” refers to the multitude of the Buddhas of the ten directions. “Speaking of minute particles of dust” adduces the minute particles of dust as an analogy. As conventional designations, minute particles of dust are non-existent; hence it says “are not minute particles of dust.” “Are called minute particles of dust” concludes again with the meaning of correct conventional designation. As for “the unitary composite characteristics of the world,” if minute particles of dust and the world are contrasted, the minute particles of dust illustrate that the dharmakāyas of the ten directions are not one, and the world illustrates that the dharmakāyas of the ten directions are not different. However, the commentary's intention employs the minute particles of dust to generally illustrate neither oneness nor difference, and the world specifically illustrates not one. Question: If the minute particles of dust previously illustrated neither oneness nor difference in general, why is the world adduced to specifically illustrate not one? Answer: When people hear that the dharmakāyas of the ten directions are all without coming and going, or greatness and smallness, they think they must be one. Because many have the doubt of oneness, oneness is specifically refuted. As for the unitary composite characteristics, this means combining the many particles of dust to form a world. That the unitary composite characteristics are ineffable means that the sage understands that combination has nothing to combine, as in the “Examination of Combination”: “This dharma does not combine with itself, / nor does it combine with a different dharma. / The dharma of combination, the time of combination, / and that which combines are all non-existent.” Therefore, there is no combination. It is merely that ordinary persons see the existence of a world and thus give rise to a mind of craving and attachment, saying that a world exists. As for “If someone says that the Buddha taught the view of a self,” this text closely connects to what precedes it, explaining that it arises because ordinary persons are cravenly attached to these things. The craving and attachment of ordinary persons stems from the view of a self; once the view of a self is absent, whence could craving and attachment arise? Furthermore, looking broadly back over the whole sūtra, throughout it has praised selflessness and the absence of a person, and it is merely that ordinary persons, being deluded, give rise to the view of a self and the view of a person. The assembly at that time then doubted: If the Buddha said that ordinary persons give rise to the view of a self, one should know that there is a view of a self that can arise; if there were no view of a self, the Buddha should not say that ordinary persons give rise to the view of a self. This is the first doubt. Furthermore, people of the two vehicles say: Because there is previously a view of a self, one eliminates the view of a self, and thereby obtains the cognition of selflessness, which is called attaining the path. This is the second doubt. Refuting the first doubt, it says: If someone says that in speaking of the view of a self there is then a view of a self that can be spoken of, they do not understand the meaning of what the Buddha taught. The Buddha merely wishes to explain that the view of a self is non-existent, and therefore speaks of the view of a self; he does not mean that speaking of the view of a self implies there is a view of a self that can be spoken of. Therefore, the final verse of the *Madhyamakaśāstra* says: “All dharmas being empty, / where and at what time, / and by whom could such views / of eternity in the world and so forth arise?” Therefore, not only is correct view unobtainable, but wrong view is also unobtainable; thus one knows that the gate of the Path has never been wrong or right. This sūtra is drawing to a close. Above, it refuted the previously held correct view with apprehension as unobtainable; now, it refutes its wrong view as also unobtainable, revealing that correct prajñā has never been wrong or right. This is precisely the reply to the people of the two vehicles: one also cannot say that there was previously a view of a self, and that by eliminating the view of a self one obtains the cognition of selflessness. Now it is explained that a self has fundamentally and ultimately been unobtainable from the beginning; what is there to be eliminated that one would speak of selflessness? As for “should thus know,” above it was explained that the view of a self has fundamentally been unobtainable, and now it is explained that the view of dharmas has also fundamentally been unobtainable; hence adducing the self lays out dharmas, and so it says that one should thus know, see, and resolve with faith, not giving rise to the characteristic of dharmas. As for “what is called the characteristic of dharmas is not the characteristic of dharmas,” this is also like the meaning of self. Just as the self taught by the Buddha is not a self, so too the characteristic of dharmas taught is not the characteristic of dharmas. Question: How do thus knowing, seeing, and resolving with faith differ? Answer: The verse in the commentary says: “Two cognitions and samādhi: / knowing is the cognition of worldly truth,” and seeing is the cognition of ultimate truth. Resolving with faith is the samādhi upon which the two cognitions depend; relying upon samādhi, the two cognitions are brought forth. Question: Why are two cognitions explained? Answer: Bodhisattvas comprehend the emptiness of persons and dharmas, fully possessing the two cognitions. Furthermore, for bodhisattvas of initial practice who have not yet attained the non-arising [of dharmas], their shallow awakening is called the cognition of worldly truth. For bodhisattvas of profound practice who have attained the acceptance of the non-arising of dharmas, their awakening to the twofold emptiness is called the cognition of ultimate truth. Samādhi is universally that upon which the cognitions of both persons depend.