金剛般若疏 4.3

4.3

From "Subhūti, if a good man or good woman" onward is the second major section. The first part above explained estimation; now it explains that which cannot be measured by estimation, reaching beyond what estimation can encompass. If one were to estimate it further, people would not believe it; hence it is called "inconceivable."

From "At that time Subhūti addressed the Buddha" onward: within the two rounds of teaching the Dharma, this is the second. According to the treatise master's twelve divisions, this is the tenth: resolving doubts. But we do not adopt this here. Why so? The treatise states, "From the section on the Tathāgata being unconditioned onward, all serve to resolve doubts that arise"; how then can one say that resolving doubts only begins here?

Others also say: The preceding text only answered the question on abiding and the question on subduing the mind; now it next answers the question on the bodhicitta. We now clarify: previously all four questions were fully answered; how could the answer to the question on the bodhicitta only begin here? Furthermore, since the earlier and later answers are no different, why would the earlier not be an answer regarding the bodhicitta, while only this one is? Such people see what is near but fail to see what is far.

Next, others say: The earlier part explained the emptiness of the cause, while this part explains the emptiness of the fruit. They consider practice and the like to be the cause—since the previous part analysed practice as empty, it is the cause; while bodhi is the fruit, and now it states that truly there is no bodhi to be attained, so it is the emptiness of the fruit. This too is incorrect. Above, the profound meaning of cause and fruit has already been fully explained; how could one claim that the earlier is the emptiness of the cause and this is the emptiness of the fruit?

We now explain that this is the second round of teaching. How is this known? Because the four questions before and after are entirely identical, and the Buddha's answers are also identical; therefore we know it is a second round of teaching.

Question: How do the two rounds of teaching differ?
Answer: The earlier is an extensive explanation, while the later is a concise explanation. The earlier was spoken for the earlier assembly, and the later was spoken for the later assembly. Thus the Mahāprajñāpāramitopadeśa, explaining the chapter on non-arising, states: "Question: Prajñā has already been spoken before; why should it be spoken again now? Answer: The earlier was spoken for the assembly that came before; the later was spoken for the assembly that arrived later. Just as with a cool pond, those who arrived first drank and departed, while those who arrived later drink again."

Question: The Mahāparinirvāṇa Sūtra says, "For sentient beings who arrive later, it is spoken in verses (gāthās)"; why then are verses not used here?
Answer: Preaching the Dharma has many modes; it cannot be restricted to a single pattern. Sometimes there is prose for the earlier assembly and verses for those who come later; sometimes both are verses, or both are prose, as stated in the Mahāprajñāpāramitopadeśa, which serves as proof.
Question: Why then are verses not used here?
Answer: Prajñā texts mostly do not use verses, because verses have a limited number of words and cannot exhaustively express profound meanings in all their nuances.

Next, it is explained that it is still a single assembly wherein two rounds are taught. The first round was spoken for people of sharp faculties; those of dull faculties who had not yet awakened are taught in the subsequent round.
Question: The earlier and later explanations are no different; how can the earlier be for people of sharp faculties and the later for people of dull faculties?
Answer: Although the general import is identical, the presentation and phrasing are varied, so that those of dull faculties, hearing it, still attain realization. Just as when a single principle is explained in one manner and not understood, if it is explained through a different approach, they awaken. Or just as when a single grain of rice is prepared as one type of food, one cannot eat it, but if it is made into a different food, one can eat it. Although this is an everyday analogy, it represents the grand design of the sages. "Prajñā is a single dharma; the Buddha speaks of it under various names, establishing different terms in accordance with the capacities of sentient beings"—this is precisely the proof.

Another meaning: The earlier round exhausts the objects (ālambana), while the later round exhausts contemplation. "The earlier round exhausts the objects" means that it correctly instructs the bodhisattva to generate the mind without apprehension, refuting the generation of the mind with apprehension, up to practicing without apprehension, refuting practice with apprehension; hence it exhausts the objects. Now, this section explains that there is no person who generates the bodhicitta, nor is there any person who practices; hence it exhausts contemplation. The treatise says, "If in internal practice one maintains the notion of 'I am a bodhisattva', this obstructs the mind and contradicts the path of non-abiding." How could the compositions of these sūtras and treatises be made in vain? Because objects are exhausted, there are no objects; because contemplation is exhausted, there is no contemplation. Having neither objects nor contemplation, one knows not what to call it, but in praising it, it is forcibly termed "correct contemplation"; correct contemplation is prajñā, is vajra.

Furthermore, the earlier round directly clarifies the practice of contemplation, while the later round removes the subject of contemplation. Thus the Mahāprajñāpāramitopadeśa, explaining the chapter on practicing in conformity, states: "Question: The two emptinesses of persons and dharmas have already been clarified above; why analyse the emptiness of persons again now? Answer: Previously, to refute the two illnesses of persons and dharmas, the two emptinesses of persons and dharmas were clarified; now it is to refute the person who contemplates emptiness."

Without the commentary's division, the sūtra has fifteen sections; with the commentary's division, there are sixteen sections in all, having one additional section on faith and acceptance.

Question: The earlier round of teaching opened into three gateways: first, the gateway of the essence of prajñā; second, the gateway of faith and acceptance; third, the gateway of merit. Can the later round for the later assembly also be like this or not?
Answer: According to the treatise's edition of the sūtra, it can also be like this. The beginning is the gateway of the essence of prajñā; faith and acceptance is the second gateway; and from the mass of the seven treasures like Mount Sumeru in the three-thousandfold world onward is the gateway of merit. Seeing now that the form is slightly different from the above, we do not open three gateways, but merely rely on the fifteen sections linked like an interlocking chain, taking the resolution of doubts and explanation of difficulties as the sequence.

The first section has two parts: first the question, then the answer. If treated from the perspective of the later assembly, the intent of the question is the same as before: in the past, having not yet relied on prajñā, generating the mind and practicing were not achieved; therefore they now request instruction on the meaning of generating the mind and practicing. If treated from the perspective of the contemplation of emptiness, the earlier question was to establish generating the mind and practicing, while the later question asks the Buddha to obliterate generating the mind and obliterate practicing.
Question: If the earlier was to establish generating the mind and practicing, and the later is to obliterate generating the mind and practicing, does this not entail a contradiction?
Answer: In the end, they accomplish a single meaning. It is precisely through obliterating the generation of the mind that the generation of the mind is accomplished; if one sees that there is a generation of the mind, the generation of the mind is not accomplished. Therefore, the earlier establishment of the generation of the mind is itself the obliteration of the generation of the mind, and the present obliteration of the generation of the mind is itself the generation of the mind.

In the Buddha's answer there are two parts: first, taking up the question to show that generating the mind is the exhaustion of objects; from "Why? Truly there is no one who generates the mind" onward, it explains the exhaustion of contemplation.
Question: How does the Buddha's answer differ from the above?
Answer: Above it only exhausted objects; here both objects and contemplation are exhausted—that is the difference. Furthermore, above was an extensive answer fully responding to all four questions; here is a concise answer, responding only to the generation of the mind. Since the generation of the mind is such, the other three questions follow by analogy, to demonstrate that the later round is a concise explanation. Another meaning is that if even the initial generation of the mind puts an end to both objects and contemplation, how much more so with practice and the rest—could they still retain apprehension?

From "What do you think? Did the Tathāgata at the time of Dīpaṃkara Buddha..." onward, the second section appears. The treatise's contextualization states: "If there is no bodhisattva who generates the mind, how could there now be a bodhisattva who receives a prophecy? Since there is a person who receives a prophecy, there must be one who generates the mind, because receiving a prophecy is the fruit and generating the mind is the cause; how could there be a fruit without a cause?" In the end, this progressively refutes the views of self and person based on apprehension. Previously the view of a person generating the mind was refuted; now the view of a person receiving a prophecy is refuted.

In the text there are eight occurrences of "bodhi", divided into two parts: first, five occurrences of bodhi, which cite the past awakening to the absence of a bodhisattva receiving a prophecy to resolve doubt; next, three occurrences of bodhi, which cite the present attainment of bodhi as the Buddha-fruit to resolve doubt.

In the first part there are three divisions: first, the Buddha's question; second, Subhūti's answer; third, the Buddha's confirmation. The first and second are as in the text. In the third, the Buddha's confirmation and explanation, there are three clauses on bodhi, divided into four points: first, directly stating that the principle is truly without marks, and therefore without apprehension; second, from "If there were a dharma" onward, this is a negative explanation: if there were something apprehended, no prophecy would have been received; third, from "Because truly there is no dharma" onward, this is a positive explanation: precisely because there is nothing apprehended, the prophecy was received; fourth, from "Why?" onward, it explains why having nothing apprehended leads to receiving a prophecy. Why does having nothing apprehended lead to receiving a prophecy? The explanation says: "Tathāgata" means the reality (tathatā) of all dharmas; because he embodies reality, he is called "Tathāgata", and because he embodies reality, he is said to receive a prophecy—within reality, how could there be any dharma to be attained? If there were something attained, one would not embody reality; not embodying reality, one is not called a Tathāgata, nor would one receive a prophecy.

From "If someone says" onward is the second part, citing the present time of attaining the fruit to resolve doubt. The doubt asks: If there is no bodhisattva who receives a prophecy, could there now be a Buddha who attains bodhi? Since there truly is a Buddha-fruit attaining bodhi, there truly must be a bodhisattva receiving a prophecy and generating the mind. In the end, this progressively refutes the views of self and person based on apprehension across all dharmas. Thus the sūtra says: "The view of bodhicitta, the view of prophecy, the view of Buddha, the view of bodhi, annihilationism, eternalism, and so forth are all of the same order."

"Truly there is no Buddha who attains bodhi": at the time of initial bodhicitta and receiving a prophecy, one already realized non-apprehension; how much more so when reaching Buddhahood could there still be a self or person attaining bodhi?

"That which the Tathāgata attains as sambodhi is neither real nor unreal": the above refuted the view of existence, now it refutes the view of non-existence. It clarifies that the Buddha attains sambodhi by taking non-attainment as attainment; why would it not be attained? Master Sengzhao said, "The profound path lies in the ultimate realm, where non-attainment constitutes attainment"—which is precisely this meaning. "Neither real nor unreal": the preceding separately criticized the views of existence and non-existence; this jointly concludes with neither existence nor non-existence. Because there is no attainment with apprehension, it is said to be "not real"; because there is no absence of attainment without apprehension, it is said to be "not unreal"—such is the treatise's meaning.

"Therefore the Tathāgata says that all dharmas are the Buddha-dharma": this completes the above meaning of neither real nor unreal, false nor existent. Because he embodies the reality (tathatā) of all dharmas, he is called the Tathāgata; therefore the reality of all dharmas is precisely the Tathāgata, which is why it is said that all are the Buddha-dharma.

"Are not all dharmas": all inverted dharmas are not what the Tathāgata realizes; hence it is said "they are not all dharmas." Because all reality is the Tathāgata, it is not non-existent; because all inversions are not the Tathāgata, it is not existent; thus it completes the above [principle of] neither existence nor non-existence. This is still the meaning of "having that which is absent and being devoid of that which exists" in the Mahāparinirvāṇa Sūtra. Because non-existence is called great nirvāṇa, it is the Tathāgata; having that which is absent is inverted saṃsāra, hence it is not the Tathāgata.

"Are called all dharmas": this returns to conclude with the reality of all dharmas.
Question: The above two lines were already sufficient; why conclude further below?
Answer: The first line directly clarifies that all dharmas are the Tathāgata; the next two lines distinguish their existence and non-existence: the first line clarifies the absence of all inversions, and the second line clarifies the presence of the reality of all dharmas.

Question: What is the difference between the earlier mention of Dīpaṃkara Buddha and this one?
Answer: The earlier was introduced to establish the meaning of being ungraspable and ineffable; this one is introduced to establish the absence of a bodhisattva. Furthermore, the earlier briefly explained the meaning, while the eight occurrences of bodhi below explain the meaning extensively.

Regarding the treatise's explanation of the Buddha's answer, the treatise's verse says: "Because the prophecy was received at a later time, Dīpaṃkara's practice was not supreme." A treatise master explained: "There are four periods of Dīpaṃkara and four periods of prophecy, namely the stage of practice disposition (adhimukticaryā-gotra), nature disposition (prakṛti-gotra), path disposition (gotra of the path), and the first bhūmi. The earlier Dīpaṃkara was at the time of the practice disposition; the present one is at the two times of nature disposition and path disposition. Here it is merely a nominal prophecy, not yet the true prophecy of non-arising, hence it says there is no dharma attaining bodhi. If at this time he had already received the true prophecy of non-arising, the subsequent Dīpaṃkara would not have conferred a prophecy again." We now hold that this explanation has no textual basis. The treatise simply states, "Because the prophecy was received at a later time, Dīpaṃkara's practice was not supreme"; these words are inherently difficult to explain, and there are no four periods of prophecy or four Dīpaṃkaras. Furthermore, even if such a doctrine existed, it does not accord with the literal or thematic context; therefore it is not accepted here.