金剛般若波羅蜜經略疏 2.46

2.46

Regarding the fourth [part], revealing the measure of the virtues of practice, there are five [sections] in the text: First, there are four sentences citing the number of finely crushed dust motes to reveal that defilement is exhausted and purified, because within the dharmadhātu there is not a single abiding mark. The 'collection of dust motes' is presented as a metaphor for non-oneness. Second, 'Why is this?' is a question and answer explaining the intent behind the arising of the teaching. Third, from 'Furthermore, why' onward explains the purport of the holy teaching, within which there are successively five sentences that may be understood. Fourth, from 'The Buddha said, Subhūti' onward reveals its correct meaning. Fifth, from 'yet ordinary persons' onward harmonizes with the holy intent, within which there are eight mutually generating sentences that may be understood. The text says that if worlds and an integrated composite were real existents, the Tathāgata would not speak of them. Why is this? Because ordinary persons would be right and the holy ones would be wrong; the rest should be gauged accordingly. As for the text saying 'an integrated composite', it is like discriminately seeing a single real mark. If one wishes to recognize the meaning of the text, one must first open up two marks concerning the positions of ordinary persons and holy ones in relation to the words of the text: First, regarding sentient beings: seeing an integrated composite, it is an integrated composite, and it is not an integrated composite. Second, regarding holy ones: speaking of an integrated composite, it is not an integrated composite, and it is named an integrated composite. Relying on these two gates, it is easy to grasp the understanding. What is its meaning? Sentient beings seeing an integrated composite: because they rely on seeming [dust] to form an understanding of real dust, they do not see that seeming dust depends on numerous conditions and does not abide when produced; thus it does not form an integrated mark. Deludedly seeing real dust, they only see a single existence. That it 'is an integrated composite' is because they see real dust as having a definite nature; thus it is integrated. That it 'is not an integrated composite' is because they see the reality of dust as lacking real principle, being no different from nonexistence; thus it is not integrated. That the Buddha speaks of an integrated composite: the Buddha knows that seeming dust is formed by temporary combination, not existent yet seeming to exist; therefore he speaks of an integrated mark. That it 'is not an integrated composite' has two meanings: first, it is not that integrated composite of real dust alleged by those ordinary persons; second, because those various conditions do not abide and do not produce when producing, it is not a seeming integration. That it 'is named an integrated composite': because those various conditions seem to combine to form dust, it is not nonexistent; hence it is named an integrated composite. Now, the holy intent in speaking of an integrated composite reveals that ordinary discrimination is its error and blindness. The integrated composite seen by the holy ones is free from discrimination and conforms to its correct principle; therefore there are these two statements providing an expedient means of access. What is its meaning? There are two kinds of expedient means: First, because of seeming production, one is free from the discrimination of nonexistence, since seeing seeming existence, it cannot be nonexistent—if one sees it as nonexistent, that is discrimination; because of seeming non-production, one is free from the discrimination of existence, since seeing seeming nonexistence, it cannot be existent—if one sees it as existent, that is discrimination. Second, because of seeming production, one is free from the discrimination of nonexistence, since seeing seeming existence, it cannot be nonexistent—if one sees it as nonexistent, that is discrimination; because of seeming production, one is free from the discrimination of existence: now seeing seeming existence is not real existence—if one sees real existence, that is discrimination. Because of seeming non-production, one is free from the discrimination of existence, since seeing seeming nonexistence is not real existence—if one sees real existence, that is discrimination; because of seeming non-production, one is free from the discrimination of nonexistence, since seeing seeming nonexistence is not real nonexistence—if one sees real nonexistence, that is discrimination. This should be pondered. Why is this? Because the meaning here is not identical with the subsequent eight metaphors.