仁王經疏 2.333

2.333

問：諸眾生有本際不？若言有者，如何經說眾生本際不可知？若言無者，此經所說復如何通（勘《不增不減經》等）？解云：即依此義，總約諸宗所說不同，有其四句：一有始無終，謂彌沙塞部中立有時頭眾生，隨緣而有。如真諦《部執記》中說。而彼宗中雖無成文，義說無般涅槃性及佛果不滅者，得成初句。二無始有終，謂如薩婆多宗及經部，及大乘中定性二乘。三有始有終，如彌沙塞部宗中，二乘聖者入無餘位。四無始無終者，無涅槃性、不定種性及菩薩種性，如《瑜伽》等。餘師所說，不可具陳。若依《本記》有二義：一依理論，不可說煩惱在前在後；二依教化門，且約受生等說之為初。

Question: Do sentient beings have an absolute beginning or not? If one says they have one, why do sūtras say that the absolute beginning of sentient beings is unknowable? If one says they do not, how is what this sūtra says to be reconciled? (Examine the Sūtra of Neither Increase Nor Decrease and so forth.) It is explained: based on this meaning, generally surveying what the various schools say, which is not uniform, there are four propositions: 1. Having a beginning and no end: this refers to the Mahīśāsaka school positing that there are sentient beings who have a temporal beginning, coming into being according to conditions, as stated in Paramārtha's Commentary on the Nikāyabheda. Although there is no explicit text in that school, if it is meaningfully explained that those without the nature to attain nirvāṇa and the buddhahood-fruit are unceasing, the first proposition can be established. 2. Having no beginning but having an end: this refers to the Sarvāstivāda school and the Sautrāntikas, as well as the determinate two vehicles in the Mahāyāna. 3. Having a beginning and having an end: as in the Mahīśāsaka school, when the noble ones of the two vehicles enter the stage of remainderless [nirvāṇa]. 4. Having no beginning and no end: those without nirvāṇa-nature, those of indeterminate gotra, and those of the bodhisattva gotra, as in the Yogācārabhūmi and so forth. What other masters say cannot be fully set forth. If one relies on the Original Commentary, there are two meanings: first, relying on theoretical principle, one cannot say afflictions are prior or posterior; second, relying on the gate of teaching and transformation, one provisionally speaks of it as the beginning with respect to undergoing birth and so forth.