仁王經疏 2.286

2.286

Explanation: From here below, the second part jointly explains the two piṭakas to elucidate the inconceivable. The text has two distinct parts: first the explanation, and next the conclusion. In the explanation, there are two parts: first, clarifying the inconceivable by contrasting person and phenomena; second, clarifying the inconceivable by contrasting object and cognition. In the first of these, there are two: first, clarifying the emptiness of the person; second, clarifying the emptiness of phenomena. This is the first. The text has two sections: first, discerning the emptiness of the characteristics of the self by means of three meanings; second, from 'afflictions' onward, discerning the emptiness of the person with reference to the multiple names for the self. This is discerning the characteristics of emptiness by means of the three meanings. As for the three meanings: first, unarisen and unceasing; second, unbound and unliberated; third, neither cause nor effect, yet not devoid of cause and effect. Regarding 'unarisen and unceasing', the various expositions differ. One says: 'Unarisen and unceasing' is the general phrase, meaning that all sentient beings have birth and death, which is termed 'arising and ceasing'. By setting aside both death and birth, it says 'unarisen and unceasing'. Another says: 'Unarisen' dispels the eternalist view, because they posit that the self arises and does not cease. 'Unceasing' dispels the annihilationist view, because they posit that the self ceases and does not continue. Regarding 'unbound and unliberated', the text below explains it distinctively. Since there are no sentient beings, who can be said to be bound or liberated? Therefore, the Dazhidulun, chapter 51, 'Chapter on Bondage and Liberation', says: 'The five aggregates have neither bondage nor liberation, being ultimately empty. There being no agent, who is bound or liberated? The ordinary person's phenomena are deceptive and ungraspable, therefore they are not bondage; the noble person's phenomena are ultimately empty and ungraspable, therefore they are not liberation. And further, it says: The bodhisattva abides in this path; afflictions do not drag him down into ordinary persons, hence it is said "unbound"; he does not use uncontaminated dharmas to destroy afflictions, hence it is said "unliberated".' It is fully explained as in that text. Paramārtha explains: The tathatā of personal emptiness is not bound by afflictions, nor is it comprehended by wisdom, because it is empty and devoid of anything to be grasped. Regarding 'neither cause nor effect', it sets aside both. The Vaiśeṣika non-Buddhists posit the self as the agent, calling it 'cause'; the Sāṃkhya non-Buddhists posit the self as the experiencer, calling it 'effect'. Therefore it says 'neither cause nor effect'. Regarding 'yet not devoid of cause and effect', according to conventional principle there are not no causes and effects. Regarding 'afflictions' onward, it discerns the emptiness of the person with reference to the multiple names for the self. Herein there are two: first, 'afflictions' points out the dharma that can grasp, namely the affliction of the view of self. Because self, person, and so forth disturb and torment practitioners, they are called afflictions. Next, 'self, person', and so forth discerns the grasped self, which has numerous names. Herein there are two: first, discerning the five names of the self: 1. self (ātman), 2. person (pudgala), 3. knower (jñātṛ), 4. seer (draṣṭṛ), 5. experiencer (bhoktṛ). Next, 'belonging to the self' and so forth discerns the emptiness of what belongs to the self, meaning that the aforementioned five kinds of self all have what belongs to the self, from what belongs to the first, the self, up to what belongs to the fifth, the experiencer. Summing up the five kinds, it therefore says 'empty of what belongs to the self'. The entity of the dharma to be eliminated comprehensively subsumes the three feelings, namely painful feeling termed the suffering of suffering, pleasant feeling termed the suffering of change, and neutral feeling termed the suffering of conditioning; therefore all three feelings are comprehensively termed 'painful feeling'. Since these three feelings are all conditioned formations and are equally the dharmas eliminated as belonging to the self, it therefore says 'because all painful feelings and conditioned suffering [are empty]'.