仁王護國般若波羅蜜多經疏 2.421

2.421

解曰：行斯道者，謂諸菩薩依此證修，境智俱寂，如虛空故。又以此文對不知亡相生正解者，為立量云：觀照般若為宗有法，定無照相為宗之法。法及有法和合為宗。無知無見等故，別三合一，以為因法。由如虛空，此是喻法。若爾，對佛弟子宗有相符，小乘諸師因犯隨一。若有空者、若無空者，喻犯有俱無俱不成：略有四過。若對外道，宗有所別，能別不極成，同有隨一，彼不許此。無知見等，取彼無想，非此極成。喻對空論、對無空論，有俱無俱，二二不成，略有六過。有過之量，豈能立破耶？此亦不然。為對大乘初心菩薩，未解亡相生正解者，此無過量。小乘諸宗慧解狹劣、外道倒執，耳初不聞，寧以摩尼爾無目者？然此量中改經「而」字以為「定」字，取文不次，性相求故。由此自上明忍境智一一文中有多比量，皆無過失，能生正解，樂者敘焉。又於菩薩境智之中，如次亦為苦集滅道。從此第二釋結難量。於中分二：初釋難量、後結難量。釋難量中，文復分三：且初第一標不可得。

The commentary states: 'Those who practice this path' refers to the bodhisattvas who, relying on this, realize and cultivate; object and cognition are both quiescent, because they are like empty space. Furthermore, relying on this text to generate correct understanding for those who do not understand the obliteration of signs, an inference is established thus: Contemplative prajñā is the subject (dharmin) of the thesis; definitely lacking signs of illumination is the property (dharma) of the thesis. The property and subject combined constitute the thesis (pakṣa). Being without knowing, seeing, etc., brings the three distinct parts together as one to serve as the reason (hetu). Being like empty space serves as the example (dṛṣṭānta). If so, against Buddhist disciples, the thesis commits the fallacy of proving what is already accepted (siddhasādhana), and for the Hinayāna masters, the reason commits [the fallacy of] non-establishment for one party (anyatarāsiddha). Whether for those who accept emptiness or those who do not, the example commits [the fallacies of] absence of both [properties] or presence of both in the negative, roughly four fallacies. If against non-Buddhists, the subject has a distinct qualification, the property to be established is not commonly recognized (aprasiddhaviśeṣaṇa), and likewise there is non-establishment for one party because they do not accept this. 'Without knowing and seeing' takes their non-conception, which is not commonly recognized here. Against treatises on emptiness or treatises on non-emptiness, the example would fail in both ways, having roughly six fallacies. Can an inference with fallacies establish or refute anything? This is not so. For initial bodhisattvas of the Mahāyāna who have not yet understood the obliteration of signs, this inference generates correct understanding without fault. The Hinayāna schools have narrow intelligence, and non-Buddhists have inverted attachments, so their ears have never heard this; how could one show a mani-jewel to the blind? However, in this inference, the word 'yet' from the sūtra was changed to 'definitely', drawing from the text out of sequence because it seeks nature and characteristics. For this reason, from above onward in every text explaining the kṣāntis, objects, and cognition, there are many inferences, all without fault, able to generate correct understanding; those who delight in it may recount them. Furthermore, within the bodhisattva's object and cognition, they correspond in order to suffering, origin, cessation, and path. Hereafter is the second [part], explaining and concluding the immeasurability. In this there are two divisions: first, explaining the immeasurability; second, concluding the immeasurability. Within explaining the immeasurability, the text is again divided into three: first, indicating unattainability.