仁王護國般若波羅蜜多經疏 2.536

2.536

The commentary: "If one says it does not exist" and so on is a twofold challenge. If the conventional does not exist, cognition should not be two—why then speak of having two cognitions, the real and conventional? If one says it exists, cognition should not be one—why then, at the time of realization and understanding through real cognition, is there no duality? Clarifying this in terms of persons: ordinary persons are deluded about the real, and their cognition takes only the conventional as its object; for the two vehicles, principle and phenomena are taken as objects separately in concentration and distraction; for bodhisattvas on the bhūmis, real cognition is exclusively directed to the real; prior to the fifth bhūmi, fundamental cognition realizes the real, and subsequent cognition penetrates the conventional, so the two cognitions do not occur together with respect to the ultimate and conventional truths; from the eighth bhūmi onward and up to all buddhas, although the objective realms are two, cognition can occur together. In general, based on this meaning, the question is posed accordingly: if one says it does not exist, conventional cognition should not see two; if one says it exists, real cognition should not illuminate one. Repeating the objective realm to challenge cognition, there is this distinction. From here, the third part concludes with a twofold "how is it?"