般若波羅蜜多心經幽贊 2.34

2.34

The proponent of conforming [teaching] says: 'If distinct phenomena are also said to be identical to emptiness, then within paramārtha-satya this itself becomes a contradiction: those who have not awakened should know that form is itself emptiness, and those who have awakened would not awaken to the emptiness of form; diligent noble ones would be pitiable and lamentable, while indolent foolish persons would be enviable and delightful. As the Bhagavat said: "What is a bodhisattva’s conforming, harmonizing, and skillfully discerning pāramitā? If sentient beings do not understand the emptiness sūtras spoken by the Buddha, thinking that all phenomena lack intrinsic nature, lack actual things, are unarisen and unceasing, and are all like illusions and dreams; then the bodhisattva, harmonizing it properly for them, should tell them: 'This sūtra does not say that all phenomena are entirely nonexistent; it only says that the expressed intrinsic nature of phenomena is entirely nonexistent, and therefore it says that all phenomena lack intrinsic nature. Although there are all things spoken of, based on which various verbal expressions operate, the expressed intrinsic nature that can be spoken of is, according to paramārtha-satya, not its intrinsic nature, and therefore it says all phenomena are nonexistent. Since the expressed intrinsic nature of all those phenomena is fundamentally nonexistent, what would be arisen? What would be ceased? Therefore it says all phenomena are unarisen and unceasing. Furthermore, just like illusions and dreams, they do not exist as they appear in reality, nor are all physical forms of illusions and dreams completely nonexistent; so it is with these phenomena: they do not exist in reality as manifested by the force of foolish persons' habitual verbal expressions, nor is the ineffable intrinsic nature of all phenomena in paramārtha-satya completely nonexistent. Realizing from this that all phenomena are neither existent nor nonexistent, like illusions and dreams, their nature being non-dual, it is therefore said that all phenomena are like illusions and dreams. Thus the bodhisattva, throughout the entire realm of phenomena (dharmadhātu), grasps nothing whatsoever, rejects nothing whatsoever, neither diminishes nor augments, and does not destroy anything. If a phenomenon actually exists, he knows it as actually existing; if a phenomenon actually does not exist, he knows it as actually not existing; teaching in this manner is called the bodhisattva’s conforming, harmonizing, and skillful means.'" The intention of this sūtra is to say that the spoken intrinsic nature of all phenomena clung to by all foolish persons according to words, like illusions and dreams, lacks intrinsic nature, completely lacks actual things, and is unarisen and unceasing; it does not mean that the ineffable dharmatā, which is the sphere of the holy wisdom of the two truths (ultimate and conventional), is nonexistent, nor is it like the physical forms of illusions and dreams being completely devoid of substance and termed 'non-nature' and so on. Understanding that what is grasped is nonexistent is called awakening to non-existence; understanding that the holy sphere exists is called awakening to non-nonexistence; hence it is said that the bodhisattva grasps nothing whatsoever and rejects nothing whatsoever, knowing the nonexistent as nonexistent and knowing the existent as existent. If, according to paramārtha-satya, the substance of phenomena were completely empty without the slightest existence, making this harmonizing explanation would not be skillful, and claiming awakening to non-nonexistence without rejecting anything would also be a futile formulation, becoming a deprecation that destroys the correct principle. From this we know that the intention of this sūtra is to refute prior grasping to form as existent, and therefore it speaks of form as empty. 'Empty' means nonexistent; it is not the emptiness of dharmatā. The form-marks conceived by the foolish person based on subjective feelings are fundamentally nonexistent in their intrinsic nature. If one clings to non-emptiness and to emptiness being established only when form is destroyed, these become two inversions, so both should be discarded, revealing that the phenomenon and principle of form are not as clung to, so that one does not give rise to false thoughts and inverted views. When false thoughts are cut off, clung-to forms perish; therefore, cutting off other-dependence dispels the parikalpita. Just as when cataracts are cured, one no longer sees sky-flowers, the two vehicles and heterodox paths grasp real functioning, while phenomena born of causes and conditions are completely nonexistent in nature. Therefore the Holy One said: 'Phenomena born of causes and conditions, I declare to be empty'—not that the illusion-like form of other-dependence is also entirely empty. Therefore a verse says:
'The nature of abhūta-parikalpa
Is established by this principle;
It is neither truly existent nor completely nonexistent,
Because its destruction is acknowledged as liberation.'
Furthermore, the holy teaching says: 'Phenomena do not arise from themselves, nor do they arise from another, nor from both, nor without both.' Although there is no clung-to functioning cause and condition, functional conditions are indeed obtainable. If these did not exist, conventional truth would not exist, and because conventional truth did not exist, paramārtha-satya would also not exist. Dependent on what, and through what, would one attain liberation? Or, this emptiness is the emptiness of dharmatā: if one clings to parikalpita forms and other-dependent forms as definitively different from true existence, making ultimate and conventional definitively distinct, this is extreme confusion. Now it is revealed that the nature of these two forms is empty suchness, markless, asaṃskṛta, and the sphere of ineffable wisdom; one should abandon both grasps and seek true emptiness. Therefore they are subsumed into emptiness, dispelling both false views; the form of dharmatā is itself the true mark, not different and immediately empty—what confusion could there be in this? The Holy One taught that the two truths each have shallowness and depth: mutually comparing them, both have conventional and ultimate; there is the conventional-conventional conventional, the conventional-conventional ultimate, the ultimate-ultimate ultimate, and the ultimate-ultimate conventional. The conventional is the conventional ultimate, and the ultimate is also the conventional ultimate: there is conventional and there is ultimate; when conventional is absent, ultimate is destroyed. Since it is not that form is absent and emptiness alone exists, nor is it that form and emptiness are definitively non-different or identical, true emptiness and form are neither different nor non-different, neither identical nor non-identical. Now, to preclude definitive difference and the like, it only speaks of 'not different' and 'identical'; yet this statement of 'not different' and 'identical' is itself neither not different nor identical. The *Madhyāntavibhāga* states:
'Because of the existence of the non-dual and the non-existence [of the dual],
It is neither existent nor nonexistent,
Neither different nor one;
This is explained as the mark of emptiness.'