般若波羅蜜多心經幽贊 2.36

2.36

The sacred teaching also says: 'Phenomena are not produced from themselves, nor are they produced from another, nor are they produced from both, nor are they produced without both.' Although there are no grasped causal conditions of active functioning, conditions of efficacy can indeed be found. If these did not exist, there would be no conventional truth; and because conventional truth would not exist, ultimate truth would also not exist. Relying upon what, or by means of what, would liberation be attained? Or again, this emptiness is the emptiness of dharmatā. If one grasps the parikalpita forms and the paratantra forms as definitively different from true existence, and conventional and ultimate [truths] as definitively separate, this is an utter delusion. Now, showing that the nature of both forms is itself empty suchness, signless, asaṃskṛta, and the cognitive object of wisdom beyond verbal expression, one should abandon the two grasps and seek to progress toward true emptiness. Therefore, subsuming them under emptiness and eliminating both false views, the form of dharmatā is in substance itself the true mark, not different and immediately empty—what confusion is there in this? The noble teaching states that the two truths each have their depths and shallows; in comparison with each other, they each have the conventional and the ultimate. There is the conventional within the conventional; there is the ultimate within the conventional; there is the ultimate within the ultimate; and there is the conventional within the ultimate. What is conventional is the conventional of the ultimate, and the ultimate is also the ultimate of the conventional. There is the conventional and there is the ultimate; when the conventional is absent, the ultimate ceases. Since it is neither that form is absent and emptiness alone exists, nor that form and emptiness are definitively not different or identical, true emptiness and form are therefore neither different nor non-different, neither identical nor non-identical. Now, refuting definitive difference and the like, one only speaks of non-difference and identity; and this speech of non-difference and identity is itself neither non-different nor identical. The Madhyāntavibhāga says: