般若波羅蜜多心經贊 1.26

1.26

問：「色空相對為一異耶？一體相即，便成一執；體若異者，則是異執；亦一亦異，寧不相違？非一非異，應成戲論。」釋此四句，分別成兩解。一、外道、小乘多依表門，以說四句，言有、無等，有所詮故。二、依大乘有無等言皆是遮詮，一切諸法不可說故，然一切法皆有二相，謂即自、共，自相唯是現量智得，非假智言所可得故。若假智言所詮得者，謂即共相。且如說青，莖葉等相，其相各異，唯現量得，由斯假智及諸名言，但能詮表青上共相，而說青時，遮黃等故名為說青，非正表青，故說遮詮。就遮詮中自有兩說，一、清辨宗，其性道理不可以名名，不可以相相，破而無執，立而無當，所引理教，準上應知。二、護法宗，實有世俗、勝義道理，皆離名言，於中真性對世俗故說真性言，非無所詮。清辨宗中，一師所說亦同此釋。是故護法破清辨曰，若依真性說諸法空，便成相符極成之失。於清辨宗遣依他性，護法不許故有差別。由斯道理，內宗所說有無等言皆是遮詮，遠離一異戲論等失。依清辨宗釋文已訖。

Question: "When form and emptiness are correlated, are they identical or different? If they are identical in one essence, that would be an attachment to identity; if their essences are different, that would be an attachment to difference; if both identical and different, how would they not contradict each other? If neither identical nor different, it would become conceptual proliferation." Explaining these four phrases, analysis yields two interpretations: First, non-Buddhists and the Hīnayāna mostly rely on the direct affirmative method to state the four phrases, using terms such as 'existence' and 'non-existence', because there is something expressed. Second, according to the Mahāyāna, words like 'existence' and 'non-existence' are all apophasis, because all dharmas are ineffable. However, all dharmas have two characteristics: specific and common. The specific characteristic is attained solely by direct perception knowledge and cannot be attained by conceptual knowledge and words. What is expressed and attained by conceptual knowledge and words is the common characteristic. Take, for example, speaking of 'blue': the aspects of stem, leaf, and so forth have distinct characteristics and are attained solely by direct perception; therefore, conceptual knowledge and nominal designations can only express the common characteristic of blue. When one says 'blue', it is called 'saying blue' because it excludes yellow and the rest, not because it directly affirms blue; thus it is called apophasis. Within apophasis there are themselves two explanations: First, the school of Bhāviveka holds that the nature of truth cannot be named by names and cannot be characterized by characteristics; it refutes without holding attachments, and establishes without taking any position. The reasoning and scriptures cited should be understood by analogy with the above. Second, the school of Dharmapāla holds that there truly exist saṃvṛti and paramārtha truths, both of which are beyond words; among them, the true nature is spoken of with the words 'true nature' in contrast to saṃvṛti, not that it lacks an object of expression. In Bhāviveka's school, the statement of one master is also identical to this explanation. Therefore, Dharmapāla refuted Bhāviveka, saying: "If you explain that dharmas are empty on the basis of the true nature, you fall into the fault of arguing what is already mutually accepted." Because Bhāviveka's school eliminates the paratantra nature, which Dharmapāla does not accept, there is a divergence. By this principle, what is stated in the Buddhist school, such as words of 'existence' and 'non-existence', is all apophasis, far removed from faults such as the conceptual proliferation of identity and difference. The explanation of the text according to Bhāviveka's school is concluded.