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Translation of 般若波羅蜜多心經贊

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English
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108 passages, 16,645 words
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pramana-mt · Machine translation by Gemini 3.8 Flash (2026-10-21) of in.bauddha.taisho.1711 · Machine output without human authorship: no copyright is claimed (CC0 1.0). The original text keeps its own…

Contents

Text

1.1

Composed by the Śramaṇa Woncheuk.

1.2

Intending to explain this sūtra, it is distinguished into four sections: first, the causes and conditions for the arising of the teaching; second, determining the tenets and essence of the sūtra; third, defining and explaining the title; fourth, analyzing the text and explaining [it].

1.3

Regarding the arising of the teaching: we observe that the ultimate principle is profound and serene, marvelously transcending the realm of existence and non-existence; the nature of dharmas is exceedingly deep, capable of surpassing the expressions of names and words. However, as the approaches to the principle are without a single way, the exposition of the two piṭakas was opened; and since the setting up of the teaching must have a basis, the responses of the three bodies were fully manifested. One may say that when the spring water is clear and pure, the reflection of the moon suddenly appears; when all enemies stir in the dark, the heavenly drum sounds of itself. Nevertheless, responding to beings has its proper time, guiding them according to their capacities. Thus the Tathāgata set rolling the three dharmacakras: to cause those who have not yet entered the Dharma to proceed into it, he first opened up the causes and effects of saṃsāra and nirvāṇa in the Mṛgadāva in Vārāṇasī; this is the first dharmacakra of the catur-āryasatya, which can eliminate the attachment to self. For those who have already entered, to turn them toward the Mahāyāna, he taught the various prajñās in the sixteen assemblies at Gṛdhrakūṭa and elsewhere; this is the second animitta dharmacakra, through which the attachment to dharmas as having a real nature is gradually severed, yet the attachment to emptiness could not yet be dispelled. Therefore, thirdly, in pure and impure lands such as the Padmagarbha, he taught the nītārtha Mahāyāna such as the Saṃdhinirmocana-sūtra, fully revealing the two principles of emptiness and existence and jointly eliminating the two biased attachments to existence and non-existence. This, then, is the arising of the teaching.

1.4

Regarding the tenets and essence: "essence" generally clarifies the expressive essence of the teaching; "tenet" specifically reveals what is expressed by the various teachings. Now, regarding the essence of the Buddha's teaching, the various assertions are not the same. The Sarvāstivāda school takes voice as the essence, because names and the like are neutral, while voice is wholesome. According to the Sautrāntika school, it is conventional continuous sound, because apart from voice there are no separate names, phrases, and so forth. According to the Mahāyāna school, the various teachings differ: in some places it is solely voice, as in the Vimalakīrti-nirdeśa, where in some Buddha-lands voice performs the Buddha's work; in some places it takes only names and the like as the essence, as in the Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi, where the unhindered cognition of dharmas takes names and the like as its intentional object; in some places it speaks of voice and names together, as the Daśabhūmika-sūtra says that both the speaker and the hearer rely on two things, namely voice and names, and so forth. Why is there this difference among the various teachings? In fact, subsuming the conventional under the real, both voice and names and so forth are taken as the essential nature, but the various noble teachings each rely on one particular meaning, and thus they do not contradict one another. Why is this? Subsuming the conventional under the real, voice is taken as the essence, because apart from voice there are no separate names, phrases, and so forth. Subsuming the essence under its function, names and the like are the essence, because they are the two bases that express the intrinsic nature and distinctions of all dharmas. The conventional and the real depend on each other, and they are spoken of together as the essence, because if either one is lacking, the teaching cannot be established. Subsuming the object under the mind, consciousness is taken as the essence, because sūtras state that all dharmas are not separate from consciousness. Subsuming the false and returning to the true, suchness is taken as the essence, because the Benevolent King Sūtra and others speak of the true nature of all dharmas.

1.5

Regarding the tenets expressed, there are briefly three kinds: first, distinguishing the tenets according to illnesses; second, revealing the tenets according to individual texts; third, determining the tenets with reference to periods of time. Distinguishing the tenets according to illnesses means that all sentient beings, owing to ignorance, give rise to the eighty-four thousand gates of afflictions such as greed and anger; therefore, the Tathāgata prescribed medicines according to the illnesses, [giving] the eighty-four thousand dharma-gates of the aggregates and so forth, whereby each one, according to what is appropriate, takes the aggregates, sense bases, elements, and so forth as its expressed tenet. Revealing the tenets according to individual texts means that within each individual text, although there are various approaches, when investigating their ultimate import, each differs according to the text: for example, the Saddharmapuṇḍarīka-sūtra takes the ekayāna as its tenet, the Vimalakīrti takes non-duality as its tenet, the Mahāparinirvāṇa-sūtra takes Buddha-nature as its tenet, and the Avataṃsaka takes the causes and effects of the sages and āryas as its tenet; the remaining various texts should be understood by analogy with the above. Determining the tenets with reference to periods of time means that although the classes of noble teachings are numerous, when determining their tenets with reference to the periods, they do not exceed three kinds. These three kinds are precisely the catur-āryasatya, animitta, and the nītārtha Mahāyāna, as taught in the Saṃdhinirmocana-sūtra. As for this present single text, among all the tenets, it takes animitta as its tenet.

1.6

"The Prajñāpāramitā Heart Sūtra Spoken by the Buddha."

1.7

Regarding the title: "Spoken by the Buddha" indicates the master who can speak. The Sanskrit sound is buddha, which is translated here as "awakened"; endowed with the wisdom of the ultimate and the conventional, and with the awakening of self and others perfected, he is therefore called "Buddha." Unfolding the wonderful gate to lead sentient beings to understanding is called "speaking." "Prajñāpāramitā" distinguishes the Dharma that is spoken; in this land it is translated as "wisdom gone to the other shore." "Heart Sūtra" directly reveals the expressive teaching. In the body, the sovereign mind alone is preeminent; among all the prajñās, this teaching is most venerable; having established its name by metaphor, it is therefore called "Heart." Sūtra has two meanings: stringing together and upholding; because it strings together the meanings that should be spoken, and upholds the sentient beings who are transformed. This is a dependent-compound name, establishing its designation based on the expressive and the expressed, the Dharma and the metaphor; therefore it is said, "The Prajñāpāramitā Heart Sūtra Spoken by the Buddha."

1.8

"Avalokiteśvara Bodhisattva,"

1.9

Fourth, analyzing the text and explaining [it]. Within this sūtra there are altogether three parts: first, clarifying the wisdom that contemplates; next, from "Śāriputra" below, distinguishing the object that is contemplated; finally, from "Because there is nothing to attain" below, revealing the fruit that is attained. The reason why it has no preface and no dissemination section is that it is a concise compilation of the essentials from the various prajñās; therefore it has only the main body, without preface or dissemination, just like the Avalokiteśvara Sūtra, which does not possess the three parts. Regarding "Avalokiteśvara Bodhisattva": within the first part it is further divided into two: first, indicating the person who contemplates; next, distinguishing the essence of the contemplative wisdom. This is the first, indicating the person who contemplates. According to the old version, he was named Guanshiyin: contemplating the sounds and vocal actions of all worldly beings calling the Bodhisattva's name in order to rescue them from various difficulties, his name was established accordingly as Guanshiyin; however, this could not yet reveal the contemplation of the actions of body and mind. The present version says Avalokiteśvara (Guanzizai): internally realizing the two kinds of emptiness and externally contemplating the three karmas, not relying on effortful exertion and spontaneous at will, he is therefore called Avalokiteśvara. Now, is this Bodhisattva really in the causal stage, bound to one more birth, or has he already become a Buddha? Supposing this is so, what is the fault? If he is a bodhisattva, how should one reconcile and explain it? The Guanyin Samādhi Sūtra says: "The Buddha told Ānanda, 'I now speak the truth; the matter is not false. I recall that Avalokiteśvara Bodhisattva attained Buddhahood before me, with the name Zhengfaming Tathāgata, Arhat, Samyaksaṃbuddha, Vidyācaraṇasaṃpanna, Sugata, Lokavid, Anuttara, Puruṣadamyasārathi, Śāstā Devamanuṣyāṇām, Buddha, Bhagavat. At that time, I was an ascetic disciple under that Buddha.'" If he is a Buddha, how should one reconcile the prophecy regarding Avalokiteśvara? That sūtra says: "Good son! The lifespan of Amitābha Buddha is immeasurable hundreds of thousands of koṭis of kalpas, yet it will have an end, and he will enter parinirvāṇa." It further says: "Good son! After the true Dharma of Amitābha Buddha has perished, past midnight when the morning star appears, Avalokiteśvara Bodhisattva will sit cross-legged under the seven-jeweled bodhi tree and achieve equal, perfect awakening, named the Tathāgata King of the Mountain of Universal Light and Merit, complete with the ten epithets, and up to the land being named Adorned with Many Jewels." Furthermore, the Sukhāvatīvyūha-sūtra says: "Avalokiteśvara Bodhisattva practiced the bodhisattva conduct in this land, and at the end of his life transferred and was born in that Buddha-land." Explanation: Because the name Avalokiteśvara is the same while the persons are different, the two accounts do not contradict each other. It is just as in the Saddharmapuṇḍarīka-sūtra, where various Buddhas share the same name Candrasūryapradīpa. Another explanation: Avalokiteśvara himself has two kinds: first, the real; second, the transformative. The first is the real body, as in the Avalokiteśvara Sūtra; the second is the transformation body, as in the Sukhāvatīvyūha-sūtra. It is like the Saddharmapuṇḍarīka-upadeśa, where Śākyamuni Tathāgata achieved awakening long ago, yet with respect to the transformative appearance, he only now becomes a Buddha. Although there are two explanations, the latter explanation is superior, as it accords with the noble teachings and does not contradict reason.

1.10

"when practicing the deep prajñāpāramitā,"

1.11

The second distinguishes the wisdom that contemplates. In this there are two parts: first, clarifying the essence of the wisdom; second, distinguishing the function of the wisdom. This clarifies the essence of the wisdom. "Practicing" means proceeding forward; it is the wisdom that contemplates. "Deep" means exceedingly profound; depth has two kinds. First, depth of practice: the nirvikalpa-jñāna internally realizes the two kinds of emptiness, free from all discriminations, with neither an agent nor an object of practice serving as its mental aspect; hence it is called "practicing deeply." Therefore the Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā says: "Not seeing practice, not seeing non-practice: this is called the bodhisattva practicing the deep prajñā." Second, depth of the object: namely, the principle of the two kinds of emptiness, free from the marks of existence and non-existence and cutting off all conceptual proliferation; the nirvikalpa-jñāna realizes this deep object, hence it is said, "practicing deeply." The Sanskrit sound is prajñā, translated here as "wisdom." "Pāra" is called "the other shore"; "mita" is called "gone"; following their syntax it should say "wisdom other shore gone," but following the language of this region it is "wisdom gone to the other shore": through wisdom one severs hindrances and arrives at the city of nirvāṇa, therefore it is said to be "wisdom gone to the other shore." "Time" means the temporal period. The Mahāprajñāpāramitā-śāstra states that temporal periods are conventionally designated relying on conditioned dharmas, but time, number, and so forth are dharmas not included in the enumerations of aggregates, sense bases, and so on. The Śramaṇa-śāstra also agrees with this explanation, wherefore that treatise states: "Relying on dharmas, time is conventionally designated; apart from dharmas there is no separate time." The Yogācārabhūmi and others state that temporal periods are conventionally established upon the prior and subsequent states of conditioned dharmas, included in the aggregate of formations as unassociated dharmas. According to the Buddhabhūmy-upadeśa, it also agrees with this explanation, wherefore that treatise states: "One posits the states of time as unassociated, or as mental images." The overall intent of the explanation is: prajñā has three kinds, namely literal prajñā, contemplative insight, and dharmatā; in order to reveal contemplative insight and distinguish it from dharmatā and the like, it says "when practicing the deep prajñāpāramitā" (here the three kinds of prajñā should be explained).

1.12

"illuminated and saw that the five aggregates are all empty,"

1.13

Distinguishing the function of that wisdom. Function has two kinds: first, benefiting oneself; second, benefiting others. Here, clarifying the contemplation of emptiness is precisely benefiting oneself. Intending to explain this text, we first recount the various contemplations, and then explain this sūtra text according to the preceding contemplations. Regarding the various contemplations: now, the Buddha-Dharma is exceedingly profound, fundamentally possessing only a single flavor, but because trainees have not awakened, different assertions have arisen. Therefore, the Bhagavat in the Buddhabhūmi-sūtra taught: The Buddha addressed Miaosheng: "For example, various great and small streams, before entering the great ocean, each have distinct bases, and their waters have distinctions, increases, and decreases; when they enter the great ocean, they have no distinct bases, and their waters have no distinctions, increases, or decreases. In the same way, bodhisattvas, before realizing and entering into the great ocean of the Tathāgata's pure dharmadhātu, each have distinct bases, and their wisdoms have distinctions, increases, and decreases; once they have realized and entered into the great ocean of the Tathāgata's pure dharmadhātu, they have no distinct bases, their wisdoms have no distinctions, increases, or decreases, and they experience harmonious, single-flavored functional wisdom." Bandhuprabha explained: "Before one thousand years, the Buddha-Dharma was of a single flavor; after one thousand years had passed, emptiness and existence conflicted and disputed. One thousand years after the Buddha's parinirvāṇa, in the country of Kāñcī in the realm of South India, two bodhisattvas appeared in the world at the same time: the first was Bhaviveka, and the second was Dharmapāla. To cause sentient beings to awaken and enter into the Buddha-Dharma, they established the schools of emptiness and existence, jointly fulfilling the Buddha's intent. Bodhisattva Bhaviveka grasped emptiness and negated existence in order to eliminate the attachment to existence; Bodhisattva Dharmapāla established existence and negated emptiness in order to eliminate the attachment to emptiness. However, emptiness does not contradict existence, for the principle of emptiness is not non-existent, nor does it contradict the teaching that emptiness is form; this naturally establishes both emptiness and existence, in accord with the two truths, and neither empty nor existent, tallying with the Middle Way. Is this not indeed the great tenet of the Buddha-Dharma?"

1.14

Question: "How could the dispute between existence and non-existence accord with the Buddha's intent?" Answer: "Clinging to ego-supremacy greatly contradicts the noble teaching. The Buddha himself acknowledged them as liberated bodhisattvas; how much more so when the two bodhisattvas mutually complemented one another to give rise to understanding in beings—how could they contradict the Buddha's intent?"

1.15

Therefore, I will now briefly state two approaches of contemplation. First, relying on the various *Prajñā* [sūtras] and the school of Nāgārjuna, Bhāviveka establishes an approach of contemplation: namely, the approach of contemplating emptiness by going through dharmas and banishing marks, establishing that all dharmas are completely empty, without arising and without cessation, fundamentally tranquil, and intrinsically in nirvāṇa. Hence the *Prajñā Sūtra* says, "All conditioned phenomena / Are like dreams, illusions, bubbles, shadows, / Like dew and like lightning; / One should contemplate them thus." Further, the *Viśeṣacinti-brahma-paripṛcchā-sūtra* states, "Distinguishing dharmas with the mind is entirely erroneous; not distinguishing dharmas with the mind is entirely correct." Further, the *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā* states, "If there were something non-empty, there would accordingly be emptiness; if the non-empty cannot even be apprehended, how much less could emptiness be apprehended?" Again, the *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā* states, "The Buddhas sometimes speak of a self, and sometimes speak of a non-self; within the dharmatā of all dharmas, there is neither self nor non-self." Texts such as these provide many clear proofs. For this reason, Bhāviveka's *Karatalaratna* states, "Conditioned [dharmas] are empty in their true nature, because they arise from conditions, like an illusion; unconditioned [dharmas] have no real [existence], being unarisen like sky-flowers." Second, relying on the *Saṃdhinirmocana-sūtra* and others, and on the school of Maitreya, Dharmapāla establishes an approach of contemplation: namely, the approach of contemplating emptiness by abiding in consciousness and negating objects, establishing that all dharmas partake of both existence and non-existence—the imagined nature exists in conception but is non-existent in principle, the dependent nature exists because of causes and conditions, and the perfected nature exists in principle and is not non-existent. Hence the *Saṃdhinirmocana-sūtra* states that based on the imagined [nature], it is said that all dharmas lack self-nature; the *Ratnakūṭa-sūtra* states that if one repudiates all dharmas as lacking any nature, I say that person is incurable; the *Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra* and others state that based on the imagined nature, the sūtras say all dharmas lack self-nature; and a verse in the *Madhyāntavibhāga-śāstra* says, "Unreal distinction exists; duality is entirely non-existent in this; within this there is only emptiness, and in that there is also this; therefore all dharmas are said to be neither empty nor non-empty, because of existence, non-existence, and existence; thus it accords with the Middle Way." Texts such as these provide many clear proofs. For this reason, the *Viṃśatikā-vijñaptimātratāsiddhi* and others state, "It is not through knowing that all dharmas are non-existent in every way that one is said to enter the selflessness of dharmas; rather, it is through realizing that the self-nature and distinctions of dharmas imagined by foolish ordinary people are without a self of dharmas—only thus is it named entering the selflessness of dharmas." The accounts of contemplation are as above; now the text should be explained.

1.16

As for the "five aggregates," they are the aggregate of form, [and those of] sensation, ideation, mental formations, and consciousness. The five physical sense-faculties, objects, and form included in the sphere of phenomena have ascertainable spatial locations and the characteristic of material obstruction; hence they are named "form." Unpleasant, pleasant, and neutral sensations respectively experience adverse, agreeable, and neutral objects; hence they are named "sensation." The ideation associated with the various consciousnesses grasps the limits and features of objects, such as male or female, giving rise to various verbal expressions; hence it is named "ideation." Mental factors such as volition drive the mind, causing it to generate wholesome and other [actions]; hence they are named "mental formations." The various consciousnesses, such as the eye-[consciousness], cognize objects; hence they are named "consciousness." Because all five kinds have the meaning of accumulation, they are named "aggregates." These five aggregates are of three kinds: first, the five aggregates of the imagined nature exist in conception but are non-existent in principle; second, the five aggregates of the dependent nature exist conventionally through causes and conditions; third, the five aggregates of the perfected nature exist in real principle. Hence the *Madhyāntavibhāga-śāstra* states that there are three kinds of aggregates: first, the aggregate of the imagined; second, the aggregate of categories; and third, the aggregate of dharmatā. This adopts the new translation. The *Aṣṭādaśanirhāra-śāstra* is also identical to that statement; hence that treatise says there are three kinds: first, distinction; second, categories; and third, tathatā. Within these three kinds of five aggregates, each has both the emptiness of self and the emptiness of dharmas. Saying that "all are empty" reveals the principle realized, which is the aforementioned two kinds of emptiness. Depending on these forms of emptiness, [the commentators] divide into two explanations. In Bhāviveka's school, there are itself two explanations: one says that of the three, it banishes the first two natures, but not the perfected nature, and hence the *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā* states, "Dharmas that arise from causes and conditions, precisely these are explained as empty"; the other says that the five aggregates of all three natures are empty, and hence the *Karatalaratna* states, "Unconditioned [dharmas] have no real [existence], being unarisen like sky-flowers"—according to this, one should know that the perfected is also banished. In Dharmapāla's school, among the three kinds of aggregates, it only banishes the imagined in order to discern emptiness, the reason and scriptural proof cited being fully as stated above. Some editions have "contemplated and saw that the five aggregates and so forth are all empty." Although there are two editions, the latter edition is the correct one. Checking the Sanskrit text, the word "and so forth" is present; subsequent occurrences of "and so forth" should be understood accordingly.

1.17

"Relieved all suffering and distress":

1.18

This is the second part, which reveals the function of benefiting others. This has three [interpretations]: first, suffering is itself distress, hence it is called "suffering and distress"—among the six compound interpretations, this is a karmadhāraya compound. Conditioned dharmas with defilements are nothing other than suffering; hence the Bhagavat said that the three realms are entirely suffering. However, this category of suffering briefly has three kinds, namely the suffering of suffering, the suffering of change, and the suffering of conditioned existence; moderately, there are eight: the suffering of birth, old age, sickness, death, association with the disliked, separation from the loved, failure to obtain what is sought, and the suffering of the five clinging-aggregates; at length, there are the sufferings of suffering across the twenty-five states of existence, each possessing the four conditioned marks of arising, abiding, changing, and ceasing, thus forming one hundred sufferings. The twenty-five states of existence are the four continents, the four evil destinies, the four formless realms and four dhyānas, the Brahma king, the six heavens of the desire realm, [the heaven of] non-conception, and the anāgāmin [heavens]. A proposed note states: distress refers to the four yokes, namely desire, existence, views, and ignorance; these four bind sentient beings, causing them to undergo various sufferings, just like the yoke of a cart. If based on this explanation, because it is the distress of suffering, it is called "suffering and distress"; hence among the six compound interpretations, it is a tatpuruṣa compound. Another says that suffering and distress refer to distinct things, as in the former two explanations; hence among the six compound interpretations, it is a dvandva compound.

1.19

"Śāriputra":

1.20

From here below is the second part, discerning the contemplated object. In this there are two parts: first, discerning emptiness by means of the four propositions; and second, revealing the marks of emptiness based on the six meanings. In the former there are two: first, indicating the person who receives the teaching; and second, directly discerning emptiness. This is the indication of the person. In Sanskrit, *Śāriputra*, or pronounced *Śāriphuttara*; *śāri* is translated as "myna bird," and *putra* is translated as "son." Because his mother's eyes were clear and dark blue, resembling the eyes of a myna bird, the mother was named "Myna Bird." The *Prajñāpāramitā Sūtra of Brilliant Transubstantiation* calls him the "Son of the Heron"; or he is called *Upatisya*, which is a title derived from his father. The old translation as "Son of the Body" (*Shenzi*) is erroneous.

1.21

Question: "This prajñā is the teaching of bodhisattvas; why did the Bhagavat address Śāriputra rather than a bodhisattva?" Answer: "As the *Mahāprajñāpāramitā-śāstra* says, Śāriputra attained ten thousand samādhis, and among all disciples of the Buddha, he was foremost in wisdom; therefore the Bhagavat said that of the wisdom of all sentient beings, excluding only the Buddha, the Bhagavat, if one wished to compare it with the wisdom and vast learning of Śāriputra, it would not equal even one-sixteenth part. Moreover, when Śāriputra was only eight years old, whenever he established a thesis, his expressions and principles were transcendent, and the debate masters of the time praised it as unprecedented, with fools and the wise, small and great alike submitting to him. The remaining causes and conditions are explained at length in that treatise; hence here he addressed Śāriputra, also desiring to guide those of the small [vehicle] to turn towards the Mahāyāna."

1.22

"Form is not different from emptiness; emptiness is not different from form. Form is itself emptiness; emptiness is itself form":

1.23

This directly discerns emptiness by means of the four propositions. In this there are two: first, discerning the four propositions with respect to the aggregate of form; and second, analogizing that the other four aggregates each have four propositions. This discerns the four propositions with respect to the aggregate of form. Before explaining the four propositions, first discerning emptiness: as distinguished before, emptiness is of two kinds: first, the emptiness of the person; and second, the emptiness of dharmas. The emptiness of the person that has been spoken of has four kinds: first, the non-existence of the imagined self is called emptiness, because it is not included in the categories of dharmas; hence the *Bodhisattvabhūmi* in the *Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra* says that conditioned and unconditioned dharmas are called existent, while the absence of self and what belongs to self is called non-existent. Second, the tathatā revealed by the emptiness of the person is also called emptiness because it is what is expressed by emptiness. Third, the distinct emptiness of defilements subsumed under the truth of suffering takes the defiled five aggregates as its essence; hence the sixth fascicle of the *Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi* says that distinct emptiness and non-self belong to the truth of suffering. Fourth, the general emptiness and non-self subsumed by all dharmas takes all dharmas as its essential nature; hence the various sūtras say that all dharmas are without self. Although there are four kinds, based on the principle of the three natures, they are subsumed under three: first, the emptiness of the imagined nature; second, the emptiness of the dependent nature; and third, the emptiness of the perfected nature—these take the three natures as their essences, respectively. As for the four kinds of emptiness of dharmas, although there is no explicit canonical text, deduced by reason there should be four propositions. The three kinds of emptiness of dharmas should be known by analogy with the above. If distinguished at length, there are eighteen kinds of emptiness, as in the *Aṣṭādaśanirhāra-śāstra*; based on the *Large Prajñāpāramitā Sūtra*, they are sometimes spoken of as sixteen, seventeen, eighteen, and up to twenty, fully as stated in that sūtra.

1.24

Now, explaining the four propositions based on the three natures: among the four propositions, the first two propositions indicate the principal correct teaching, and the latter two propositions eliminate doubts from outsiders. "Form is not different from emptiness" indicates that the conventional is not different from the ultimate; "emptiness is not different from form" indicates that the ultimate is not different from the conventional. Next, eliminating doubts from outsiders: an outsider might raise a doubt, 'Is it called not different because they mutually depend on each other? Or is it called not different because they are identical?' Therefore, this statement is made: 'Form is itself emptiness, emptiness is itself form'—it is not called not different because they mutually depend, nor is it called not different because they are identical. Based on this text itself, the Western masters have two explanations.

1.25

First, Bhāviveka and others say: Form is of three kinds, namely the imagined and so forth; emptiness can banish nature, and its essence is not the three natures. Now, in saying 'form is itself emptiness,' because the imagined nature is fundamentally non-existent, it is called empty. According to reality, this emptiness is also not empty; hence the *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā* states, 'If there were a non-empty dharma, there would then be an empty dharma; but in reality there is no non-empty dharma, so how could there be an empty dharma?' The emptiness of the latter two natures should be known by analogy with this: in order to remove the attachment to existence, that word 'empty' is spoken. The dependent nature is like an illusion and so forth, being empty because of conditions; the perfected nature, because it does not arise, is like a sky-flower, and its own essence is also empty. In a school of commentators there is yet another explanation: it banishes the first two natures, but not the perfected nature, because both schools mutually accept that it is free from the characteristics of existence and non-existence and cuts off conceptual proliferation.

1.26

Question: "When form and emptiness are correlated, are they identical or different? If they are identical in one essence, that would be an attachment to identity; if their essences are different, that would be an attachment to difference; if both identical and different, how would they not contradict each other? If neither identical nor different, it would become conceptual proliferation." Explaining these four phrases, analysis yields two interpretations: First, non-Buddhists and the Hīnayāna mostly rely on the direct affirmative method to state the four phrases, using terms such as 'existence' and 'non-existence', because there is something expressed. Second, according to the Mahāyāna, words like 'existence' and 'non-existence' are all apophasis, because all dharmas are ineffable. However, all dharmas have two characteristics: specific and common. The specific characteristic is attained solely by direct perception knowledge and cannot be attained by conceptual knowledge and words. What is expressed and attained by conceptual knowledge and words is the common characteristic. Take, for example, speaking of 'blue': the aspects of stem, leaf, and so forth have distinct characteristics and are attained solely by direct perception; therefore, conceptual knowledge and nominal designations can only express the common characteristic of blue. When one says 'blue', it is called 'saying blue' because it excludes yellow and the rest, not because it directly affirms blue; thus it is called apophasis. Within apophasis there are themselves two explanations: First, the school of Bhāviveka holds that the nature of truth cannot be named by names and cannot be characterized by characteristics; it refutes without holding attachments, and establishes without taking any position. The reasoning and scriptures cited should be understood by analogy with the above. Second, the school of Dharmapāla holds that there truly exist saṃvṛti and paramārtha truths, both of which are beyond words; among them, the true nature is spoken of with the words 'true nature' in contrast to saṃvṛti, not that it lacks an object of expression. In Bhāviveka's school, the statement of one master is also identical to this explanation. Therefore, Dharmapāla refuted Bhāviveka, saying: "If you explain that dharmas are empty on the basis of the true nature, you fall into the fault of arguing what is already mutually accepted." Because Bhāviveka's school eliminates the paratantra nature, which Dharmapāla does not accept, there is a divergence. By this principle, what is stated in the Buddhist school, such as words of 'existence' and 'non-existence', is all apophasis, far removed from faults such as the conceptual proliferation of identity and difference. The explanation of the text according to Bhāviveka's school is concluded.

1.27

Second, explaining the four phrases according to Dharmapāla: Form is of three kinds, namely the forms of the three natures; emptiness is also of three kinds, their essences being the three natures. Therefore, Bodhisattva Asaṅga says in the Madhyāntavibhāga: "There are three kinds of emptiness: first, emptiness of non-nature, because its nature does not exist; second, emptiness of different nature, because it is different from the falsely conceptualized self-nature; third, emptiness of self-nature, because what is revealed by the two kinds of emptiness is its self-nature." Correlating the form of the parikalpita with emptiness in the four phrases, there are three types: First, discerning the four phrases by correlating imagined form with imagined emptiness: the form of the faculties, objects, and so forth imagined according to sentiment is not different from the fundamentally non-existent emptiness of what is imagined; therefore, it is said that 'form is emptiness'. The fundamentally non-existent emptiness exists according to sentiment; therefore, it is said that 'emptiness is form'. This is identity within the same nature. The two phrases establishing the tenet should be understood by analogy with the above. Second, discerning the four phrases by correlating imagined form with paratantra emptiness: relying on the paratantra, the imagined real form is not different from the emptiness devoid of real existence of the paratantra; therefore, it is said that 'form is emptiness'. And that false sentiment clings to real form in that place of emptiness; therefore, it is said that 'emptiness is form'. The two phrases establishing the tenet should be understood by analogy. This is identity across different natures. Third, discerning the four phrases by correlating imagined form with the pariniṣpanna: clinging to real form upon the pariniṣpanna nature is not different from the emptiness of the self-nature of the pariniṣpanna; clinging to real form upon the emptiness of self-nature, it is therefore said that 'form is emptiness' and 'emptiness is form'. The two phrases establishing the tenet should be understood by analogy. This, like the paratantra, is identity across different essences. Correlating the form of the paratantra with the emptiness of different nature, there are four phrases: form born of conditions is not different from the emptiness of the paratantra's different nature; yet because this empty nature has the quality of material obstruction, it is therefore said that 'form is emptiness' and 'emptiness is form'. This is identity within the same nature. The two phrases establishing the tenet should be understood by analogy. Another explanation correlates the form of the paratantra born of conditions with the emptiness of two natures, giving two sets of four phrases: correlating with the different nature is no different from the preceding explanation; correlating with the emptiness of self-nature also has four phrases: form born of conditions takes suchness as its essence, yet that empty nature is not different from the paratantra. Thus the Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi says: "Therefore this and the paratantra are neither different nor non-different, like the nature of impermanence and so forth." And the Madhyāntavibhāga says: "Herein there is only emptiness, and therein this also exists." By this principle, paratantra and pariniṣpanna are mutually inseparable; therefore it is said that 'form is emptiness' and 'emptiness is form'. It is not said that they are identical because of the emptiness of conditioned arising; if it were not so, it would incur the fault of contradicting one's own tenet. This is identity across different natures. The two phrases establishing the tenet should be understood by analogy. Correlating the pariniṣpanna nature with the emptiness of self-nature has its four phrases: the pariniṣpanna is the real nature of paratantra form, and is therefore called form; because it is revealed by the two kinds of emptiness of self and dharmas, the pariniṣpanna is said to be empty; by this principle, it is therefore said that 'form is emptiness' and 'emptiness is form'. This is identity within the same nature. The two phrases establishing the tenet should be understood by analogy.

1.28

"Sensation, perception, volition, and consciousness are also like this."

1.29

This is the second part, analogously explaining the [remaining] four aggregates: each has four phrases, and the identity of the four phrases should be understood by analogy with the above. Another explanation: this sūtra exists in two recensions. One recension is as above; another recension of the sūtra states: "Sensation, perception, volition, consciousness, and so forth are also like this." The word 'and so forth', by analogy with the text below, refers to the six dexterous skills: aggregates, bases, elements, conditioned arising, the four noble truths, and bodhi and nirvāṇa. Now, by raising the four aggregates to encompass the other five gates, all of which have the four phrases, it says 'and so forth'. The distinctions among the meanings of the six gates will be analyzed below.

1.30

"Śāriputra, this emptiness-characteristic of all dharmas does not arise and does not perish, is neither defiled nor pure, and neither increases nor decreases."

1.31

Hereunder is the second part: revealing the characteristic of emptiness through six meanings. Within this there are two: first, directly revealing the characteristic of emptiness through the six meanings; second, eliminating the dharmas of the six gates on the basis of the characteristic of emptiness. In revealing the six characteristics, the address to Śāriputra has already been explained above; the six characteristics are non-arising, non-perishing, non-defilement, non-purity, non-increase, and non-decrease. However, regarding these six characteristics, there are two explanations from the West: first, Bhāviveka; second, Dharmapāla. Explaining the six characteristics according to Bhāviveka's school: what was originally non-existent now becoming existent is called arising; what temporarily exists and then reverts to non-existence is called perishing (as explained in the Yogācārabhūmi); the inherently defiled and impure is called defilement; what is free from defilement and not defiled is called purity (as stated in various teachings); clinging to a dharma as having function is called increase; falsely conceiving a dharma to be destroyed is called decrease (as explained in the Mahāyānasaṃgraha). Regarding the three pairs of six characteristics, there are three differing explanations: One says: this text distinguishes the three according to stage, meaning that because the true empty nature is free from all characteristics, prior to the path one is far removed from samsaric arising and perishing; on the path there is no defilement or purity of affliction and wisdom; after the path one permanently abandons the increase and decrease of essence and function. Another says: this text distinguishes the three according to nature: because the parikalpita is fundamentally non-existent, it does not arise and does not perish; because the paratantra arises from conditions, it is neither defiled nor pure; because the pariniṣpanna does not arise, it neither increases nor decreases. Another says: these three pairs of six characteristics each apply throughout all stages and all natures, universally eliminating the three natures so that nothing is retained. Among the three, the latter is superior, as it accords with the fundamental tenet. According to Dharmapāla's school, in truth the characteristics of emptiness are indeed numerous, being neither identical nor different, neither existent nor non-existent, and so forth; yet the sūtra temporarily speaks of three pairs of six because arising and perishing are the common characteristics of conditioned phenomena, defilement and purity merely discern the self-nature of dharmas, and increase and decrease express the conceptual function upon dharmas. In truth, the three emptinesses all possess the six characteristics; the intent of the sūtra is specifically to reveal the emptiness of self-nature, because the true principle revealed by the two kinds of emptiness of self and dharmas universally serves as the basis for both delusion and awakening.

1.32

"Therefore, in emptiness there is no form, no sensation, perception, volition, or consciousness;"

1.33

Hereunder is the second part: eliminating the dharmas of the six gates on the basis of the preceding characteristic of emptiness. Eliminating the dharmas of the six gates is divided into six: this is the first, the gate of eliminating the five aggregates, meaning that because the emptiness of all dharmas is endowed with the six characteristics, therefore in emptiness there are no dharmas of the five aggregates. The distinction in meaning of the five aggregates has already been explained above. As for the dharmas of the six gates spoken of here, they collectively reveal the common and distinct spheres of the two vehicles. Because the first three merely reveal the nature of dharmas, they are called the common spheres of the three vehicles; based on the preceding nature of dharmas, gates such as conditioned arising are expounded distinctly according to faculties, and therefore the latter three are called the distinct spheres. Thus the Saddharmapuṇḍarīka-sūtra says that for śrāvakas he expounded the Dharma of the four truths, for pratyekabuddhas he expounded the Dharma of conditioned arising, and for bodhisattvas he expounded the Dharma of the six pāramitās.

1.34

"no eye, ear, nose, tongue, body, or mind; no form, sound, scent, taste, touch, or dharmas;"

1.35

This is the second, because it eliminates the twelve bases. Now we briefly explain the meaning of the twelve bases, distinguishing them through three gates: first, clarifying the arising of the teaching; second, explaining the names; third, identifying the essence.

1.36

Regarding the arising of the teaching, it has two purposes: namely, entering into the two kinds of emptiness of self and dharmas. Entering into the emptiness of self is as stated in the Viṃśikā-vijñaptimātratāsiddhi: relying on this teaching of the twelve bases expounded [by the Buddha], if one understands that from six pairs of dharmas six consciousnesses evolve, and that there is entirely no seer up to knower, one can enter into the selflessness of sentient beings. Entering into the emptiness of dharmas is this elimination of the twelve bases spoken of here, revealing the principle of the emptiness of dharmas. The difference in how Bhāviveka and Dharmapāla eliminate dharmas should be considered as above.

1.37

Next is explaining the names, first generally and then specifically. First, generally clarifying the twelve bases: 'twelve' is specifying the number; 'base' (āyatana) has the meaning of generating and growing, meaning that the six faculties and objects generate and grow all mind and mental factors, hence they are called bases; among the six compound analyses, it is a numeral determinative compound (digu-samāsa). Next, the specific names are as explained in the third fascicle of the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra: "Furthermore, repeatedly observing various colors, observing and then relinquishing them, it is therefore called the eye. Repeatedly, upon sounds arriving here, being able to hear them, it is therefore called the ear. Because by this one can repeatedly smell various scents, it is therefore called the nose. Being able to dispel hunger and emaciation, repeatedly producing speech, expressing, and calling out, it is therefore called the tongue. Followed by all the faculties, being a pervasive accumulation, it is therefore called the body. Ordinary persons throughout the long night adorn, conceal, and protect it, clinging to it as their own, conceiving it as 'mine' and 'self'. Furthermore, the worldly, relying on this, nominally designate various names and notions, calling it sentient being, person, jīva, born one, mind-born, māṇava, and so forth; therefore it is called mind. Repeatedly demonstratable, located in a spatial direction, and its material obstruction can increase; therefore it is called form. Frequently appropriate and frequently passing away, giving rise to diverse discourses accordingly; therefore it is called sound. Detached from matter and concealed in form, repeatedly moving with the wind; therefore it is called scent. Capable of being tasted by the tongue, repeatedly incurring illness and suffering; therefore it is called taste. Frequently capable of being experienced by the body; therefore it is called touch. Universally capable of sustaining, an object remembered solely by the mind; therefore it is called dharma."

1.38

Third, regarding identifying the essence: As stated in the treatises, the eye faculty has for its essence subtle matter made of the four great elements, upon which eye-consciousness relies. As it is said of the eye faculty, so too through to the ear faculty: it has for its essence subtle matter made of the four great elements, upon which ear-consciousness relies. The mental faculty generally takes the eight consciousnesses as its essence. As for form, as stated in the Abhidharmasamuccaya, it has for its intrinsic nature twenty-five forms that are made of the four great elements and are the domain of the eye faculty—namely: blue, yellow, red, white, long, short, square, round, coarse, fine, high, low, straight, crooked, light, shadow, brightness, darkness, cloud, smoke, dust, mist, far form, indicative form, and the manifesting form of space. Sound has eleven [kinds], namely: agreeable, disagreeable, or neither; caused by grasping the great elements, caused by not grasping the great elements, or caused by both great elements; generally accepted by the world, introduced by cultivation, imputed by conceptualization, subsumed under noble speech, or not subsumed under noble speech. Odour has six kinds, namely: good odour, bad odour, neutral odour, innate odour, composite odour, and transformed odour. Taste has twelve [kinds]: bitter, sour, sweet, acrid, salty, bland, agreeable, disagreeable, neither, innate, composite, and transformed. Tangibles have twenty-six, namely: the four great elements, smoothness, roughness, lightness, heaviness, softness, slackness, tautness, cold, hunger, thirst, turbidity, satiety, strength, debility, faintness, itching, stickiness, illness, aging, death, exhaustion, rest, and vigour. For these five dust-objects, elaborate explanations are as in the Abhidharmasamuccaya-vyākhyā; the agreements and differences among the treatises are fully set forth in a separate chapter. The base of mental objects takes as its intrinsic nature eighty-two dharmas among the hundred dharmas: fifty-one among mental factors; one among forms, namely form belonging to the base of mental objects; twenty-four conditioned dharmas non-concurrent with mind; and six unconditioned dharmas. Relying on the Abhidharmasamuccaya and others, it takes eighty-eight dharmas as its intrinsic nature, namely the four kinds of form belonging to the base of mental objects and two unconditioned dharmas, fully as explained therein. Analysis through other headings is extensive, as in a separate chapter.

1.39

As for "no eye-element up to no mind-consciousness-element":

1.40

This is the third [section], negating the eighteen elements. These eighteen elements are analysed through three portals: first, showing the arising of the teaching; second, explaining the names; third, identifying the essential nature. Regarding the arising of the teaching: because of those who grasp form and mind as a self and those of lower faculties, the Bhagavat taught the eighteen elements. Next, regarding the explanation of the names: first general, then specific. As for generally naming them the eighteen elements: "eighteen" is the number; "element" (dhātu) has the meanings of clan and of distinction of nature, because all dharmas comprise eighteen clans and distinctions of nature; this is a compound bearing a number, which should be understood by analogy with the above. Next, regarding the specific names: the six faculties and six dust-objects are as explained under the bases; the six consciousnesses derive their names with two meanings. First, named from the object, as form-consciousness up to mental-object-consciousness, names are established following the objects because that accords with the meaning of consciousness. Second, named from the faculties, as eye-consciousness up to mind-consciousness, names are established following the faculties because they fully possess the five meanings of subduing, generating, and so forth. This means "consciousness of form," thus called form-consciousness, up to "consciousness of mind," thus called mind-consciousness; therefore, among the six compound types, it is a tatpuruṣa compound. If analysed fully, it is as explained in the fifth fascicle of the Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi. Finally, clarifying the essence: the twelve [elements] of the eye and so forth are as explained under the bases; the six consciousnesses of the eye and so forth, in accordance with their own names among the hundred dharmas, take the six consciousnesses of the eye and so forth as their intrinsic nature. The remaining headings are extensive, as in the treatises.

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