妙法蓮華經玄義 1.224

1.224

今古諸釋，世以光宅為長。觀南方釋大乘，多承肇、什。肇、什多附通意。光宅釋妙，寧得遠乎？今先難光宅，餘者望風（云云）。因體廣狹四難者：若謂昔因體狹為麁，指何為昔？若指三藏等，可然。若指《法華》已前皆稱為昔，此不應爾。何者？《般若》說：「一切法皆摩訶衍，靡不運載。」《思益》明「解諸法相，是菩薩遍行。」《華嚴》：「入法界，不動祇洹。」《淨名》：「一念知一切法，是為坐道場。」昔因如此，無所不收，若為是狹？若言今因體廣，那忽言《法華》明一乘是了，不明佛性是不了？那復言《法華》明緣因是滿，不明了因是不滿？那復言前過恒沙，後倍上數，猶是無常因？既以無常因，那得常果？因果俱無常，此無常人，那見佛性？非了義故，體不收行一。非滿字故，體不收教一。非常住故，體不收人一。不見佛性故，體不收理一。當知今因狹中之狹，狹則是麁；昔體既廣，昔還是妙。此一難已知麁妙，薳復具作後難耳。

Among the various past and present commentaries, the world considers Guangzhai's to be the best. Observing the southern interpretations of the Mahāyāna, they mostly inherit from Sengzhao and Kumārajīva, and Sengzhao and Kumārajīva mostly accord with the meaning of the shared [teaching]. When Guangzhai interprets "subtle," how could he have reached far? Now I shall first challenge Guangzhai; the others will fall like grass before the wind. Regarding the four challenges to the breadth and narrowness of the cause's substance: if one says that the past cause's substance was narrow and therefore coarse, to what does "the past" refer? If it refers to the Tripiṭaka and so on, that may be acceptable. But if it refers to everything prior to the Lotus Sūtra being called "the past," this should not be so. Why? The Prajñā[-pāramitā] says: "All dharmas are the Mahāyāna; there is none that is not carried." The Viśeṣacintā[-brahma-paripṛcchā] clarifies that "understanding the characteristics of all dharmas is the bodhisattva's universal practice." The Avataṃsaka states: "Entering the dharma-dhātu without moving from Jetavana." The Vimalakīrti[-nirdeśa] states: "Knowing all dharmas in a single thought-moment is sitting in the bodhimaṇḍa." If the past cause was like this, encompassing everything, how could it be narrow? If you say that the present cause's substance is broad, why did [Guangzhai] suddenly say that the Lotus Sūtra's clarification of the eka-yāna is definitive (nītārtha) while its non-clarification of the Buddha-nature is non-definitive (neytārtha)? Why did he further say that the Lotus Sūtra's clarification of the conditioned cause is complete, while its non-clarification of the disclosing cause is incomplete? Why did he further say that exceeding the sands of the Ganges in the past and doubling that number in the future is still an impermanent cause? Since it is an impermanent cause, how could it attain an eternal fruit? Cause and fruit are both impermanent; how could this impermanent person see the Buddha-nature? Because it is not the definitive meaning, its substance does not encompass the oneness of practice. Because it is not the complete letter, its substance does not encompass the oneness of teaching. Because it is not eternally abiding, its substance does not encompass the oneness of persons. Because it does not see the Buddha-nature, its substance does not encompass the oneness of principle. One should know that the present cause is the narrowest of the narrow, and narrowness is coarseness; since the past substance was broad, the past was rather subtle. From this one challenge alone, coarseness and subtlety are already known; we only formulate the subsequent challenges to be fully comprehensive.