妙法蓮華經玄義 2.152

2.152

然執者不同，莊嚴旻據佛果出二諦外，為中論師所覈：如此佛智照何理？破何惑？若無別理可照，不應出外；若出外而無別照者，藉何得出？進不成三，退不成二（云云）。梁世《成論》執世諦不同。或言世諦名、用、體皆有；或但名、用而無於體；或但有名而無體、用（云云）。陳世《中論》，破立不同。或破古來二十三家明二諦義，自立二諦義。或破他竟，約四假明二諦。古今異執，各引證據，自保一文，不信餘說。

However, those who cling [to views] differ. Min of Zhuangyan based himself on the fruit of buddhahood transcending the two truths, which was examined by masters of the Madhyamakaśāstra: What principle does such buddha-wisdom illuminate? What affliction does it destroy? If there is no distinct principle to illuminate, it should not transcend them; if it transcends them without a distinct illumination, by relying on what could it emerge? Going forward it does not form three, stepping back it does not form two (and so on). During the Liang dynasty, masters of the Tattvasiddhi-śāstra held differing views on conventional truth: some said that for conventional truth, name, function, and substance all exist; some said there are only name and function but no substance; some said there is only name without substance or function (and so on). During the Chen dynasty, masters of the Madhyamakaśāstra differed in their refutations and establishments: some refuted the ancient twenty-three schools that clarified the meaning of the two truths and established their own meaning of the two truths; some, having refuted others, clarified the two truths on the basis of the fourfold provisionality. Ancient and modern disparate attachments each cite textual evidence, each safeguarding their own single text and not believing other teachings.