妙法蓮華經玄義 6.20

6.20

Second, concerning the clarifying of the characteristics of capacity and response: one clarifies the characteristics of capacity with reference to good and evil, and discusses the characteristics of response with reference to benevolence and compassion. If good and evil constitute capacity, are they solitary or combined? Commentators differ. Some say that evil alone constitutes capacity, quoting a sūtra: 'I am here to cut off the boils, warts, and grave illnesses of all sentient beings.' It also says: 'Suppose there are seven sons; yet toward the one who is sick, one's mind is particularly partial. The Tathāgata is also like this: toward sentient beings he is not unequal, yet toward those who have sinned, his mind is particularly partial.' It also says: 'The Tathāgata does not dwell in the world for unconditioned sentient beings.' Furthermore, the indeterminate is ignorance, which ultimately falls under the category of evil. This takes evil alone as capacity. Others take good alone as capacity, quoting the Mahā[parinirvāṇa]-sūtra: 'When I regard sentient beings, I do not look at whether they are old, young, or middle-aged, poor or rich, noble or base; if they have a good mind, I immediately look upon them with compassionate thought.' This takes good alone as capacity. Others say that neither good nor evil can individually constitute capacity. Why? Like the mind following the diamond[-like samādhi], which is just the Buddha, in which all goods universally gather and good surpasses none—how could this constitute capacity? Although it is said that 'Buddhas are mindful of Buddhas', this is a general statement, and there is neither pulling out nor bestowing; hence we know that good alone cannot constitute capacity. That evil alone cannot constitute capacity is because, as with icchantikas, supreme evil cannot stimulate the Buddha. The Mahā[parinirvāṇa]-sūtra says: 'A single hair cannot lift the body'; this refers to the goodness of principle in natural virtue. This is general capacity and ultimately does not accomplish stimulus. Others take the accompaniment of both good and evil as capacity: from an icchantika giving rise to a mind of remorse, up to equivalent enlightenment, there is always the accompaniment of both good and evil; therefore it can constitute capacity. Therefore, it is with reference to this good and evil that its characteristics are clarified (and so on).