法華玄義釋籤 12.21

12.21

即生此念時，佛於空中現。即是雙明感應二義。若得此意，例應可知。次別釋中今先明機三義者為二：先明用機為名例知緣感，次「機有」下正釋機名。言「如弩有可發」等者，眾生如弩，宿因如機，佛如射者，應如發之，益如箭中。「善機」者，《大經》十八云：「我觀眾生，不觀老少中年、貧富時節、日月星宿、工巧下賤、童僕婢使，唯觀眾生有善心者，即便慈念。」料簡中問意者，由前帖釋中云宜生理善即第一義，故今問云：為人名生善，理事俱是善，何意於理善而稱第一義？答意者，理明是理善，理暗是理惡，故理之善惡其性雖相傾，若理善生時，理惡必定滅，無有先惡滅方始理善生。若事中善惡其性亦相傾，善生之時未必惡滅，惡滅之時未必善生。故於生善以分事理，理善即屬第一義義。事中善惡，善生即屬為人義也。惡滅即屬對治義也。理惡即滅、理善即生，故於生善以分二悉，滅惡唯得立一對治，惡無先滅故不分二。「眾生得事」等者，眾生得即理之事，聖人得即事之理，聖人知即眾生不知。又聖人得於因果化他咸應等事，眾生但得非因非果迷中之理。又眾生在因，聖人居果。「問為用法應」等者，此一問答為欲生起機應之相，約理雖即不當應與不應，約事必有應與非應，法應應應俱皆應故，得法應俱名應，由此與機相對辨，致成三十六機應。次相中二：先正釋，次廣問答料簡。初又二：先標、次釋。釋中先略舉機應兩相，次釋。釋中先機、次應。機中二：先徵起，次釋。釋中有三，不言去取，應中亦然。初機者，惡為機中言「七子」者，《大經》十八釋月愛中云：「譬如有人而有七子，是七子中一子遇病，父母之心非不平等，然於病子心則偏重。」章安云：或以七方便根性為七子，謂人天二乘三教菩薩，是七子中有起過者，心則偏重。「如來不為無為眾生」者，亦第十八經，有為是惡故惡為機。又「無記是無明」者，若分三性即立無記，今立機緣且對善惡，無記雖非身口行惡，能覆理善亦屬惡攝，即屬惡機。現雖是惡，乘於宿種，故得為機。相帶為機中二：先判，次正釋。初文中云「唯有一髮」者，《大經》三十一「迦葉菩薩問佛：一闡提者終無善法，是故名為一闡提耶？佛言：如是。又問：一切眾生有三種善，所謂三世，一闡提輩亦不能斷未來善法，云何佛言斷諸善法名一闡提耶？佛言：滅有二種，一現在滅，二者現在障於未來；闡提具二，故作是說。佛言：善男子！譬如有人沒在圊廁，唯有一髮毛頭未沒，雖復一髮不能升身。闡提亦爾，未來善法不能救於地獄之苦，未來之世雖即可救，現在之世無如之何？」以佛性故則可得救，佛性非三世，故佛性不斷。今意亦爾，於現在世雖有正因，不可救故不成機緣。善惡相帶為機者，初從闡提起改悔心，此舉極惡以帶微善，上至等覺一品無明，此舉極善以帶微惡。準望前釋，極善唯在佛，極惡唯闡提，二既非機，故以闡提改悔、等覺無明，即是相帶，名之為機。

As she gave rise to this thought, the Buddha appeared in the sky. This explains both meanings of stimulus and response together. If one grasps this meaning, the rest can be known by analogy. Next, in the specific explanation, first explaining the three meanings of capacity (ji) has two parts: first, explaining that taking capacity as the name allows one by analogy to know condition and stimulus; second, from "capacity has" onward, directly explaining the name "capacity." As for "like a crossbow ready to be discharged," and so forth: sentient beings are like the crossbow, past causes are like the trigger (ji), the Buddha is like the archer, the response is like discharging it, and the benefit is like hitting the target. As for "good capacity": the Great Sūtra, chapter eighteen, states: "When I observe sentient beings, I do not look at whether they are old, young, or middle-aged; rich or poor; the season; the sun, moon, or constellations; base craftspeople; or male and female servants. I observe only whether sentient beings have a good mind, and thereupon extend compassionate thought to them." Regarding the questioner's intent in the analysis: because the preceding gloss stated that being suitable to produce goodness of principle is the supreme truth, it now asks: "For the sake of persons" is termed producing goodness, and both principle and phenomena are good; why then is goodness of principle termed the supreme truth? The meaning of the answer is: clarity of principle is goodness of principle, and darkness of principle is evil of principle. Thus, although the natures of goodness and evil of principle undermine each other, when goodness of principle arises, evil of principle must necessarily be destroyed; there is never a case where evil is first destroyed and only then goodness of principle arises. In the case of phenomenal goodness and evil, their natures also undermine each other, but when good arises, evil is not necessarily destroyed, and when evil is destroyed, good does not necessarily arise. Therefore, within producing goodness, phenomena and principle are distinguished: goodness of principle belongs to the meaning of the supreme truth. In phenomenal goodness and evil, the arising of good belongs to the meaning of "for the sake of persons," while the destruction of evil belongs to the meaning of "antidote." Evil of principle is instantly destroyed and goodness of principle is instantly produced; therefore, within producing goodness two siddhāntas are distinguished, whereas destroying evil can only establish the single [siddhānta of] antidote; since evil is not destroyed beforehand, it is not divided into two. As for "sentient beings attain phenomena," and so forth: sentient beings attain phenomena that are identical to principle; sages attain principle that is identical to phenomena. Sages know this identity, whereas sentient beings do not know it. Furthermore, sages attain phenomena such as cause and fruit, transforming others, and universal response; sentient beings merely attain the principle amid delusion that is neither cause nor fruit. Furthermore, sentient beings abide in the cause, while sages reside in the fruit. As for the question, "Does one use the dharma [body] or response [body]?" and so forth: this question and answer is intended to generate the characteristics of capacity and response. Although in terms of principle it does not admit of responding or not responding, in terms of phenomena there must be responding and non-responding. Because the dharma-response and response-response are both responses, both dharma and response are termed "response"; distinguishing them in relation to capacity results in thirty-six kinds of capacity and response. Next, the characteristics have two parts: first, direct explanation; second, extensive questions and answers in analysis. The first also has two parts: first, stating; second, explaining. In the explanation, first briefly presenting the two characteristics of capacity and response; second, explaining. In the explanation, first capacity; second, response. In capacity, there are two parts: first, raising the question; second, explaining. In the explanation there are three, without choosing or rejecting; the same applies to response. In the first capacity, concerning evil as capacity, the mention of "seven children": chapter eighteen of the Great Sūtra, in explaining the love like the moon, states: "For example, a person has seven children, and among these seven children, one child falls ill. The parents' hearts are not un-equal, yet toward the sick child their hearts are particularly biased." Zhang'an states: alternatively, taking the dispositions of the seven expedient means as seven children refers to humans, devas, the two vehicles, and the bodhisattvas of the three teachings; if among these seven children one gives rise to faults, the [Buddha's] heart is particularly biased toward them. As for "the Tathāgata is not for unconditioned sentient beings": this is also from chapter eighteen; the conditioned is evil, hence evil serves as capacity. Furthermore, "neutrality is ignorance": if distinguished into three natures, neutrality is established; now in establishing capacity and conditions they are tentatively contrasted as good and evil; although neutrality is not evil committed by body or speech, because it can conceal goodness of principle it is also subsumed under evil, thus belonging to evil capacity. Though presently evil, by virtue of past seeds it can become a capacity. In mutual entailment as capacity, there are two parts: first, evaluation; second, direct explanation. In the first text, stating "there is only a single hair": chapter thirty-one of the Great Sūtra states, "Bodhisattva Kāśyapa asked the Buddha: Does an icchantika never have wholesome dharmas, and is therefore called an icchantika? The Buddha said: It is so. He asked again: All sentient beings have three kinds of goodness, namely across the three times; icchantikas also cannot sever future wholesome dharmas, so why does the Buddha say that severing all wholesome dharmas is called an icchantika? The Buddha said: Destruction has two kinds: first, destruction in the present; second, the present obstructing the future. The icchantika possesses both, hence this is stated. The Buddha said: Good son! For example, a person is submerged in a privy, with only a single hair tip not yet submerged; although there is a single hair, it cannot lift the body. The icchantika is also like this: future wholesome dharmas cannot rescue them from the suffering of hell; although future lives can be rescued, regarding the present life nothing can be done." Because of Buddha-nature they can be rescued; Buddha-nature does not belong to the three times, so Buddha-nature is never severed. The present intention is also like this: although there is a direct cause in the present life, because they cannot be rescued, it does not constitute a capacity and condition. As for good and evil mutually entailing to become a capacity: starting from an icchantika giving rise to a mind of remorse, this cites extreme evil entailing slight good; reaching up to the single grade of ignorance in equal awakening, this cites extreme good entailing slight evil. Following the preceding explanation, extreme good exists only in the Buddha, and extreme evil exists only in the icchantika; since neither of the two is a capacity, the icchantika's remorse and equal awakening's ignorance are mutually entailed, and this is named capacity.