法華玄義釋籤 14.27

14.27

○五明權實者，大文第五，第二卷初大為五文，釋此十妙：一列名，二生起，三引證，四廣釋，今當第五結前十妙以成權實。於中為二：初破古，次正釋。初文又二：先出古人意，次破。初云「三三之權」者，此光宅意，以昔三乘但各有三，故云「三三」，謂教人因，昔三乘權未至於果，故闕於果，果即是理，大小俱有理，大小各有果，何故昔三但有於三？昔教何辜而不立理？次破中二：先破三三，次破四一。初文又四：初直破。次「彼」下明光宅救。大師既不見光宅，應是他人亦曾此破先有斯救，故今述之。三「若爾」下重難，還以彼三三，離彼無理。四「又」下重並難。次從「實有四」去難光宅四一中但立因果而無於理，於中為三：初難，次引證責云，云何分別因果為理一耶？「若爾」去重難，若但因果而不出理則同魔說，今家和舊亦作四一，乃廢因果以立理一，更加行一，是故數同而名義永異。

Fifth, on explaining the provisional and the real: the fifth great division, at the beginning of the second fascicle, divides into five major texts to explain these ten subtleties: first, listing the names; second, their order of arising; third, citing proof texts; fourth, broad explanation; now, this is the fifth, concluding the preceding ten subtleties to establish the provisional and the real. Within this there are two parts: first, refuting the ancients; next, the correct explanation. The first text again has two parts: first, presenting the ancient view; next, refuting it. The first says 'the provisional of the three threes': this is the idea of Guangzhai [Fayun], who, because the former three vehicles each had only three, said 'three threes', referring to teaching, person, and cause; because the provisional of the former three vehicles had not yet reached the fruit, they were deficient in the fruit. The fruit is precisely the principle: both the great and the small have principle, and both the great and the small each have fruit. Why should the former three have had only three? What fault did the former teachings have that they did not establish principle? Next, in the refutation, there are two parts: first, refuting the three threes; next, refuting the four ones. The first text also has four parts: first, direct refutation. Next, from 'he' onward, explains Guangzhai's rescue. Since the Great Master did not see Guangzhai, someone else must have also made this refutation and previously offered this rescue, which is now recounted. Third, from 'if so' onward, he cross-examines again, using his own 'three threes' to separate him from his 'lack of principle'. Fourth, from 'moreover' onward, he presents a compounded objection. Next, from 'the real has four' onward, he cross-examines Guangzhai's 'four ones' for establishing only cause and effect without principle. Within this there are three parts: first, the objection; next, citing proof texts to reprimand him, saying: how can cause and effect be differentiated into the 'one of principle'? From 'if so' onward, he cross-examines again: if there is only cause and effect without presenting principle, it is identical to the preaching of Māra. Our school, in harmonizing with the old, also formulates 'four ones', but we eliminate cause and effect to establish the 'one of principle', and further add the 'one of practice'; therefore, the number is the same, but the names and meanings are eternally different.