法華玄義釋籤 15.21

15.21

第七判麁妙中二，先以本對迹相望判之。次「又迹中」下約前六門以判。初文者，若不先將迹門開顯，且判麁妙與本所證更無差別，如何得知迹中之妙不及本麁，以不約開顯待絕等判，但約久遠實成以論，故中間今日若麁若妙皆非先得，是故先得麁亦名妙，中間今日妙亦成麁。次又約六重判者，前但開顯久近等展轉束判已竟，應更於開顯久近等中，細判六門迹麁本妙。於中三：先釋，次況，三「若發」下亦明本迹六門相顯相融之相及不思議一等。於中二：先約事理一雙略釋，次五雙例知。又言「已今」者，即是昔日已得已今為本，今日中間所對已今為迹，中間節節皆有五味教故，故四味及以迹門為已，開長遠壽為今，故使已今亦論今昔麁妙故也。次明權實中三：先本迹相對為權實，以判迹中權實為權，本地權實俱妙，以久成故。次「復次」下更約本迹相望論自行等三，則本自迹他，本迹相對為一自他。三「復次」下更約本迹各有三義以明理同，約事則知本中施麁亦妙，迹中開廢猶麁，理無麁妙。初文中意具如判麁妙文意，於中又二：先正明，次「迹權本實」下明融通。二理不可思議，故云「法性非古今」等。次「自」等文則本中化他，亦名為妙，亦應合有不思議融通，文無者略，應云法性之理非自非他，自他雖殊不思議一。第三中亦二：先釋，次融通結歸。釋中又二：初中言「復次迹中約實施權」等者，然約實施權意在歸實，而人多以所施之權謂為究竟，故俱不識。若廢權顯實，意在所廢之權，初欲廢之，故斥此權非為究竟，權是事法而人易知，故一代法教，自法華前佛意恒實，二乘不退始終不知，及至廢權乃云「汝等去來寶處在近」，而人咸知寶處非此，此即是於寶渚之初，發足已涉於脩途，況復曾已行於三百，指我之果，即彼妙因，故云「易測」。言「華嚴明阿鞞跋致多明事數」者，引例釋前權易測意也。一切事法無非權施，如來久遠為諸眾生施設方便，故恒沙佛法施已皆廢，所施之權屬於事相，是故事相多為不退者說，即能於事達不退理。又不退位高下不同，若是地前行不退位，但聞事數知事即理，故開權顯實得入初地念不退位，能達此權即是實相，豈可離此別求實相？為對跋致故云「初地融通如前」。

Seventh, regarding the evaluation of coarseness and wondrousness, there are two parts: first, evaluating them by contrasting origin with trace; next, from 'Also within the trace...' downward, evaluating according to the previous six portals. As for the first text: if one does not first open and reveal the trace portal, and for the time being evaluates coarseness and wondrousness as having no difference from what was realized in the origin, how could one know that the wondrous within the trace does not equal the coarse of the origin? Because this evaluation is not based on opening, revealing, relative, or absolute, but is discussed solely in terms of the actual attainment in the remote past, both the coarse and wondrous of the intermediate and present day were not attained earlier; therefore, what was attained earlier, even if coarse, is also called wondrous, and the wondrous of the intermediate and present day also becomes coarse. Next, regarding evaluating by the sixfold layers: previously, opening and revealing the remote and recent were merely summarized and evaluated progressively; now, within the opening and revealing of the remote and recent, one should further minutely evaluate the trace as coarse and the origin as wondrous according to the six portals. Within this, there are three parts: first, the explanation; next, the comparison; third, from 'If arising...' onward, clarifying the characteristics of the mutual manifestation and mutual integration of the six portals of origin and traces, as well as the inconceivable oneness. Within this, there are two parts: first, briefly explaining in terms of the pair of matter and principle; next, understanding the other five pairs by analogy. Furthermore, saying 'past and present' means taking what was previously attained as past and present to be the origin, and taking what corresponds to past and present in the intermediate and present day to be the trace; because at every node in the intermediate there are teachings of the five flavors, the four flavors and the trace portal are taken as 'past', while opening the long life-span is taken as 'present', which causes past and present to also be discussed in terms of coarseness and wondrousness of present and past. Next, clarifying provisional and real has three parts: first, setting origin and trace against each other as provisional and real, so as to evaluate provisional and real in the trace as provisional, whereas provisional and real in the original stage are both wondrous because they were accomplished long ago. Next, from 'Furthermore...' downward, further discussing the three aspects of one's own practice and others by comparing origin with trace: the origin is oneself and the trace is others, so origin and trace set against each other constitute one self and other. Third, from 'Furthermore...' downward, further clarifying the identity of principle through each possessing three meanings in origin and trace: in terms of phenomena, one knows that setting forth coarseness in the origin is also wondrous, whereas opening and discarding in the trace is still coarse; principle has neither coarseness nor wondrousness. The intention in the first text is fully as in the text evaluating coarseness and wondrousness. Within it, there are also two parts: first, directly clarifying; next, from 'Trace provisional, origin real...' downward, clarifying integration. The two principles are inconceivable; hence it says 'the Dharma-nature is neither ancient nor modern', and so forth. In the subsequent text on 'self', etc., transforming others within the origin is also called wondrous, and it should likewise have inconceivable integration; its absence in the text is an abbreviation—it should say that the principle of Dharma-nature is neither self nor other, and though self and other are distinct, they are inconceivably one. The third part also has two sections: first, the explanation; next, integration and conclusion. In the explanation, there are also two parts: first, regarding 'Furthermore, within the trace, setting forth the provisional based on the real...', setting forth the provisional based on the real aims at returning to the real, yet many people consider the provisional that was set forth to be ultimate, and so both remain unrecognized. If discarding the provisional to reveal the real, the intention is directed at the provisional that is to be discarded; when first wishing to discard it, one refutes this provisional as not being ultimate. The provisional consists of phenomenal dharmas and is easily known by people; therefore, throughout the teachings of the Buddha's lifetime prior to the Lotus Sūtra, the Buddha's intent was always real, yet those of the two vehicles and non-retrogression never knew it from beginning to end. When it came to discarding the provisional, he then said: 'Come, all of you, the place of jewels is near'; then everyone knew that the place of jewels was not here. This is precisely having already embarked upon the long path at the beginning of the jewel island; how much more so having already traveled three hundred [yojanas]! Pointing to my fruit as their wondrous cause, it is therefore called 'easy to measure'. As for 'The Avataṃsaka explains non-retrogression (avaivartika) largely in terms of phenomenal enumerations': it cites an analogy to explain the previous meaning of the provisional being easy to measure. All phenomenal dharmas are nothing other than provisional adaptations; since the Tathāgata instituted expedient means for sentient beings in the distant past, the sands-of-the-Ganges Buddha-dharmas were all discarded after being set forth. The provisional that was set forth belongs to phenomenal characteristics; therefore, phenomenal characteristics were mostly spoken for those of non-retrogression, who could thereby penetrate the principle of non-retrogression through phenomena. Furthermore, the stages of non-retrogression vary in height: if it is the stage of non-retrogression of practice prior to the bhūmis, merely hearing phenomenal enumerations they know that phenomena are identical to principle; therefore, opening the provisional to reveal the real enables them to enter the stage of non-retrogression of mindfulness of the first bhūmi, capable of penetrating that this provisional is identical to the real mark. How could one seek the real mark apart from this? To contrast with avaivartika, it says: 'Integration in the first bhūmi is as before'.