法華玄義釋籤 16.48

16.48

次約五時中二：先正約五時，次「大經」下更獨明一實。初文不云鹿苑者，以鹿苑中無大可論。前以對二乘人竟，今文欲相對簡之，故云「方等三虛一實」等，或是略無；若云鹿苑，無實唯虛，亦應無爽。次獨明一實中又三：初獨明一實，次「如是」下約待對說，三「又開」下約開顯說。初文又二：初正釋，次「一實」下結示正體。初文又二：初約對所破以說，次從「異則為二，二故非一實」等，約能對德體以說。初文者，無二乘之二，亦是無二邊之二，無三惑二死之虛，無無常等四倒故也。並須約圓行說，故如是等法魔不能說。次約能對中，約德體謂四德三諦，德若無諦，德無所依，諦若無德，諦不能顯，故以修成之德，顯於理性之諦，即是今經正體。故更複疎明體無非無前所對諸過故也。文為六：先明無二，次無虛偽，三無顛倒，四一乘者即是無異轉釋無倒，五「魔雖」下明即義者非魔所說，六「若空」下重釋具德之相，此具德相即無前所對，故四德具足。四德具足非二乘所知，況魔能說？次結示正體，可知。次明待對，以由前明有能破所破、能對所對故，故知所破所對不出藏通及別方便，故今更明之，以不思議三諦非三而三，以三為破，非空而空故破凡夫，餘三被破，準此可知。於中又二：先明對破，次「無復」下顯一實相。又二：先顯一實，次「亦具」下更明一實攝法。又二：先明攝法，次「何以故」下釋攝法意。三明開中二：先開，次「即絕」下結。初開中二：先正開說諸教從淺至深，從聖至凡次第開之。次「一切諸法」下結束開意，以諸法中有妙理，故方可論開。若也本無，何所開顯？點示眾生及三乘人本有覺藏，心佛眾生三無差別耳。

Next, in [the elimination] according to the five periods, there are two parts: first, directly according to the five periods; next, from "The Great Sūtra" onward, further clarifying the one reality alone. The first passage does not mention the Deer Park because in the Deer Park there was no Great [Vehicle] to speak of. Previously, the contrast with the persons of the two vehicles had already been completed; now the text wishes to eliminate them by mutual contrast, hence it says "the Vaipulya has three provisional and one real," and so on, or perhaps it was omitted for brevity. If one were to say that the Deer Park has no reality and is solely provisional, that would also not be amiss. Next, in clarifying the one reality alone, there are again three parts: first, clarifying the one reality alone; next, from "Thus" onward, speaking in terms of mutual dependence; third, from "Also opening" onward, speaking in terms of opening and revelation. In the first passage there are again two parts: first, the direct explanation; next, from "the one reality" onward, concluding by showing the correct substance. In the first passage there are again two parts: first, speaking in terms of what is refuted; next, from "difference constitutes duality, and because of duality it is not the one reality" onward, speaking in terms of the substance of virtues that serves as the counterpart. As for the first passage, it is free of the duality of the two vehicles, and also free of the duality of the two extremes, free of the falsehood of the three delusions and two deaths, and free of the four inversions such as impermanence. All must be explained in terms of the perfect practice; therefore, Māra cannot preach such dharmas. Next, regarding the counterpart, in terms of the substance of virtues, it refers to the four virtues and three truths. If virtues lack truths, virtues have nothing to rely upon; if truths lack virtues, truths cannot be revealed. Therefore, through the virtues cultivated and achieved, the truth of the nature of principle is revealed, which is precisely the correct substance of the present sūtra. Hence, it further and repeatedly explains that the substance is not without the negation of all the previously contrasted faults. The text has six parts: first, clarifying the absence of duality; second, the absence of falsehood; third, the absence of inversion; fourth, the one vehicle being non-difference, which further explains the absence of inversion; fifth, from "Although Māra" onward, clarifying that the meaning of identity cannot be preached by Māra; sixth, from "If emptiness" onward, re-explaining the characteristics of possessing virtues. These characteristics of possessing virtues mean being free of the previously contrasted [faults], and therefore the four virtues are fully present. That the four virtues are fully present is not known by the two vehicles, how much less could Māra preach it? Next, concluding by showing the correct substance can be understood. Next, clarifying mutual dependence: because it was previously explained that there are the refuting and the refuted, the counterpart and what is contrasted, one therefore knows that the refuted and contrasted do not go beyond the Tripiṭaka, Shared, and Separate expedients. Hence it is now further clarified: by means of the inconceivable three truths being non-three yet three, it uses the three as the refutation; being non-empty yet empty, it refutes ordinary beings. That the remaining three are refuted can be known by analogy with this. Within this there are again two parts: first, clarifying the refutation by contrast; next, from "No longer" onward, revealing the characteristic of the one reality. There are again two parts: first, revealing the one reality; next, from "also fully possesses" onward, further clarifying that the one reality subsumes dharmas. There are again two parts: first, clarifying the subsumption of dharmas; next, from "Why?" onward, explaining the intent of subsuming dharmas. Third, in clarifying the opening, there are two parts: first, the opening; next, from "namely absolute" onward, the conclusion. In the first, the opening, there are two parts: first, directly opening and explaining the various teachings sequentially from shallow to deep, and from noble to ordinary. Next, from "all dharmas" onward, concluding the intent of opening: because there is the wondrous principle within all dharmas, opening can only then be discussed. If it were originally absent, what could be opened and revealed? It directly points out to sentient beings and persons of the three vehicles the store of awakening that they originally possess, where mind, Buddha, and sentient beings are completely undifferentiated.