法華玄義釋籤 18.28

18.28

次私廣引破古中，初破遠師者，所明一乘但是破三之一、待麁之妙，則但因而非果，是則在始而不該末，故云「不該始末」。況所破之三為在何教？次破龍師者，此經本以因果為宗，龍師棄因獨存於果。言「乖文」者，今經本迹各立因果以為經宗，具如下引本迹二文，故知乖文。慧觀師釋今無破者，什公已歎今家粗許。以遠公棄果而存因，龍師棄因而存果，觀既有始有盛即是兩存，仍非全當，故亦不依。何者？若以法華會三歸一為乘始者，豈法華部無乘終耶？若無終者，直至道場為是何等？若以澄神指涅槃者，涅槃部內豈無乘始？若無始者，初破三修，及初發心常觀涅槃為是何等？破印師中云「加境闕果」者，此乃從容許其用智，智通因果，稍似經宗；若望三法，然但在因而闕於果，況復加境？境屬於體，將陪宗義腫不益肥。次破光宅者，正釋中自立兩處師弟因果，次破用權實及名為宗可見。次破用名中言「此是地師用八識極果」者，指向不異惑染不與染俱，今尚破攝師，攝師所破既非能破，非今經宗。次破常住為宗者，上句且與而言非我今宗所顯，若是所顯所顯非宗，不覆亦非未為全當。破次師準上可知。破萬善者，責其棄果而取因。次破無漏者，七方便之因果，俱為我家之因，何得局促獨立無漏？若取初住已去，雖是真因，而無漏之名，復濫小果。次破悟者，悟通因果，仍別在真因，既無的指，且以果責之。又破妄引《大經》救立不定門，若諸法不定何得定悟？

Next, in [the section] personally quoting broadly to refute the ancients, first, regarding the refutation of Master Yuan: the one vehicle he explains is merely the 'one' that breaks down the three, the 'subtle' relative to the coarse; thus it is merely cause and not effect. Being at the beginning, it does not encompass the end; therefore [the text] says, 'it does not encompass the beginning and the end.' Moreover, in which teaching does the 'three' that is refuted reside? Next, regarding the refutation of Master Long: this sūtra originally takes cause and effect as its central theme (zong), but Master Long discarded the cause and preserved only the effect. When it says 'contradicts the text', this sūtra establishes cause and effect in both the origin and traces as the central theme of the sūtra, fully as in the two passages of the origin and traces cited below; hence we know it contradicts the text. As for Master Huiguan's explanation having no refutation here, Venerable Shi (Kumārajīva) had already praised it, and our school roughly grants it. Because Master Yuan discarded the effect and preserved the cause, while Master Long discarded the cause and preserved the effect, since Guan has both the beginning and the culmination, he preserves both; yet it is still not entirely accurate, so it is also not relied upon. Why is that? If taking the Lotus Sūtra's convergence of the three to the one as the beginning of the vehicle, could it be that the Lotus Sūtra section lacks the end of the vehicle? If it lacked the end, what would 'going straight to the seat of awakening (bodhimaṇḍa)' be? If taking the clarification of the spirit as pointing to nirvāṇa, could it be that within the Nirvāṇa Sūtra section there is no beginning of the vehicle? If it lacked a beginning, what would the initial breaking of the three cultivations and the initial aspiration of the mind constantly contemplating nirvāṇa be? In the refutation of Master Yin, stating 'adding the object and lacking the effect': this is casually allowing his use of wisdom (jñāna), for wisdom pervades cause and effect, slightly resembling the sūtra's central theme; but with respect to the three dharmas, it is merely in the cause and lacks the effect, so why further add the object? The object belongs to the substance; using it to augment the meaning of the central theme is like swelling, which does not add healthy flesh. Next, regarding the refutation of Guangzhai: in the main explanation he himself establishes cause and effect of teacher and disciple in both places; next, the refutation of using the provisional and real, as well as the name, as the central theme is evident. Next, in the refutation of using the name, stating 'this is the Dilun master using the ultimate effect of the eighth consciousness': it points to [that which] originally is not different from delusion and defilement, yet does not accompany defilement. Now we still refute the Shelun masters; what the Shelun masters refuted was already not what can refute, so it is not the central theme of this sūtra. Next, regarding the refutation of taking eternal abiding as the central theme: the upper clause temporarily concedes [it], saying it is not what is revealed by our present central theme; if it were what is revealed, what is revealed would not be the central theme; without covering it, it is also not, and not yet completely right. The refutation of the next master may be known by analogy with the above. The refutation of the myriad virtues reproaches his discarding the effect and taking the cause. Next, regarding the refutation of the uncontaminated (anāsrava): the cause and effect of the seven expedient means are all causes for our school; how could one be so narrow as to independently establish the uncontaminated? If one takes from the initial abode onward, although it is the true cause, the name 'uncontaminated' also confuses with the lesser fruition. Next, regarding the refutation of awakening: awakening pervades cause and effect, yet separately resides in the true cause; since it lacks a precise designation, we temporarily reproach it with the effect. Furthermore, it refutes falsely citing the Great Sūtra to rescue and establish the indeterminate gate: if all phenomena are indeterminate, how could there be a determinate awakening?