法華玄義釋籤 6.38

6.38

於中先正明無諦，次問答料簡。初文又二：初別約極理以明無諦，次通約諸教以明無諦。前明一諦亦有通別二義不同，故今亦爾。理無二極，故同歸一無，眾生緣異，故復歷教。初中三：初正立無諦，次「一一」下判麁妙，三「不可說亦不可說」下明絕待即是開麁。次文又二：初四教，次五味。初文二：先列四教，次明判開。初四教如文。次從「前不可說」去判，次「若麁異妙」下開。準上下文，例應在五味後開，今隨便各明，於理無失。次約五味中，初判，次從「開麁如前」者例前四教開。次料簡中有三重問答，初問者通約諸教為問，所言「無諦」者，秖應如前歷教明實別約極理，理即一實，如何諸教並論無諦？答意者，為破執理而生戲論，是故云「無」。大小乘教既並有理，是故大小俱論無諦。故引例云，滅本無惑，緣滅生惑，如三界利鈍一十九使，但破能執，不破所緣，今意亦爾。次問者，小乘未得執成戲論，是故須破；若實證得，理仍是權，是故亦破。今以此意例難於大，既得大小通論無諦，亦應大小得否俱破？答云「不例」者，小乘得否俱皆有惑，是故俱破。大乘不得有惑須破，得即無惑，得何須破？是故不例。次問意者，小乘是權，破權名無；大乘是實，實諦非無，何故中道亦名無諦？答意者，實如所問，於實得者不須云無。今云無者為未得者。

Therein, it first directly explains no-truth, and next examines it through questions and answers. The first text also has two parts: first, distinctively explaining no-truth in terms of the ultimate principle; second, generally explaining no-truth in terms of the various teachings. Previously, explaining the one truth also had two different meanings, general and distinct, and hence it is also like this now. Since principle has no two extremes, they identically return to one non-existence; because sentient beings' conditions differ, it again traverses the teachings. In the first part there are three: first, directly establishing no-truth; second, from 'each and every' downward, judging crude and subtle; third, from 'inexpressible and also inexpressible' downward, explaining absolute incomparability, which is just opening the crude. The next text also has two parts: first, the four teachings; second, the five flavors. The first text has two: first, listing the four teachings; second, explaining judging and opening. The first four teachings are as in the text. Next, judging begins from 'the former inexpressible', and next, opening begins from 'if the crude differs from the subtle' downward. Matching the text before and after, according to the pattern it should be opened after the five flavors; now, explaining each as convenient entails no loss to the principle. Next, in terms of the five flavors: first, judging; next, from 'opening the crude is as before' matches the preceding opening of the four teachings. Next, in the examination there are three layers of questions and answers. The first question asks generally in terms of the various teachings: as for what is called 'no-truth', it should just be as before, explaining the real through the teachings and distinctively in terms of the ultimate principle; since principle is just the one real, how can the various teachings all discuss no-truth? The intent of the answer: it is in order to break the proliferation of conceptual play produced by attaching to the principle that it is called 'no'. Since both the Great and Small vehicle teachings have principle, therefore both the Great and Small discuss no-truth. Hence it cites an analogy, saying: cessation is fundamentally without delusion, yet giving rise to delusion in connection with cessation is like the nineteen entanglements, sharp and dull, of the three realms; it only breaks that which attaches, not the object of connection. The present intent is also like this. The second question: in the Small Vehicle, before attaining it, attachment becomes conceptual play, and hence it must be broken; if one truly realizes it, the principle is still provisional, and hence it is also broken. Now, using this sense to challenge the Great by analogy: since it is obtained that the Great and Small generally discuss no-truth, should both whether attained or not in the Great and Small be broken? The answer says 'they are not analogous': in the Small Vehicle, whether attained or not there is delusion in both, and hence both are broken. In the Mahāyāna, when not attained there is delusion that must be broken; when attained there is no delusion, so why should attainment need to be broken? Therefore they are not analogous. The intent of the third question: the Small Vehicle is provisional, and breaking the provisional is called 'no'; the Mahāyāna is real, and the real truth is not non-existent—why is the Middle Way also called no-truth? The intent of the answer: it is truly as asked; for one who has attained the real, it is not necessary to say 'no'. Its being spoken of now as 'no' is for the sake of those who have not yet attained it.