法華文句記 2.116

2.116

次列體上之名者，先破古。涉法師云：「論採諸經名有十七，慈恩廣釋乃為過分。」今先破生觀，於中先述彼所立，次「若爾」下今文難者，《般若》、《淨名》無相非序，安得以《無量》無相為序？次救意者，五時相生次第別故，雖俱無相前後有殊，二經之後方《無量義》，《無量義》後方是《法華》，故唯《無量》為《法華》序，餘二遠故序義不成。「若爾」下更難者，始自華嚴，後後教起以至法華，此則通途，前經生後乃成次第，展轉為序別義不成。若諸經不然，豈獨《無量義》為《法華》別序耶？次基師所立不殊生觀，破準前說。次「印師」者，印受於龍，龍受於遠，所計既等破立一同。言「無相善有成佛義」者，意云：十二年前是有相教非成佛因，指無相善有成佛義。意云：至法華中一切無不皆成佛道。所言義者，謂可成也。故以成佛義為一乘經序。「又云」等者，若爾，方等、般若亦明無相，亦應以方等、般若為《法華》序。印師防此伏難，故更述《無量義》與《大品》對辨，《大品》無相猶說有三無三，《無量義》中無相不說三之有無，故《大品》無相非《法華》中《無量義經》，《無量義經》未翻譯故。此有三失：一者錯解《無量義》云不說有三無三失，二者謂《無量義》未翻譯失，三者妄破古師以《大品》為《無量義》失。然初失者，彼《無量義》既說二三從無相出，何名不說有無之異？次「今謂」下今文破也。但破第二餘二可知。故具敘經來翻譯年代，《注無量義經序》云：「此《無量義經》雖《法華》首載其名目，而中夏未覩，每臨講肆，未甞不廢譚而歎。忽有武當山惠表比丘，自偽帝姚秦略從子，略是萇子，因為晉軍何澹之所得，養為假子，俄放出家勤苦求道。以齊建元三年，至廣州朝廷寺，遇曇摩伽陀耶舍，欲傳此經，表乃致請僅得一本，仍還武當。永明三年九月十八日始傳於世。」「經既已來」等者，笑印師也。次破光宅中亦先依彼立。彼立意者，以同歸與《法華》仍有二異：一者同歸非無二無三，二者同歸非破三與一。雖有二異，由同歸故可成此二，故以萬善同歸為無二三等序。「若言」下先破初句，問《無量義》中同歸萬善，何異《法華》所無二三？兩處若同，破則俱破、歸則俱歸。「二三」下結難。次「若言」下破其次句，前舉其《無量義》難其《法華》，今舉其《法華》難其《無量義》。此難意者，前破語存略，破三正是破二破三，故今牒言破二破三，但加與一異於上句，故先將破以難同歸，故云「何不破萬」。次「破二」下雙牒兩難，初難唯正無序，破即是無，故破二三是無二三，文中語略，亦應更言「若破二三即是破萬，既其破萬是則無序」。若以低頭舉手為萬善者，二三尚無，萬善何有？若其俱無，序義安在？次「取經」下即縱難也。若言二經俱歸俱破，但此經舉破、彼經舉歸，今亦破云「不成異也」。既云互舉，歸必有破、破必有歸，互舉一邊豈得為異？次「異意」下結難也。凡言序者，須與正殊，殊又表同方可為序，異同既混序義如何？「劉虬」下破注家也。亦先依其所立，次「若含」下破其「不貲」，與其無相自語相違，故將其不貲難其無相。

Next, regarding the enumeration of the names corresponding to the essence: first, refuting the ancients. Dharma Master She states: “The treatise extracts seventeen names across various sūtras; Ci'en's extensive explanation is simply excessive.” Now, first refuting Master Guan: within this, his formulation is first presented, and next, from “If so” below, the present text poses a refutation: the signlessness of the Prajñā and Vimalakīrti does not serve as an introduction; how then can the signlessness of the Amitārtha serve as an introduction? Next, regarding the intended defense: because the sequence of successive emergence of the five periods differs, although both are signless, there is a distinction between earlier and later: the Amitārtha comes only after the two sūtras, and the Lotus comes only after the Amitārtha; hence, only the Amitārtha serves as the introduction to the Lotus, while the other two are distant and cannot constitute an introductory function. From “If so” below, another refutation is raised: beginning from the Avataṃsaka, subsequent teachings arise one after another down to the Lotus; this being the general course, the preceding sūtra generating the succeeding one constitutes the sequence, and their serving successively as introductions cannot establish a specific introductory function. If the other sūtras do not function thus, why would the Amitārtha alone be the specific introduction to the Lotus? Next, Master Ji's formulation does not differ from Guan's; its refutation follows the preceding explanation. Next, regarding “Master Yin”: Yin received it from Long, and Long received it from Yuan; since their views are identical, the refutation and formulation are the same. The statement that “signless good has the meaning of attaining buddhahood” means: the teachings prior to the twelve years were teachings with signs and were not causes for attaining buddhahood; pointing to signless good possesses the meaning of attaining buddhahood. The idea is that upon reaching the Lotus, there is none who does not attain the Buddha Path. What is termed “meaning” [or “potential”] means it can be attained. Thus, the meaning of attaining buddhahood is taken as the introduction to the One Vehicle sūtra. Regarding “It is also said,” etc.: if so, the Vaipulya and Prajñā also clarify signlessness, so the Vaipulya and Prajñā should also serve as introductions to the Lotus. Master Yin anticipated this implicit objection and therefore further contrasted and distinguished the Amitārtha from the Large Prajñā: the signlessness of the Large Prajñā still speaks of having the three and lacking the three; the signlessness in the Amitārtha does not speak of the presence or absence of the three. Therefore, the signlessness of the Large Prajñā is not the Amitārtha Sūtra mentioned in the Lotus, for the Amitārtha Sūtra had not yet been translated. This entails three errors: first, the error of misinterpreting the Amitārtha by claiming it does not speak of having the three or lacking the three; second, the error of asserting that the Amitārtha had not yet been translated; third, the error of rashly refuting ancient masters who took the Large Prajñā to be the Amitārtha. Regarding the first error: since that Amitārtha already states that two and three arise from the signless, how can it be called not speaking of the difference between presence and absence? Next, from “Now I say” below, the present text refutes this. By merely refuting the second, the other two can be known. Thus, it recounts in full the date of the sūtra's arrival and translation. The Preface to the Commentary on the Amitārtha Sūtra states: “Although this Amitārtha Sūtra has its title recorded at the head of the Lotus, it had not yet been seen in the Central Lands; whenever one mounted the lecture platform, one never failed to halt the discourse and sigh. Suddenly there was Bhikṣu Huibiao of Mount Wudang, a first cousin's son of Yao Lüe of the illegitimate Yao Qin dynasty. Lüe was the son of Chang. Because [Huibiao] had been captured by the Jin general He Danzhi, he was raised as an adopted son; shortly thereafter he was released to leave the household, striving bitterly in pursuit of the Way. In the third year of the Jianyuan era of the Qi dynasty, he arrived at Chaoting Monastery in Guangzhou and met Dharma-gatayaśas, who wished to transmit this sūtra. Biao then made a request and barely obtained a single copy, whereupon he returned to Wudang. It was first propagated in the world on the eighteenth day of the ninth month in the third year of Yongming.” The phrase “Since the sūtra had already arrived,” etc., ridicules Master Yin. Next, in refuting Guangzhai, his formulation is also first relied upon. His intended position is that “converging in common” still has two differences from the Lotus: first, converging in common is not the absence of the two and the three; second, converging in common is not the dismantling of the three and the granting of the one. Although there are two differences, because of converging in common these two can be accomplished; therefore, the convergence of myriad goods in common is taken as the introduction to the absence of the two and three, and so forth. From “If it is said” below, the first line is refuted first: it asks, how does the convergence of myriad goods in common in the Amitārtha differ from the absence of the two and three in the Lotus? If the two places are the same, if they dismantle, both dismantle; if they converge, both converge. The lines from “Two and three” below conclude the objection. Next, from “If it is said” below, the second line is refuted: previously, the Amitārtha was adduced to challenge the Lotus; now, the Lotus is adduced to challenge the Amitārtha. The intent of this challenge is that the previous refutation was phrased briefly: dismantling the three is precisely dismantling the two and dismantling the three; hence, it now cites dismantling the two and dismantling the three, only adding the granting of the one as different from the line above, and thus first uses dismantling to challenge converging in common, hence saying: “Why not dismantle the myriad?” Next, from “Dismantles the two” below, both objections are cited together. The first objection is that there is only the main body and no introduction: dismantling is precisely absence, so dismantling the two and three is the absence of the two and three. The phrasing in the text is brief; it should also have further stated: “If dismantling the two and three is precisely dismantling the myriad, since it dismantles the myriad, there is then no introduction.” If bowing the head and raising the hand are taken as the myriad goods, when the two and three are absent, where can the myriad goods exist? If both are absent, where is the introductory function? Next, from “Taking the sūtra” below is a concessionary challenge. If it is said that both sūtras both converge and both dismantle, but this sūtra raises dismantling while that sūtra raises convergence, now it is also refuted: “This does not establish a difference.” Since it is said that each raises one aspect, convergence must entail dismantling, and dismantling must entail convergence; how could alternately raising one side constitute a difference? Next, from “The intent of difference” below concludes the challenge. Whenever an introduction is mentioned, it must be distinct from the main body, and being distinct must also signify identity before it can serve as an introduction; when difference and identity are conflated, how can there be an introductory function? From “Liu Qiu” below, the commentator is refuted. His formulation is also first relied upon, and next, from “If it contains” below, his “immeasurable” is refuted as mutually contradictory with his “signless”; hence, his “immeasurable” is used to challenge his “signless.”