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法華文句記 4.24

法華文句記 4.24

Language
Classical Chinese

4.24

次本迹者,未是品意,以本迹中俱有方便,故寄明之。方便名同,遠近永異,雖即永異不逾十雙,以本實得亦何出於自他因果,故我本行菩薩道時及我實成,即是理事乃至因果,成佛已來即是體用乃至悉檀。於中師弟二文各二,並先明自他等三,次結成四句。初師中二文者,初文本迹各有權實,次束本為實、束迹為權,則迹中麁妙望本俱麁,本中麁妙望迹俱妙,故今唯指久成名之為自,故久成中非無化他,所以中間今日縱有廢三,亦名為他。世人不見,而但以法身為本。何教無之?但弊不知父母之年,故顯實成為本。次束但一久成之外,皆名為他,故自他中但束本迹,得權實名。三結成四句。言結成四句者,對之應言本中權實皆實,迹中權實俱權,以本中實望迹中權,名第三句。不思議一,本迹俱得雙非故也。「云云」者,令如向對之。次弟子迹本相對各有權實,亦從本迹而立二名。若通論者,本及中間乃至今日,節節無不具有四句。「亦具四句云云」者,如前師中但以弟子為異,故云亦具。雖師弟俱四,若於師弟委判本迹,則本中四句皆本,迹中四句皆迹。若以本迹之名作四句者,應云本迹俱本、迹本俱迹,本迹各有本迹,俱不思議,思之可見。復應但以二句判之,即初兩句是,具如《玄》文本門十妙,乃至多少廣狹準知。次「若從佛迹」下結成釋品也。師弟從本垂迹,據化本意既俱得稱為方便品,況師弟引入圓因而不稱方便品耶?有人問云:今方便品以何為體?他答,有人云:以後得智為體,引《唯識》說後五波羅蜜皆後得智。我今以根本智為體。今謂所言體者,為取所依為用當體,若取所依即權而實為體,若取當體即實而權為體,此之二義根本、後得奚嘗暫分?況唯說五則後得無體,況分本迹唯一久成而為根本,餘皆後得。

Next, origin and traces: this is not yet the chapter's primary intention, but because there are skillful means in both origin and traces, it is explained by lodging [the meaning] here. The name "skillful means" is identical, but distant and near are eternally distinct; although they are eternally distinct, they do not exceed the ten pairs, for how could what was truly attained in the origin ever depart from self and other, cause and effect? Therefore, "when I originally practiced the bodhisattva path" and "my true realization" are precisely principle and phenomena, up to cause and effect; "since attaining buddhahood" is precisely essence and function, up to the siddhāntas. In this, the two texts on master and disciple each have two [parts]: both first clarify the three of self, other, and so forth, and next conclude with the four propositions. As for the two texts regarding the master: the first text shows that origin and traces each possess the provisional and the real; next, bundling the origin as real and bundling the traces as provisional, the coarse and wondrous in the traces are both coarse compared to the origin, while the coarse and wondrous in the origin are both wondrous compared to the traces. Therefore, now it only points to the ancient realization and names it "self"; thus within the ancient realization there is not an absence of transforming others, which is why intermediate [times] and today, even if there is discarding the three, are also called "other." People of the world do not see this and merely take the dharmakāya as the origin. What teaching lacks that? But their defect is not knowing the parents' age, which is why revealing the true realization is the origin. Next, bundling: outside of this one ancient realization, all are called "other"; therefore, within self and other, merely bundling origin and traces attains the names "provisional" and "real." Third, concluding with the four propositions. As for concluding with the four propositions: in matching them, one should say that provisional and real in the origin are both real, and provisional and real in the traces are both provisional; taking the real in the origin against the provisional in the traces is called the third proposition. The inconceivable one is because origin and traces both attain double negation. "And so forth" means to match them as just shown. Next, the disciple's traces and origin, contrasted with each other, each possess the provisional and real, also establishing the two names from origin and traces. Speaking generally, in the origin, the intermediate [stages], and down to the present day, every stage without exception possesses the four propositions. "Also possessing the four propositions, and so forth": as in the preceding regarding the master, it differs only in being the disciple, hence it says "also possessing." Although master and disciple both have four, if one minutely determines origin and traces within master and disciple, then the four propositions in the origin are all origin, and the four propositions in the traces are all traces. If one uses the names of origin and traces to make the four propositions, one should say that origin and traces are both origin, traces and origin are both traces, and origin and traces each have origin and traces, both being inconceivable; through reflection this can be seen. Furthermore, one should determine it with only two propositions, which are the first two propositions, fully as in the ten wonders of the origin section in the text of the *Profound Meaning*, down to greater or lesser, broad and narrow, which can be understood by analogy. Next, from "If proceeding from the Buddha's traces" onward concludes the explanation of the chapter. Master and disciple descend into traces from the origin; based on the original intention of transformation, both already attain the designation of the Skillful Means Chapter—how much more so when master and disciple guide [beings] to enter the perfect cause, could it not be called the Skillful Means Chapter? Someone asks: "What does the present Skillful Means Chapter take as its essence?" Others answer; someone says: "It takes subsequent-attainment wisdom as essence," citing the *Vijñaptimātra* statement that the last five pāramitās are all subsequent-attainment wisdom. "I now take fundamental wisdom as essence." Now I say: regarding what is called essence, does one take that upon which it relies, or the immediate essence of function? If taking that upon which it relies, then what is provisional yet real is the essence; if taking the immediate essence, then what is real yet provisional is the essence. How could these two meanings—fundamental and subsequent-attainment—ever be separated even for an instant? Furthermore, if one only speaks of the five, then subsequent-attainment has no essence; how much more so when dividing origin and traces, only the single ancient realization is the fundamental, and all the rest are subsequent-attainment.

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