法華文句記 4.59

4.59

次「諸法」下釋甚深境界者，此是《法華》之理本、諸教之端首，釋義之關鍵、眾生之依止，發心之凭仗、權謀之用體，迷悟之根源、果德之理本，一化之周窮、五時之終卒，得此十義以消諸異坦然無誤，所以先歎能依之智，即五佛之權實。權實何依？所謂妙境。境不稱智尚非佛智，況無境可論直云對等，何能曉此難思妙智，是以廣破諸師。次廣建立，《玄》及《止觀》以此為主，一家用義大括包富者莫不由此，恐後輩猶亡其所歸，故慇懃煩重，親見尋斯教者猶昧故耳。故須思之！故須思之！若迷此意，諸教之蹊徑任運失趣，一化之條流於茲枯竭。光宅云「三三」者，謂人教因，昔無果義故，三乘各三、一理非虛故。言「實相」者，應云非虛故實、非相為相，故名實相。「四一之中偏舉理」者，準光宅意，既同舊人，不立理一，但云理是四一之本，故四俱名一，此不及今文云四中之一。此去訖「北師」並是光宅釋也。「菩薩以六度為體」者，光宅亦立三祇菩薩，以為三乘之中菩薩，即今文三藏菩薩也。近代以來此義全棄，五百所集須歸五天，若但會退，大自歸佛、道不關此者，何但定性永滅，亦乃菩薩空談。「云云」者，應明支佛聲聞以諦緣為體。「實境有四一，以四廣其一理」者，因緣等四判為實境，故以此等廣談理一。暢師但約佛上唯立一實而無三權，對十力者非無此理，望今四釋佛乘，一釋尚自未周，以無究竟空假中等故也。於中相是總舉十力之相，次是別對性等體為根本，最後云「總」者，約前八力釋處非處，即以本末總收前九。「上來諸釋非不一途」者，諸釋可見，望今家釋各得十界十如中之少分，故云一途。光宅雖似自得四聖而但立九，又分擗九五權四實；北瑤二師雖具立十而不分判，但在三乘又無一實。然攢眾釋既許三乘及以一乘，三一俱有性相等十，何為不語六道十耶？四聖是事從因至果，六道亦事亦應例然，因果既同十義寧闕？四聖是能照、六道是所照，十界是所照、佛乘是能照，故佛智照十界十如三諦具足。究竟等言其理宛爾，何故諸佛各據一途，使佛境智不具足耶？今師不能細斥，但總破光宅，云「文理不通」等也。「理」謂道理，「文」即現文，初文可見，次破理中先以十中四五對難。「因果」者，因緣是因，果報是果。「若實」下約人對破且依四五，若依今文應約十界以論有無。次「義不」下結破。文云諸法須收十界，界界十如，實相是界如之體，若唯一但四，體外尚遺九五，況復十十皆如？今欲正解，先引《大論》即達磨所用。引《論》意者但泛為類例，非的同也。《論》既云一一法各有九種，故知光宅不應以四五別判，諸師不應以三一各據，故知但依十界十法，則諸家咸壞，況復四釋冠絕古今，如此消文方契經旨，諸師分擗理趣在何？此達磨欝多羅是《雜心論》主，《婆沙》有法救論師，是《雜心論》主所承，從師為名。既依《大論》不別分張，今一一句中皆云即是《法華》中如是相等，縱不委細免上諸非。

Next, regarding the explanation of the profound realm of cognition below the words 'all dharmas': this is the fundamental principle of the Lotus Sūtra and the foremost beginning of all the teachings; it is the crucial pivot for explaining meanings and that upon which sentient beings rely; it is the reliance for generating the aspiration [for awakening] and the substance of the functions of provisional expedients; it is the source of delusion and awakening and the fundamental principle of the virtues of the fruit; it is the exhaustive span of the Buddha's lifetime teaching and the ultimate culmination of the five periods. Grasping these ten points, one resolves all differences clearly and without error. Therefore, the wisdom that relies [on this realm] was praised first, namely, the provisional and real of the five buddhas. On what do the provisional and real rely? They rely on what is called the wondrous realm of cognition. If the realm of cognition does not correspond to the wisdom, it is not yet buddha-wisdom; how much less so if, with no realm of cognition to speak of, one directly claims that they are merely in opposition—how could one understand this inconceivable wondrous wisdom? Therefore, he extensively refutes the various masters. Next, he extensively establishes [his own view]. The Profound Meaning and Cessation and Contemplation take this as primary; that our school's applications of meaning comprehensively embrace such richness is entirely due to this. Fearing that later generations would still lose that to which they return, he was therefore earnestly repetitive, precisely because he had personally seen that those who investigated these teachings were still bewildered. Therefore one must reflect upon it! Therefore one must reflect upon it! If one is deluded about this intention, the pathways of all the teachings will naturally lose their purpose, and the branching streams of the lifetime teaching will dry up here. When Guāngzhái speaks of 'three times three,' he refers to person, teaching, and cause; because in the past there was no sense of fruit, each of the three vehicles has three, and the single principle is not empty. When he speaks of 'true character,' it should mean that it is real because it is not empty, and it is called character because non-character is character; hence it is called 'true character.' Regarding 'in the four unities, singling out the principle,' according to Guāngzhái's intention, since he agreed with the old masters in not establishing the unity of principle, he merely said that principle is the root of the four unities, and therefore all four are named 'one.' This falls short of the present text's statement that it is 'one among the four.' From here down to 'the Northern masters,' all are Guāngzhái's explanations. Regarding 'bodhisattvas take the six perfections as their essence,' Guāngzhái also posited bodhisattvas of three asaṃkhyeya kalpas, taking them as the bodhisattvas among the three vehicles; these are the Tripiṭaka bodhisattvas of the present text. In recent times, this doctrine has been completely abandoned. What the five hundred gathered must return to the five regions of India; if it were only that those who retrogressed assemble [there] while the Mahāyāna naturally belongs to the Buddha and the path is unrelated to this, then not only would those of fixed nature be forever extinguished, but 'bodhisattva' would also be empty talk. The words 'and so on' mean that one should clarify that pratyekabuddhas and śrāvakas take the truths and conditions as their essence. Regarding 'the real realm of cognition has four ones, using the four to expand its single principle,' the four—such as causes and conditions—are judged as the real realm of cognition; hence he used these to extensively discuss the unity of principle. Master Chàng merely established, with respect to the Buddha, only one reality without the three provisionals. Correlating this with the ten powers is not without this rationale; yet compared to our current fourfold explanation of the buddha vehicle, even a single explanation is still incomplete, because it lacks the ultimate empty, provisional, and middle. Among them, 'character' generally brings up the characteristics of the ten powers; next, nature and so forth are individually correlated to the essence as the root; finally, saying 'general' explains the possible and impossible based on the former eight powers, which thus generally gathers the former nine with the beginning and the end. Regarding 'the various explanations above are not without a certain approach,' the various explanations are evident: compared to our school's explanation, each grasps only a minor portion of the ten realms and ten suchnesses; hence it is said that they are 'a certain approach.' Although Guāngzhái seems to have obtained the four noble [realms] himself, he only established nine [suchnesses], and furthermore divided the nine into five provisional and four real. Although the two masters Běi and Yáo fully established the ten, they did not make [doctrinal] judgments, and remaining within the three vehicles, they also lacked the single reality. Yet, gathering the various explanations, since they allow the three vehicles as well as the one vehicle, and both the three and the one possess the ten—such as nature and character—why do they not speak of the ten in the six destinies? The four noble [realms] are phenomena proceeding from cause to fruit; the six destinies are also phenomena and should follow the same pattern. Since cause and fruit are the same, how could the ten meanings be lacking? The four noble [realms] are that which illuminates; the six destinies are that which is illuminated. The ten realms are that which is illuminated; the buddha vehicle is that which illuminates. Therefore, buddha-wisdom illuminates the ten realms and ten suchnesses as fully possessing the three truths. The words 'ultimate equality' clearly indicate that this principle is so. Why do the various masters each rely on a single approach, rendering the Buddha's realm of cognition and wisdom incomplete? Our master could not refute them in detail, but simply made a general refutation of Guāngzhái, saying that 'the text and the principle do not make sense,' and so forth. 'Principle' means the rationale; 'text' means the present text. The first passage is evident. Next, in refuting the principle, he first counters by opposing the four and the five among the ten. 'Cause and fruit': causes and conditions are the cause, while retribution is the fruit. Below 'If real...', he counters based on persons and provisionally follows the four and five; if following the present text, one should discuss presence and absence based on the ten realms. Next, below 'The meaning is not...', he concludes the refutation. The text says that 'all dharmas' must gather the ten realms, and each realm has ten suchnesses; true character is the essence of the realms and suchnesses. If there is only one [essence] and only four [reals], outside of this essence nine [provisional suchnesses] and five [provisional suchnesses] would still be left out; how much more so given that the ten times ten are all suchness? Now, wishing to explain correctly, he first cites the Great Treatise, which was used by Dharmatrāta. The intention of citing the Treatise is merely to draw a general analogy, not an exact identity. Since the Treatise says that each dharma has nine kinds, we know that Guāngzhái should not have judged them separately as four and five, and the various masters should not each have relied on the three or the one. Thus we know that if one merely relies on the ten realms and the ten dharmas, the various masters are all refuted; how much more so when the fourfold explanation surpasses all antiquity and modern times! Resolving the text in this manner truly accords with the purport of the sūtra. Where lies the rationale for the various masters' divisions? This Dharmottara was the author of the Za xin lun (Saṃyuktābhidharmahṛdaya); the Vibhāṣā has the treatise master Dharmatrāta, who was the predecessor of the author of the Za xin lun, and he took his name from his teacher. Since, relying on the Great Treatise, he did not divide them separately, now in every single phrase it says, 'this is the "suchlike appearance" and so on in the Lotus Sūtra'; even if it is not detailed, it avoids the various errors above.