法華文句記 4.68

4.68

三「若就」下釋不思議者，前境雖已成不思議，其名仍通，故今更對思議辯之，令識前四釋真不思議。先略出體相，次引事類況，三舉理況結。初文先略出，次「諸經」下指廣。初文先法，次譬。初文先釋名也。出心數法故不可思，過言語道故不可議。次「不能行」等出體也。體非因果及非能趣。「行」者因也。「到」者果也。此體不當因之與果，若其屬能則不關體。次舉譬譬，中三，謂法、喻、合。初法者，觀色是常故不敗壞，常必具四，四秖是心，不異亦爾。譬類中二重，初以明暗喻不思議與惑同體，故指月光全明是暗。次「又日出時」下譬轉暗為明，云「常在」者，秖是暗無暗性舉暗是明，迷悟亦爾理性無殊。因位之明與無明雜，體不可別，故云「共合」，入分真位破一分暗，所破之暗體變為明，豈有所破移在異方？無所趣故故云「常在」。豈智明發仍存先暗，云常在耶？雖云常在終須破盡，究竟永淨方名常在。「生死與道合」下合也。次指廣如文。就事況者，四不思議中闕釋佛者，世易信故、教多說故，故以佛在四中之一，三類尚爾，何況佛耶？云「如阿含」者，如《增一》十八云：「舍利弗說界生不知如來壽命。佛言：有四不思議，非小乘所知。云何為四？」如文。因釋世界不可思議，引經為證。言「阿含云一士夫」者，《雜含》亦云：「佛在舍衛，有多比丘在食堂上思惟世間。佛知其念，詣食堂上告諸比丘：汝等思惟世間，非義、非饒益、不順涅槃。汝當思惟作四聖諦，此是有義、有饒益、正向涅槃。如過去世時有一士夫，在王舍城俱絺池側不正思惟，見無數四兵入藕絲孔中。見已作是念：狂耶失性耶？世間無是，狂而今見之。時去城不遠有大會，士夫往問如是之事，大會皆謂是士夫狂，失性故爾。彼見佛問。佛言：非狂是實，彼池不遠有天與阿修羅共戰，修羅兵敗入中藏耳。是故比丘莫思惟世間，非汝所及。」釋龍中兼明有天亦能出雨，即龍類也。「五道」下郤釋眾生。《論》云：「五道各有自爾力故」，《婆沙．雜揵度》中云：「若因祭祀，唯鬼神得。」

Third, regarding the explanation of the inconceivable from "If according to" onwards: although the preceding sphere has already become inconceivable, its name remains shared [with other contexts]; therefore, we now distinguish it against the conceivable, so that one may recognize the true inconceivability of the preceding four explanations. First, briefly presenting the essence and characteristics; next, adducing comparable phenomena by way of analogy; third, adverting to principle by way of analogy and concluding. In the first text, first briefly presenting; next, from "Various sūtras" onwards, referring to the detailed [treatment]. In the first text, first the dharma, then the simile. In the first text, first explaining the name: it surpasses mental factors and is therefore unthinkable (inconceivable); it exceeds the path of language and is therefore undiscussable. Next, "cannot walk" and so on brings out the essence: the essence is neither cause nor effect, nor is it that which can proceed. "Walking" is the cause; "arriving" is the fruit. This essence does not correspond to cause and effect; if it pertained to the capable [agent], it would not concern the essence. Next, presenting similes: in this, there are three, namely dharma, simile, and application. First, regarding the dharma: contemplating form as permanent, it therefore does not perish; the permanent must possess four [virtues], and the four are simply mind; "not different" is also like this. In the analogies, there are two folds: first, using light and darkness to illustrate that the inconceivable and delusion share the same essence, pointing to the moonlight where the entirety of light is darkness. Next, from "Also when the sun rises" onwards, illustrating the turning of darkness into light: "ever present" simply means that darkness has no nature of darkness, and pointing to darkness is light; delusion and awakening are also like this, their inherent principle being no different. In the causal stage, light and ignorance are mixed, their essence indistinguishable, hence called "combined"; entering the stage of partial reality, breaking one part of darkness, the essence of the darkness broken turns into light—how could what is broken move to another place? Because it proceeds nowhere, it is said to be "ever present." How could it be that when the light of wisdom arises, the previous darkness still remains, and is called ever present? Although called ever present, it must ultimately be broken completely; only when ultimately and perpetually pure is it called ever present. From "Samsara combines with the Path" onwards is the application. Next, referring to the detailed [treatment] is as in the text. Regarding analogizing through phenomena: among the four inconceivables, the explanation of the Buddha is omitted because it is easy for the world to believe and frequently explained in the teachings; thus, with the Buddha being one of the four, if the [other] three types are already like this, how much more so the Buddha? As for saying "as in the Āgama": as the Ekottarika-āgama, fascicle eighteen, says: "Śāriputra spoke of realms and births, not knowing the Tathāgata's life span. The Buddha said: 'There are four inconceivables, which are not known by the Hinayana. What are the four?'" As in the text. In connection with explaining the inconceivability of the world, the sūtra is cited as proof. The statement "The Āgama says: 'A man'" is also found in the Saṃyukta-āgama: "The Buddha was in Śrāvastī. Many monks were in the dining hall contemplating the world. The Buddha, knowing their thoughts, went to the dining hall and told the monks: 'Your contemplation of the world is neither meaningful, nor beneficial, nor in accord with nirvāṇa. You should contemplate the four noble truths; this is meaningful, beneficial, and directly leads to nirvāṇa. Just as in a past age there was a man who, beside the Kucchi Pond in Rājagṛha, improperly contemplated, seeing countless fourfold armies enter the hole of a lotus stem. Having seen this, he thought: "Am I mad? Have I lost my mind? In the world there is no such thing; being mad, I now see it." At that time, not far from the city, there was a great assembly; the man went and asked about this matter, and the great assembly all thought the man was mad and had lost his mind. He saw the Buddha and asked. The Buddha said: "You are not mad; this is real. Not far from that pond, the devas and the asuras fought; the asura army, defeated, entered it to hide. Therefore, monks, do not contemplate the world; it is beyond your reach."'" In explaining dragons, it is additionally clarified that there are also devas capable of producing rain, who belong to the category of dragons. From "Five paths" onwards, sentient beings are explained in reverse. The Treatise says: "The five paths each have their own spontaneous power"; the Vibhāṣā, Miscellaneous Section, says: "If based on sacrificial offerings, only ghosts and spirits obtain them."