法華文句記 4.81
法華文句記 4.81
- Language
- Classical Chinese
4.81
「爾時」下次明二止,初止意者恐懷疑故,次舍利弗騰宿根利,是故更請。次佛止之護上慢故,次舍利弗述慧益多,牒疑更請。一次正廣開三中三:先分章示相,次義四分別,三依文正釋。初文四:初引經標章,次舉品分周,三「亦名」下三周異名,四引例。「例如大品三根」者,第二十一〈方便品〉云:「須菩提白佛言:如佛所說若廣若略,諸菩薩等云何求耶?佛言:如是!如是!乃至一切種智,如是相菩薩摩訶薩學,是略攝般若波羅蜜,則知一切法廣略相。世尊!是利根菩薩亦入耶?佛言:利根中根定心散心並入是門,是門無礙,亦如三種發心不同。」「以十義料簡」者,自古此文多有紛諍,今為評判及以自立因為十門,然此十門雖泛拾破,一家置章不無次第。初欲明所被之人,先明能益之法,故先辯三周通別同異。次辯所被權實有無,故次明第二於實行中得入之人,三周不同由惑厚薄,雖現惑厚薄須知由宿根,雖已成根根須在悟,既得悟已必知領解,若有領解理須與記,得記之者悟有淺深,所引之人獲記得否,能引之眾須益有無,已識顯益欲知冥利,故辯待時。初門自立,文初中云若我遇眾生等是因緣說者,昔曾結緣即是昔因,中間相遇處處皆以佛道成熟,今日五時咸資佛道,即始終赴物也。根利未須述大通事。「若謂此文屬說法」者,雖在譬說文初,分文仍屬法說文後,既在譬說題內,故且用之,不然則取次文用之。長者驚入是因緣者,昔因今緣是感應義,長者是應、所聞是機,驚入即是赴機故也。故知應赴即是今之一化故也。答意者,許各具三根,法說自被法說中三,餘二亦爾。但說三根攝九即足。「從正略旁」者,上根中上根為正、中下是旁,亦應云具論有三且言上耳。若逗上根上三俱被,但上根為多為正,中下是略是旁,中中上下下中中上亦復如是。第二義中,光宅有實為權所引,則成定有實行引權意令有實;開善定執引權意令無實。今云有無且約實行,權應暫有何須論之。開善指四念處為初業故,故云外凡。今言有者,誰論初業能知常耶?豈以初知令今無耶?如大通佛所誰不知之?亦言于今有住聲聞地,言寧有者甚不可也。法華之前所執者誰?「經明」等者,正為光宅所破,既云寧執小果,權者何所引耶?今先總斥二家乖經失義。「乖經」者,光宅也。今經二文得記故無、未記則有。又在昔故有、於今則無,故今引文約開約記破其定有,若望後無計有則失。「失義」者破開善,「若定無」已下文是,既有入城必有實行。「權何所引」者,復以光宅結破開善,故今立實有與光宅言同、其意則別,今雖云無亦與開善不同,從得記後說故。「若定有」者下破執定有,恐計三周後猶有聲聞。「若定無」者,破定計無,如〈序品〉初因光橫見文殊引往;〈方便品〉初千二百人法說周竟,尚自不悟仍待譬說;宿世文中于今有住聲聞地者,又舉不知之人,云舍利弗辟支佛等,乃至流通處處有之。云何言無?又云無者,破住果者定計永滅,非謂本無。「若言」下今文泛難,今許實有為權所引,仍恐他以三藏佛例。「此義不例」下今文申之。佛居果頭則無實行,聲聞不爾是故有之。三藏佛言出自今教,故知不是他人難也。「何處」者,佛必三身圓滿,故稱此佛為權。若言三十四心,此乃教權似實。古今學者此佛尚不敢為權,誰知寂場不實?
From the passage beginning with "At that time" onward, [the text] next explains the two stops. The intention of the first stop was out of concern that they would harbor doubt; next, Śāriputra set forth that their past roots were keen, and for this reason he requested again. Next, the Buddha stopped him to protect the arrogant; next, Śāriputra stated that the benefit of wisdom would be great, and, taking up their doubts, requested again. / At the same time, under [the second section], properly and extensively opening the three, there are three [parts]: first, dividing into chapters to show the characteristics; second, four doctrinal analyses; third, properly explaining in accordance with the text. / In the first part there are four: first, citing the sūtra to indicate the headings; second, adducing the chapters to divide into cycles; third, from "also named" onward, the different names for the three cycles; fourth, citing precedents. / Regarding "as in the example of the three types of faculties in the Large [Prajñāpāramitā Sūtra]," Chapter Twenty-One, "Skillful Means," states: "Subhūti said to the Buddha: 'Regarding that which the Buddha has spoken, whether extensive or brief, how should the bodhisattvas and others seek it?' The Buddha said: 'So it is! So it is! Up to the knowledge of all aspects; bodhisattva mahāsattvas who train in such characteristics briefly encompass the prajñāpāramitā, and thereby know the extensive and brief characteristics of all dharmas.' [Subhūti said:] 'World-Honoured One, do bodhisattvas of keen faculties also enter?' The Buddha said: 'Those of keen faculties, intermediate faculties, concentrated minds, and distracted minds all enter this gate; this gate is unobstructed, just as the three kinds of arousing the mind differ.'" / Regarding "analyzing by means of ten points," from antiquity there has been much disputation over this text; now, for evaluation and to establish our own position, ten gates are formed. Although these ten gates broadly gather and refute [other views], our school's establishment of chapters is not without sequence. At first, wishing to clarify the persons to be reached, one first clarifies the Dharma that can benefit [them]; hence, one first analyzes the general and specific similarities and differences of the three cycles. Next, one analyzes the presence or absence of the provisional and real among those who are reached; hence, second, one clarifies those persons who attain entry among the real practitioners. The differences among the three cycles are due to the thickness or thinness of afflictions; although present afflictions are thick or thin, one must know this is due to past faculties; although faculties have already been formed, faculties must culminate in awakening; having attained awakening, they must necessarily comprehend and articulate it; if there is comprehension, in principle a prediction must be conferred; among those who receive predictions, awakenings are shallow or deep; as to whether the persons led attain predictions or not, the assembly capable of leading must have benefit or not; having recognized explicit benefits, wishing to know the hidden benefit, one must analyze the waiting for the time. / In the first gate, establishing our own position: in the beginning of the text, saying that "if I meet sentient beings" and so forth is an exposition on causes and conditions; having formed conditions in the past is the past cause; meeting in between, in every place maturing them through the Buddha Path; today, the five flavors all assist the Buddha Path: this is responding to beings from beginning to end. Because their faculties were keen, there was no need yet to recount the events of the Mahābhijñājñānābhibhū Buddha. / Regarding "if one claims that this passage belongs to the preaching of the Dharma," although it is at the beginning of the parable passage, in dividing the text it still belongs after the text preaching the Dharma; since it falls within the title of the parable, it is tentatively used, or else the subsequent text is taken and used. The elder entering in alarm is [a matter of] causes and conditions: past causes and present conditions are the meaning of stimulus and response. The elder is the response; what was heard is the capacity; entering in alarm is precisely responding to their capacity. Therefore, one knows that responding to their capacity is precisely the one conversion of today. / The intent of the answer is to grant that each [cycle] is equipped with three faculties: the Dharma preaching itself reaches the three within the Dharma preaching, and the other two [cycles] are also like this. Simply speaking of the three faculties encompasses nine, and that is sufficient. / Regarding "proceeding from the principal and omitting the secondary," among the keen faculties, the upper-keen is principal, while the intermediate and lower are secondary; it should also be said that, discussing them fully, there are three, and we merely state "keen." If matching the keen faculties, all three upper ones are reached, but the keen faculty is predominant and principal, while intermediate and lower are brief and secondary; intermediate-intermediate, upper-lower, lower-intermediate, intermediate-upper are also like this. / In the second point: Guāngzhái holds that the real is led by the provisional, which results in definitely having real practice, with the intent of leading the provisional being to make them have the real; Kāishàn definitively maintains that leading the provisional is with the intent of making them have no real. Now we say that presence or absence is tentatively considered in terms of real practice; as for the provisional manifestations, they temporarily exist—why would there be any need to discuss them? Kāishàn points to the four applications of mindfulness as the initial practice, and therefore calls it the outer worldling. Now, in saying they exist, who discusses whether initial practice can know the permanent? How could knowing it initially cause them not to exist now? As in the place of the Mahābhijñājñānābhibhū Buddha, who did not know it? It is also said that up to the present there are those dwelling in the stage of the śrāvaka; to say "how could there be any?" is quite untenable. Before the Lotus [Sūtra], who was it that held attachments? / Regarding "the sūtra clarifies" and so forth, this is precisely refuted by Guāngzhái: since it says "how could they grasp the lesser fruit?", what would the provisional ones be leading? Now we first broadly reprove the two masters for departing from the sūtra and losing the doctrinal meaning. "Departing from the sūtra" refers to Guāngzhái: in the two texts of the present sūtra, because they receive predictions, they do not exist; when not yet predicted, they do exist. Furthermore, in the past they existed, while at present they do not; therefore, the cited text now, on the basis of opening and on the basis of prediction, refutes his claim of definite existence; if, looking toward the subsequent nonexistence, one supposes existence, that is an error. "Losing the doctrinal meaning" refutes Kāishàn; the passage from "if definitely nonexistent" downward is this: since there is entering the city, there must be real practice. Regarding "what would the provisional lead?", he again uses Guāngzhái to conclude the refutation of Kāishàn. Therefore, our present establishment of real existence agrees in words with Guāngzhái, but the meaning is different; although we now say they do not exist, this is also different from Kāishàn, because it is spoken from after the conferring of predictions. / The passage "if definitely existent" downward refutes the attachment to definite existence, out of fear that one might suppose that after the three cycles there are still śrāvakas. / "If definitely nonexistent" refutes the definitive supposition of nonexistence, as in the beginning of the "Introductory Chapter" where, relying on the light, they laterally see Mañjuśrī leading [them] forward; at the beginning of the "Skillful Means Chapter," when the cycle of the Dharma preaching for the twelve hundred people had ended, they still did not understand and still awaited the parables; in the text on past lives, there are those who "up to the present dwell in the stage of the śrāvaka"; furthermore, adducing those who do not know, it speaks of Śāriputra, pratyekabuddhas, and so forth, down to the transmission sections where they appear everywhere. How could one say they do not exist? Moreover, saying they do not exist refutes those dwelling in the fruit who definitively suppose eternal extinction; it does not mean they originally did not exist. / The passage from "if it is said" downward is our present text raising a general objection: now we grant that the real exists and is led by the provisional, but we still fear that others might take the Buddha of the Tripiṭaka as an analogy. / The passage from "this meaning is not analogous" downward is our present text explaining it: when the Buddha resides at the peak of the fruit, there is no real practice; with śrāvakas it is not so, and therefore it exists. The words "Buddha of the Tripiṭaka" originate from the present teaching; hence we know this is not an objection from someone else. / Regarding "where?", the Buddha must have the three bodies completely fulfilled, and therefore this Buddha is called provisional. If speaking of the thirty-four mental states, this is provisionality of teaching appearing like reality. Ancient and modern scholars do not even dare to take this Buddha as provisional; who would know that the place of tranquility is not real?
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- 大智度論 — Classical Chinese