法華文句記 6.65
法華文句記 6.65
- Language
- Classical Chinese
6.65
次「別駁」者,先破第一云「齊三藏明菩薩不斷惑」者,前云菩薩未至許處,以不斷惑故不與二乘同至許果之處,故不索者,唯三藏中明菩薩不斷,故判云「齊」。言「依法華有四句」者,謂準今經須作四句攝機方盡,若無四句恐人謂機發獨在無障之人,故第二句即三藏菩薩。若獨二乘,二乘何曾障未除耶?逐要且列機發二句破舊不索,若不索者何以機發?然機不動亦有障除,第三句也。未發且指法華已前,若至法華除五千外無不發者。破第二義者,彼師意云:索但在小,諸大乘經並無菩薩索小乘果,今經菩薩豈應索小?故今破云入涅槃既同,何得不索者?乃以通教破之。汝云菩薩不索小果,通三乘人得理既同,俱被斥云悉是方便,欲更求實理須俱索,通教尚索況三藏耶?破第三者,彼文云:所化三祇百劫至補處來,猶是凡夫道理無索。此貶太甚,豈三祇百劫一向同凡?文仍不破,但破其能化三十三心思仍未盡故不應索,至佛復無索車之義,但總判云屬三藏耳。故菩提樹下三十二心猶名菩薩,時節既促索義不成,此則可爾;言思未盡此不應然。故以見惑凡夫況之,惑障全在大機尚發,況三十三心?言佛不索道理如然,彼亦不知因不至果,至三十三心必無實行,可中此佛實是三祇至果但斷見修而已還同羅漢,如云世間有六羅漢,羅漢安得不索車耶?秖由彼不知權,故且難之,其教既權進退有妨。破第四意中,亦先牒難云「菩薩未斷習」乃至「斷盡」等者,此以第三文為例,前第三文若菩薩進斷習氣無知,理合成佛索義不成。「此三乘」下正判屬通,教既未實菩薩須索,次以具縛況之。破第五意者,彼以三乘之中菩薩為唯一。次「被會」下破,縱許菩薩伏斷不同,望二乘人亦名唯一,應知唯一語通待二不局,彼以所待二外秖一唯一,不知四教當教菩薩俱名唯一,故三唯一仍須索車。當知前三是待二唯一,圓教唯一方是絕待,如三藏唯一之外猶有三教,通別可知。「夜光」明月珠也。破第六意者,彼謂般若至法華來一概真實。「汝不」下以共不共責之,共不共文出自《大論》,不共菩薩容可不索,彼有圓故。又不共兼別,別尚須索況共菩薩?故汝不知所付之財兼共不共,而一向云真實不索。又若云般若中菩薩真實不索,今反難之,二乘於彼被付真實,即同菩薩何須更索?況汝自云至法華來皆是真實,以汝不知三味異故。破第七中牒難竟,次破中引本門文者,彼本門文既大小己他俱是方便,望彼本文圓尚方便況復偏耶?今迹中三教皆是方便,況〈方便品〉初云「佛以方便力示以三乘教」,何時獨云唯示二乘?三俱方便是故俱索。破第八者,亦先敘難,次「汝不聞」下破,亦應更引前三周初十義之中有領文來。破第九者已如前破。破第十云「猶是前義」者,不出三藏,破亦如前。世人明義多分不受四教之言,今但破云四階及以三乘共位與華嚴中菩薩不同。若復不受,請送《婆沙》、《俱舍》及《大品經》却還天竺。
Next, as for "refuting individually," first, in refuting the first by saying, "Confined to the Tripiṭaka, it clarifies that bodhisattvas do not sever defilements": previously it was said that because the bodhisattva has not reached the place of promise and because he does not sever defilements, he does not reach the place of the promised fruit together with the two vehicles, and hence does not demand; it is only within the Tripiṭaka that it is explained that the bodhisattva does not sever [defilements], which is why it is judged as "confined." As for "According to the Lotus, there are four propositions," this means that based on the present sūtra, one must form four propositions to subsume the capacities exhaustively; if there were not four propositions, one might fear that people would think the stirring of capacity occurs solely in persons without hindrances; thus the second proposition is precisely the Tripiṭaka bodhisattva. If it were solely the two vehicles, when did the two vehicles ever have their hindrances uneliminated? Following what is essential, it provisionally lists two propositions on the stirring of capacity to refute the old [view of] not demanding; if they did not demand, why would their capacity be stirred? Yet where capacity is unmoved, there is also the elimination of hindrances, which is the third proposition. Not yet being stirred provisionally refers to prior to the Lotus; once arriving at the Lotus, except for the five thousand, there is none whose capacity is not stirred. In refuting the second meaning: that master's intent was that demanding lies only in the small; the various Mahāyāna sūtras do not contain bodhisattvas demanding the fruit of the small vehicle, so how should bodhisattvas in the present sūtra demand the small? Therefore it now refutes this, saying: since their entering into nirvāṇa is identical, how could they not demand? It refutes it by means of the shared teaching. You say that bodhisattvas do not demand the small fruit, but the persons of the three vehicles within the shared [teaching] realize the principle identically, and all are reprimanded as being provisional; wishing to further seek the real, in principle they must both demand; if the shared teaching still demands, how much more so the Tripiṭaka! In refuting the third: that text says: the one who is transformed, from three asaṃkhyeyas and a hundred kalpas up to the stage of succession, is still an ordinary being, so by principle there is no demanding. This disparagement is too extreme! How could three asaṃkhyeyas and a hundred kalpas be uniformly the same as an ordinary being? The text still does not refute that, but merely refutes that the transformer's thirty-three minds still have not exhausted thoughts, and therefore he should not demand; and once arriving at buddhahood, there is again no meaning of demanding the carriages; it merely judges it comprehensively as belonging to the Tripiṭaka. Thus under the bodhi tree the thirty-two minds are still named a bodhisattva; since the period of time is brief, the meaning of demanding is not established—this, then, may be so; but to say that thoughts are not yet exhausted—this should not be so. Therefore, he illustrates it by comparison with an ordinary being with defilements of view: when the hindrance of defilements is fully present, the great capacity is still stirred, so how much more so with the thirty-three minds? To say that a buddha does not demand is indeed so in principle; but he also did not know that the cause does not reach the fruit; when reaching the thirty-three minds, there is certainly no real practice; if this buddha actually severed only [defilements of] view and cultivation from three asaṃkhyeyas up to the fruit, he is still the same as an arhat, as it is said that there are six arhats in the world; how could an arhat not demand the carriages? It is simply because he did not understand the provisional that [Tiāntái] provisionally presses him with this objection; since his teaching is provisional, advancing or retreating poses an obstacle. In the refutation of the fourth meaning, it also first cites the objection, saying: "A bodhisattva has not severed habit-energy" up to "severed completely," and so on; this takes the third text as a precedent; in the previous third text, if the bodhisattva advances to sever habit-energy and nescience, by principle he ought to become a buddha, and the meaning of demanding would not be established. From "These three vehicles…" downward, it correctly judges it as belonging to the shared [teaching]; since the teaching is not yet real, the bodhisattva must demand; next it illustrates it by comparison with those completely bound. In refuting the fifth meaning: he considered the bodhisattva among the three vehicles to be the only one. Next, from "Being converged…" downward, it refutes it: even granting that the bodhisattva differs in subduing and severing, in view of the persons of the two vehicles he is also called the only one; one should know that the phrase "the only one" is comprehensive and relative to the two, not restricted; he took there to be only a single "only one" outside of the two to which it is relative, not knowing that according to each of the four teachings the bodhisattvas of that teaching are all called the only one; therefore the three "only ones" must still demand the carriages. One should know that the previous three are the only one relative to the two; only the only one of the perfect teaching is absolute. Just as outside the only one of the Tripiṭaka there are still the three teachings, the shared and distinct can be understood accordingly. "Night-shining" is the moon-radiance pearl. In refuting the sixth meaning: he claimed that from prajñā up to the Lotus, it is uniformly real. From "You do not…" downward, it reproaches him by means of the shared and unshared; the text on shared and unshared comes from the Great Treatise (Mahāprajñāpāramitopadeśa); for an unshared bodhisattva it might perhaps be admissible not to demand, because that contains the perfect. Furthermore, the unshared also combines with the distinct; if the distinct must still demand, how much more so the shared bodhisattva! Therefore you do not know that the wealth entrusted combines the shared and unshared, and you uniformly say it is real and does not demand. Furthermore, if you say that in prajñā the bodhisattva is real and does not demand, we now turn the objection back upon you: the two vehicles are entrusted with the real there, so they are identical to the bodhisattva—why would they need to demand further? Moreover, you yourself say that up to the Lotus it is all real, because you do not know the difference among the three flavors. In refuting the seventh, having finished citing the objection, next in the refutation it cites the text of the origin section: since in that text of the origin section both the great and the small, oneself and others, are provisional, in view of that origin text even the perfect is provisional, so how much more so the one-sided? Now in the traces all three teachings are provisional, and what is more, the beginning of the "Skillful Means Chapter" says, "The Buddha, through the power of skillful means, demonstrates the teaching of the three vehicles"; when did it ever say solely that he demonstrates only the two vehicles? Since all three are provisional, all must demand. In refuting the eighth, it also first recounts the objection, and next, from "Have you not heard…" downward, it refutes it; one should also further cite from among the ten meanings at the beginning of the previous three cycles the text on understanding. Refuting the ninth is already as refuted before. As for refuting the tenth, which says "It is still the previous meaning": it does not go beyond the Tripiṭaka, and the refutation is also as before. Most worldly people, when explaining the meanings, do not accept the words of the four teachings; now we simply refute them by saying that the four stages and the shared stages of the three vehicles are not identical to the bodhisattvas in the Avataṃsaka. If they still do not accept it, please send the Vibhāṣā, the Kośa, and the Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā back to India!
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