法華文句記 9.140

9.140

生公意者，雖亦明無長無短長短恒存，故與上三家其意稍別，仍闕注家說壽意也。於中初明伽耶色身形壽不實，用為法身無壽之表。「然則」下以形例壽，萬形一致，顯身分而不分；古今為一，明壽量即非量。「古亦今也」下明今古不二，當不思議一。然準今文先須辯長，後方明一。言「古亦今」者，明本佛古不異伽耶之今。「今亦古」者，明伽耶今不殊本佛之古。「無時不有」下重釋形壽。「無時不有」釋壽也。「無處不在」釋形也。無時不有非獨今日，無處不在豈專伽耶？「若有時」下明形壽在物，應非有無。次「是以」下秖指近成即久成也，故云「伽耶是也」。次「伽耶是者」下，轉釋也。雖指其是謂近非近。「伽耶既非」下，明短既非短長亦非長。次「長短」下，真俗相對以釋長短，真乃長短斯盡，俗則長短恒存。生公意云：一身之處三身備矣，近成之果與遠果同，故八十之壽即無量壽。道理雖然，須先各判方可融通。驗前諸師偏得片意，並以法身為極皆違《論》文。《論》文但指過去報壽為長，何得用法身非壽以釋？法身非壽諸教常談，但未曾說久成遠壽，故知尚不及於注家踐極及以生公長短恒存。然不云恒存之長，諸經未說，當知消當文非無一意，釋遠趣出自一家，故說佛慧彼此悉同，若論遠壽一向須異。

As for Sengzhao's (Daosheng's) intent: although he also explains that there is neither length nor brevity while length and brevity ever persist, his intent is somewhat distinct from the three masters above; yet it still lacks the commentator's intent in expounding the life span. In this, he first explains that the physical form and life span of the physical body at Gayā are not real, using them as an expression of the dharmakāya's lack of life span. From 'Thus then' onward, he illustrates life span by way of physical form: ten thousand forms are of one accord, revealing that the body is divided yet not divided; past and present are one, explaining that the measure of life span is itself non-measure. From 'The past is also the present' onward, he explains that past and present are non-dual, corresponding to the inconceivable oneness. However, according to the present text, one must first distinguish longevity, and only then clarify the oneness. Saying 'the past is also the present' explains that the past of the original Buddha is not different from the present at Gayā. 'The present is also the past' explains that the present at Gayā is not distinct from the past of the original Buddha. From 'There is no time it does not exist' onward, he again explains the form and the life span. 'There is no time it does not exist' interprets the life span. 'There is no place it is not present' interprets the form. Not having a time when it does not exist is not unique to today; not having a place where it is not present—how could it be confined to Gayā? From 'If there is a time' onward, he explains that form and life span depend on beings, and their response is neither existence nor non-existence. Next, from 'Therefore' onward, he directly points to the recent attainment as being the ancient attainment; hence he says, 'Gayā is it.' Next, from 'That Gayā is it' onward, he further explains: although pointing to it as 'it,' it means that the recent is not recent. From 'Since Gayā is not' onward, he explains that since shortness is not short, length is also not long. Next, under 'Length and shortness,' he contrasts the ultimate and conventional truths to explain length and shortness: in the ultimate, length and shortness are completely exhausted; in the conventional, length and shortness ever persist. Sengzhao's meaning is: within a single body, the three bodies are complete; the fruit of the recent attainment is identical to the distant fruit, so the eighty-year life span is itself the immeasurable life span. Although the principle is indeed so, one must first distinguish each separately before they can be harmonised. This verifies that the previous masters only partially grasped a fragment of the meaning; they all took the dharmakāya as the ultimate, which all contradicts the text of the Upadeśa. The text of the Upadeśa merely points to the past reward life span as long; how can one use the dharmakāya's non-life span to explain it? The dharmakāya being non-life span is a common teaching of the various scriptures, but they never spoke of the distant life span of the ancient attainment. Thus we know this does not yet match the commentator's 'treading to the ultimate' or Sengzhao's 'length and shortness ever persist.' However, as for not stating that this ever-persisting length was never spoken of in the various sūtras, one should know that interpreting this passage is not without a single coherent intent, and explaining the distant reach stems from our own school; therefore, in expounding the Buddha's wisdom, both are entirely identical, but when discussing the distant life span, they must be completely distinguished.