法華文句記 3.186

3.186

From "Now explaining" onwards is the direct explanation, which has two parts: first general, then specific. The first passage has three: first listing, next explaining, and third, from "If all dharmas" onwards, discerning the function of the dharmas through the four inclusions of dharmas. In the explanation, all four propositions first state [the thesis] and next cite texts to explain it. In the first proposition, since it cites texts saying "all dharmas," etc., because there are words, it provisionally explains from the standpoint of existence; words do not go beyond the thousand suchnesses and the hundred realms. In the second proposition, it repeatedly cites five passages, all testifying to entering the real, provisionally taking realization through entry in contrast to preaching as the real. The first passage is the intent of responding to capacities; the next passage is the origin of all dharmas; the next passage is the essential theme of the teaching's protocol; the next passage is the source of the original practice; the next passage is the principle of transcending the teaching. The various passages all take realization through entry as the real, so we know that whether with preaching or without preaching, there is none that does not take the real as its basis. In the third proposition, regarding the intent of citing evidence: all dharmas are the provisional, and the true character is the real. The real is the second proposition, and the provisional is the first proposition; combining those two propositions together forms the third, because there is no other dharma separate from the first two gates. From "For example" onwards, it cites an analogy: because of mental imputation it is unreal, and because of curing desire it is real; this single contemplation itself is real and unreal, so what prevents a single dharma from being both provisional and real? In the fourth proposition, the cited text directly points to the principle of the middle; the principles of the unreal and the real are equal, and the two truths are inconceivable; the double negation of these truths reveals the wondrous middle, which is also not different from the previous three gates; because the principle of the four gates is identical, it always says "all." Third, from "If all" onwards, discerning the function. This also has two parts: first, directly discerning the function of the propositions in including dharmas; next, from "Directly listing" onwards, clarifying the intent of these propositions. In the first passage: these four propositions themselves mutually include and mutually refute one another—if provisional, all are provisional, up to all being neither provisional nor real; how much more so do they not include and refute other dharmas? Moreover, outside the four propositions there are no further dharmas; only in this way are the refutation and establishment of the present sūtra accomplished. How could this be the same as the refutations and establishments of the various masters? One should know that since the various masters do not recognize the various provisionals and reals, even if they speak of various reals, since they have not distinguished and judged them, the meaning of the real is not established; moreover, looking at one another, they mutually attribute delusion regarding the real to each other, and therefore they are all refuted by the first proposition; hence it says "none is not provisional." If this is so even for the first proposition, how much more so for the [other] three? Therefore, the provisional and real of the various masters only attain a tiny fraction of the provisional. As for "what the Tathāgata spoke": it cites the fruition to contrast with the ordinary. What the Buddha spoke is still entirely provisional; how could ordinary talks in the degenerate age claim themselves to be the real, failing to consider that the sacred teaching solely assists ordinary beings? In the second proposition, the real is the ultimate. The provisional spoken by the Buddha must still enter the real; how much more so do other provisionals and reals not enter? Therefore we know that all is solely the one real. As for "nest and cave": the *Shuowen* says: "Birds dwelling in trees is called a nest; beasts dwelling in holes is called a cave." "Guarding" means dwelling and clinging. Comprehensively penetrating the great gist must accord with the Buddha's mind; directly keeping to a single corner is like guarding a nest or cave. The third and fourth propositions can be understood by following this explanation; therefore, in the present text, every single proposition is pervasive. If subsumed to make them recognizable, they are simply the three wisdoms illuminating the realm of the three truths and responding to the three kinds of capacities; capacities are pervasive, dharmas are pervasive, principle is pervasive, and phenomena are pervasive; the reason why it always says "all" can be understood. Because one emptiness is all emptiness, all are real; because one conventionality is all conventionality, all are provisional; the third and fourth propositions are simply the wisdom of the middle simultaneously illuminating and simultaneously negating; internally, because the three virtues and three bodies are fully present, the external functions horizontally, vertically, explicitly, and secretly; to accomplish the meaning of refutation and establishment of the present sūtra, in contrast to the past, four propositions must be made. Although the dharma-characteristics are such when discussing the general outline comprehensively, when discussing this present chapter specifically, it lies solely in the third: the one half that is "also provisional" is called the "Skillful Means Chapter," spoken in contrast to the real wisdom of self-realization. Therefore one must speak of the half-proposition of the third; one must still subsume those remaining three and a half into this one half before it can properly receive the name of the present "Skillful Means Chapter." If one exclusively takes the four propositions as each including all, that is still not comprehensive; how much less so the various masters' pervasive conceptualization of the provisional teachings! Therefore it says "one must not be one-sided."