法華玄論 2.41

2.41

Answer: This is explained merely to refute attachment to an intrinsic nature. It also refutes the doctrine held by non-Buddhists and followers of the Hinayāna that there is an intrinsic nature in the cause. If it were like the nature of the Buddha-nature in the Mahāparinirvāṇa-sūtra, how could one say it does not exist? Moreover, one may challenge: Since there is no nature, there would also be no separate Buddha-seed distinct from the seeds of the three vehicles; now that there is in fact a separate seed distinct from the seeds of the five vehicles, why should there not be a separate nature distinct from the three natures? If one says that the myriad practices are the seed and there is no nature: since these myriad practices have no nature, why must they result in Buddhahood? Furthermore, if a single practice has no Buddha, the myriad practices also have no Buddha; if the myriad practices nevertheless result in Buddhahood, why should a single practice, which also lacks it, not result in Buddhahood? Nāgārjuna said: “If a pot emerges where there is no pot in the clay, why do carriages, horses, and food and drink not emerge from the fingertips?” Furthermore, if one says that because he feared past attachments to self were not yet eliminated he did not teach Buddha-nature, why not fear that now one would fail to achieve Buddhahood and therefore teach that there is a nature? One should not be cowardly when looking at what went before and bold when looking at what comes after. Deducing from various matters, one must know that Buddha-nature ought to be elucidated, and also that Buddha-nature ought to be taught. Why is this? Buddha-nature is the root of the Buddha-vehicle; because there is Buddha-nature, one uses conditions provisionally to reveal it. But to explain only conditioning causes and not speak of the fundamental nature would be abandoning the root to cling to the branches, which is not clever. Moreover, Vasubandhu’s commentary on the Diamond Prajñāpāramitā already explains Buddha-nature, so how much more should the Lotus Sūtra not fail to teach it? Furthermore, five years after attaining the Way, he spoke the Tathāgatagarbha-sūtra, explaining that there is Buddha-nature; how much less could the Lotus Sūtra fail to explain it? If one says this is not a sequential teaching and therefore should not be cited, can one say that the Diamond Prajñāpāramitā is also a teaching without a fixed framework? If one says that Vasubandhu and others are not worthy of trust: the five periods were formulated by Huiguan, and the four tenets were composed by Guangtong—why then accept them? Opposing the sages and following the common: this is truly incomprehensible. If one says that because there is no explicit text stating “Buddha-nature” it is not used: the Nirvāṇa and the Avataṃsaka have no text mentioning the ālaya[-vijñāna]; should then the Nirvāṇa and Avataṃsaka not have explained the eight consciousnesses? Thus one cannot demand that a single sūtra be equipped with all teachings at once. If there were only one single work, how could it be applied across the eight directions? Because there is Buddha-nature, by cultivating practice one achieves Buddhahood, and therefore it is wonderful; if there were no Buddha-nature, one would not achieve Buddhahood, and therefore it would not be wonderful.