法華遊意 1.178

1.178

第四、明用義難者，凡有十義：一者、此經雖明因果而妙義在果，因未圓極則猶未妙，若佛果猶是無常，無常則苦，既無常苦則無我不淨，乃是麁法，何名為妙？二者、經云「為一大事因緣故出現於世」，何容終始以無常不了麁法以化物耶？此則乖父子恩情、傷諸佛本意。三者、前明一乘異昔三乘，後明常住異昔無常。以一乘異昔三乘故，得以一乘為藥破於三病；以常異昔無常故，亦得以常住為藥破無常病，則是雙治之義。若今猶是無常者，但有以一破三，無有以常破無常，則治病未圓、顯理不足。四者、若一乘異三，而一乘之果猶是無常者，則還同昔異，終是三乘，則無一乘教，都無兩治也。五者、又若今一異昔三而無常猶同昔，則因果果聲聞果同羅漢，都非義也。六者、前文明身子為請主，而身子小乘中之極、執異之窮，故說一乘令改小入大捨異歸同，則大有接小之義、小有欣大之理，則初分經機教符會；後分經彌勒為請主，彌勒是因位之窮、無常之極，若說佛果猶是無常，則果無接因之理、因無欣果之義，便機教相乖也。七者、天親釋〈壽量品〉明於三身，伽耶成佛為化身，久已得佛壽命無量為報身，無有生死若退若出、非實非虛非如非異為法身，既具明三身，豈非是常住？八者、《涅槃經．菩薩品》云「如《法花經》八千聲聞，得受記別成大果實，如秋收冬藏更無所作」，故知《法花》顯了究竟，豈不明常耶？九者、二萬日月燈明佛說《法花經》竟便入涅槃，當知說了義之法已竟然後滅耳，若未說了義之法則便不得滅也。十者、若言品題如來壽量便是無常者，此有四句：一、無量說無量，如《涅槃》云「唯佛覩佛其壽無量」；二、有量說有量，如釋迦方八十年；三、有量說無量，如無量壽佛；四、無量說於有量，如《金光明經》乃至此經，亦如《花嚴》云「如來深遠境界其量齊虛空」也。

Fourth, explaining the objections deduced through reason: there are ten reasons in all. First, although this sūtra clarifies cause and effect, its wondrous meaning lies in the fruit; if the cause is not yet fully perfected, it is not yet wondrous, and if the buddha-fruit were still impermanent, then impermanence would be suffering; since it would be impermanent and suffering, it would be non-self and impure, which would merely be a coarse dharma—how could it be called wondrous? Second, the sūtra says: 'It is for the sake of the one great concern as cause and condition that [the Tathāgata] appears in the world.' How could he from beginning to end transform beings with impermanent, non-definitive, coarse dharmas? This would violate the affection between father and son and injure the original intent of the buddhas. Third, earlier it clarified that the ekayāna differs from the past triyāna, and later it clarified that the eternal differs from the past impermanence. Because the ekayāna differs from the past triyāna, the ekayāna can be used as medicine to overcome the three diseases; because the eternal differs from the past impermanence, the eternal can also be used as medicine to overcome the disease of impermanence—this is the principle of dual remedy. If the present were still impermanent, there would only be using the one to overcome the three, without using the eternal to overcome the impermanent; then the remedy of diseases would not be complete, and the revelation of principle would be insufficient. Fourth, if the ekayāna differs from the three, yet the fruit of the ekayāna were still impermanent, it would revert to being identical to the past differences and ultimately remain the triyāna; then there would be no teaching of the ekayāna, and no dual remedy whatsoever. Fifth, furthermore, if the present one differs from the past three, yet impermanence were still identical to the past, then the fruit of cause and effect and the fruit of the śrāvakas would be identical to that of the arhats, which is entirely unreasonable. Sixth, the earlier section of the text took Śāriputra as the requester, and Śāriputra is the pinnacle of the small vehicle and the culmination of grasping at difference; therefore, the ekayāna was expounded to make him turn from the small to enter the great, relinquishing difference to return to identity; thus the great possesses the capacity to receive the small, and the small possesses the reason to aspire to the great, so that in the first half of the sūtra capacity and teaching tally. In the latter half of the sūtra, Maitreya is the requester; Maitreya is the culmination of the stage of the cause and the extreme of impermanence. If it were expounded that the buddha-fruit is still impermanent, then the fruit would lack the principle to receive the cause, and the cause would lack the reason to aspire to the fruit, and thus capacity and teaching would contradict each other. Seventh, Vasubandhu explains the 'Lifespan Chapter' by clarifying the three bodies: attaining buddhahood at Gayā is the nirmāṇakāya; having attained buddhahood long ago with immeasurable lifespan is the saṃbhogakāya; and having no saṃsāra, neither retreating nor emerging, being neither real nor unreal, neither such nor different, is the dharmakāya. Since it fully clarifies the three bodies, how could it not be eternal? Eighth, the 'Bodhisattva Chapter' of the Mahāparinirvāṇa-sūtra states: 'Just as in the Lotus Sūtra eight thousand śrāvakas received the prediction and achieved the great fruit, like the autumn harvest and winter storage with nothing further to be done.' Thus we know that the Lotus Sūtra is explicit and definitive; how could it not clarify the eternal? Ninth, the twenty thousand Candrasūryapradīpa Buddhas entered nirvāṇa immediately after expounding the Lotus Sūtra; one should know that it is only after finishing the exposition of the definitive teaching that they extinguished, and if they had not yet expounded the definitive teaching, they could not have extinguished. Tenth, if one says that the chapter title 'Tathāgata's Lifespan' implies impermanence, there are four propositions: 1. the immeasurable spoken of as immeasurable, as the Mahāparinirvāṇa-sūtra says: 'Only a buddha beholds a buddha, whose lifespan is immeasurable'; 2. the measurable spoken of as measurable, as with Śākyamuni's mere eighty years; 3. the measurable spoken of as immeasurable, as with Amitāyus Buddha; 4. the immeasurable spoken of as measurable, as in the Suvarṇaprabhāsa-sūtra and this sūtra, and as the Avataṃsaka-sūtra states: 'The Tathāgata's profound and vast realm has a measure equal to empty space.'