妙法蓮華經玄贊 4.17

4.17

有五義：一者運載以名乘，因中通二運，至果廣運他，由此亦名乘。二者體、能通二運，能、體並名乘，果中體有能，非無亦乘攝，如割名為刀，有能即刀攝，非要廣現割，有能非是刀。佛果德體能為二運，非要廣用方名為乘。三者二乘唯自運，小尚得乘名，況佛廣運他，何理非乘攝？四者因中理智能雙運，二用勝故得名乘，果中理智因修成，因乘種類亦乘攝。五者因中二運常增進，作用現勝得名乘，果中自運窮未來，令他增進得乘稱。初之四義隨他不正答，後之一義隨自正義答。故《對法論》云「自他並利所依止」。一有三義：一簡別故名一，二破別故名一，三會別故名一。簡別故名一者，昔日說三、今時說一，故知所詮理極一而為實，能詮之教二即稱權，無別二理以為極也。無我、解脫雖悉皆等，然至佛果方名為極，故所詮理佛智名一，非別簡三，唯無二極故。論解遮云「無二乘者，無二涅槃體。然經云『我設是方便，令得入佛慧』，又云火宅之內許以三車，出門已後但與牛車。又云『雇其除糞經二十年假名為子』，故二乘者是後真子付家事因。又以果一簡別因三，即有二簡：一理簡教，二果簡因。『汝等所行是菩薩道故』，破別故名一者，二乘不知二為方便，執二乘果以為真極，今說二涅槃但為化城，說二菩提但是羊鹿權教所設，非是二果所得所證菩提涅槃真勝極也。破彼情執有二果極，故說為一，即經所言『諸求三乘人，有懷疑網者，佛當為除斷，令盡無有餘』，鶖子亦言『然我等不解方便隨宜所說，初聞佛法遇便信受，乃至斷諸疑悔』，迦葉亦言『又今我等得涅槃證，於菩薩法不生好樂之心』」。《攝論》亦云「斷除四處障，二乘作意等」，即是此執。本論末後亦云「方便品有五分示現，破二明一不說破三等。」或有說言，破三執故非唯破二，如薩婆多執佛化身以為真佛，今說為化故破三執。此亦不然，《法華》但以自修所得一乘為宗，會破彼乘令入於一；非以所知一身為宗，會破彼身令入一身。又無執彼化身為極趣求至彼，更不趣求餘身；今破彼執令求一身，故但破執二乘為極，不破執彼二身極也。亦有解云，聞昔說三執三皆極，今說一極故破三執，此乃地前菩薩起故。若破執大極，還為說一乘，更增其病，何名為破？又未出宅許以牛車，既亦破大後出宅與，是何等車？若言與白牛，棄本黃牛故，既爾即應捨頓學漸，黃、白牛相因行何殊？既還本牛明不破大，若執一極不違趣大，何須破之？執二為極不趣大故可須破也。若隨位得即執為極，未見趣大乘因中有此執，設爾許亦破，即應破無窮，由此但破執二為極。又非破執四乘為極，為無種姓說人天乘，解有四乘不執極故，執二為極不異破二，無執人天乘為極者，執者不解乘，解乘不執故。若一對四，一是方便乃應破一執而歸四乘故。亦非破五，執不定乘同執三故。由此《勝鬘》唯云「阿羅漢、辟支佛，有恐怖、有歸依，言得四智及涅槃者是佛方便」。此經亦云「唯此一事實，餘二則非真。」密遣二人息處說二，羊鹿非真不說三言，從勝至劣數，佛乘第一、獨覺第二、聲聞第三；無第二獨覺、無第三聲聞，非無三乘之中大乘體極。勘梵本云「無第二第三」，今翻之略故云「無二亦無三」也。此有難言，經說別體三寶，不破別體而歸一體，何故破二乘而歸一乘？此亦不然。若執別體三寶為極，亦同破之。若別相三寶體，亦無三極故，雖爾亦無求住別體，然可會之入於同體，廣如經說。非權實宗，會別故名一者，教理行果皆有根本及以方便，會漸悟者先二乘中所修成得教理行果為大方便，依此本論初地已上離分段死，見道已前教理行果為不退地之根本因。

There are five meanings: First, it is called a "vehicle" by virtue of conveying: in the causal stage it possesses both conveyings [of self and others], and upon reaching the fruit it extensively conveys others; thus on this basis it is also named a vehicle. Second, its substance and capacity both possess both conveyings, and both capacity and substance are called a vehicle: in the fruit, the substance possesses the capacity and is not without it, so it is also subsumed under "vehicle." Just as cutting is what defines a knife, so long as it has the capacity it is subsumed under "knife"; it is not required to extensively manifest cutting in actuality for that which possesses the capacity to be a knife. The substance and capacity of the virtues of the buddha-fruit constitute both conveyings; it does not require extensive functioning to only then be called a vehicle. Third, the two vehicles convey only oneself, yet the Lesser still receives the name of a vehicle; how much more so for the Buddha who extensively conveys others—by what principle would he not be subsumed under "vehicle"? Fourth, in the causal stage principle and cognition can both convey, and because their two functions are superior, it receives the name of a vehicle; in the fruit, principle and cognition are accomplished through causal cultivation, and as the same kind as the causal vehicle, they are also subsumed under "vehicle." Fifth, in the causal stage the two conveyings constantly increase and advance, and their functioning manifests superiority, thereby obtaining the name of a vehicle; in the fruit, one's own conveying exhausts the future, and causing others to increase and advance earns the designation of a vehicle. The first four meanings are non-standard answers accommodating others; the last meaning is the correct answer according to our own standard doctrine. Therefore the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* states: "That upon which the mutual benefiting of self and others relies." "One" has three meanings: first, it is called "one" because of distinction; second, it is called "one" because of refuting distinctions; third, it is called "one" because of integrating distinctions. As for being called "one" because of distinction: formerly three were spoken of, but now one is spoken of; thus we know that the ultimate principle expressed is one and real, while the teaching that expresses it is two and designated provisional—there are no distinct two principles that serve as the ultimate. Although selflessness and liberation are all equal, only upon reaching the buddha-fruit is it named the ultimate; therefore the principle expressed, the buddha-cognition, is named "one," not distinctly setting aside three, solely because there are not two ultimates. The treatise explains the exclusion, saying: "'There are no two vehicles' means there are no two substances of nirvāṇa." Yet the sūtra states: "I set up this expedient means to cause them to enter the buddha-wisdom"; it also says that within the burning house three carts were promised, but after leaving the gate only ox carts were given. It also says: "Employing him to remove dung for twenty years, he was provisionally called a son"; thus the two vehicles are the cause for later handing over the family estate to the true son. Furthermore, using the one fruit to distinguish the three causes entails two distinctions: first, the principle distinguishes the teaching; second, the fruit distinguishes the cause. Because [the sūtra says,] "What you all practice is the bodhisattva path." As for being called "one" because of refuting distinctions: the two vehicles do not know that the two are expedient means, clinging to the fruits of the two vehicles as true ultimates; now it is spoken that the two nirvāṇas are merely conjured cities, and that the two bodhis are merely set up by the provisional teachings of goat and deer [carts], not that the bodhi and nirvāṇa attained and realized by the two fruits are truly supreme and ultimate. Refuting their affective clinging to the existence of two ultimate fruits, it is therefore spoken of as "one." This is just what the sūtra states: "Those seeking the three vehicles / who harbor nets of doubt, / the Buddha shall sever and eliminate them, / causing them to be exhausted without remainder." Śāriputra also says: "Yet we did not understand what was spoken as expedient means according with suitability; upon first hearing the Buddha's Dharma, we straightaway had faith and accepted it, up to severing all doubts and regrets." Kāśyapa also says: "Furthermore, we have now obtained the realization of nirvāṇa, and do not generate a mind of longing toward the bodhisattva Dharma." The *Mahāyānasaṃgraha* also states: "Severing the obstacles of the four places, the mental attention of the two vehicles, and so forth"—this refers to precisely this clinging. The end of the fundamental treatise also states: "The Expedient Means Chapter has five aspects of manifestation; it refutes the two to clarify the one, not speaking of refuting three, and so forth." Some may say: because it refutes three clingings, it does not solely refute two; just as the Sarvāstivādins cling to the Buddha's transformation body as the true Buddha, now it is spoken of as a transformation, thus refuting three clingings. This is also not so: the *Lotus Sūtra* takes only the Single Vehicle attained through one's own cultivation as its fundamental tenet, integrating and refuting those vehicles to cause entry into the one; it does not take a single known body as its fundamental tenet, integrating and refuting those bodies to cause entry into a single body. Moreover, there is no one who clings to that transformation body as ultimate and aspires to attain it, no longer aspiring toward any other body; now refuting that clinging to cause them to seek the single body is only refuting clinging to the two vehicles as ultimate, not refuting clinging to those two bodies as ultimate. There is also an explanation stating that upon hearing the previous exposition of three, they clung to all three as ultimate; now speaking of the one ultimate refutes three clingings—this is generated by bodhisattvas prior to the stages. If refuting clinging to the Great as ultimate, and then again expounding the Single Vehicle to them, that would only aggravate their affliction; how could that be called refuting? Furthermore, before leaving the house an ox cart was promised; if the Great were also refuted, what kind of cart would be given after leaving the house? If one says a white ox was given because of abandoning the original yellow ox: if so, one should abandon the sudden to study the gradual; what difference in causal practice is there between the marks of the yellow and white oxen? Since the original ox was returned, it is clear that the Great is not refuted. If clinging to the one ultimate does not contradict aspiring toward the Great, why would it be necessary to refute it? Clinging to the two as ultimate prevents one from aspiring toward the Great, and therefore must be refuted. If according with whatever stage attained one immediately clings to it as ultimate, we have never seen such clinging in the causal stage of aspiring toward the Great Vehicle; even granting that this were also refuted, the refutation would have to go on ad infinitum. Therefore it solely refutes clinging to the two as ultimate. Nor does it refute clinging to four vehicles as ultimate: for those of no lineage, the human and heavenly vehicles were taught; understanding that there are four vehicles does not entail clinging to them as ultimate, so clinging to two as ultimate is no different from refuting two. There is no one who clings to the human and heavenly vehicles as ultimate: those who cling do not understand the vehicle, and those who understand the vehicle do not cling. If one contrasts the one with four, the one is an expedient means, and one would then have to refute clinging to the one to return to the four vehicles. Nor does it refute five: clinging to the indeterminate vehicle is identical to clinging to three. For this reason the *Śrīmālādevī-sūtra* only says: "Arhats and pratyekabuddhas have fear and have refuge; saying that they have attained the four cognitions and nirvāṇa is the Buddha's expedient means." This sūtra also says: "Only this one matter is real; the other two are not true." Secretly dispatching the two persons, at the resting place he spoke of two; goat and deer are not real, but he did not speak of three. Counting from superior to inferior: the Buddha Vehicle is first, the Solitary Realizer second, and the Śrāvaka third; there is no second Solitary Realizer, and no third Śrāvaka, but it is not that among the three vehicles the Great Vehicle's substance is not ultimate. Checking the Sanskrit text, it says "neither second nor third"; now the translation abbreviates it, hence saying "there is neither two nor three." Here someone objects: the sūtras speak of the Three Jewels of distinct substances, yet they do not refute the distinct substances to return to a single substance; why refute the two vehicles to return to the Single Vehicle? This is also not so. If one clung to the Three Jewels of distinct substances as ultimate, they would also be refuted likewise. If they are the substances of the Three Jewels of distinct aspects, there are also no three ultimates; even so, neither does one seek to abide in distinct substances, yet they can be integrated into the identical substance, as extensively explained in the sūtras. It is not the doctrine of provisional and real. As for being called "one" because of integrating distinctions: teaching, principle, practice, and fruit all have a fundamental aspect and an expedient aspect; integrating those of gradual awakening means that the teaching, principle, practice, and fruit cultivated and attained previously in the two vehicles serve as great expedient means. Based on this fundamental treatise, from the first stage onward one is free from fragmented birth-and-death; the teaching, principle, practice, and fruit prior to the path of vision serve as the fundamental causes for the stage of non-retrogression.