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法華宗要 1.6

English (machine translation) 1.6

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1.6

Third, explaining the function of the expressive [text]: as the Chapter on the Dharma Master says, 'The anuttarā samyaksambodhi of all bodhisattvas all belongs to this sūtra: opening the provisional gate and revealing the real dharmatā.' This text precisely clarifies the superior function of this sūtra. There are two kinds of function: namely, opening and revealing. 'Opening' means opening the provisional gate of the Triyāna; 'revealing' means revealing the real dharmatā of the Ekayāna. Although stated generally in this way, there are three [aspects] within it: first opening, next revealing, and thirdly explaining the functions of opening and revealing together.
First, explaining the meaning of opening, there are two kinds: namely, the gate that is opened and the function that can open it. The gate that is opened is the teaching of the Triyāna, which is named 'provisional.' Briefly, there are four meanings: First, the teaching preached by the Buddha's provisional wisdom is named 'provisional teaching' by naming it after its possessor. Second, the Triyāna teaching skillfully accords with the three capacities, and takes its name from sustaining the vehicles, being named 'provisional teaching.' Third, it acts as a prior expedient for the Ekayāna teaching, and because of this the correct teaching of the Ekayāna is later preached, so it is named 'provisional' in contrast to the later correct teaching. Fourth, with respect to the principle of the Ekayāna, it provisionally preaches as an expedient and is not an exposition of the real; this meaning of expedient is named 'provisional' in contrast to the real. Based on these four meanings, it is therefore named provisional. This is called a 'gate' with two meanings: First, the meaning of exit, because the children rely on this to exit the traidhātuka. Second, the meaning of entry, because relying on this teaching they also enter the Ekayāna. Now, 'gate' has two kinds of designation: if one says 'a Buddha-gate' or 'a human-gate', then the gate is not the Buddha or the person; but if one says 'a plank-gate' or 'a bamboo-gate', then the gate is itself the planks or bamboo. Here, when the Triyāna teaching is called a 'provisional gate', it is like the plank-gate or bamboo-gate: the gate is itself the provisional, and therefore it is named the 'provisional gate.' In 'opening the provisional gate,' 'provisional' has two meanings: from the perspective of exit, when preaching the Triyāna it is opened and not closed; from the perspective of entry, when preaching the three it is closed and not opened—although they have exited the traidhātuka, they have not yet entered the Ekayāna. Therefore now, preaching the Ekayāna teaching, it says that the three are provisional, and only then opens the provisional gate to cause them to enter the Ekayāna. As a subsequent passage says: 'You should know that by the power of the Buddhas' skillful means, within the one Buddha-vehicle they discriminately preach three.' These words precisely open the provisional gate; other statements are to be understood by analogy with this.
Next, explaining the function of revealing, there are also two [aspects]: first explaining what is revealed, and next explaining what can reveal it. What is revealed, the real dharmatā, means as explained previously: the persons and dharmas of the Ekayāna, the nature of dharmas being eternally abiding, the principle being ultimate, which neither heavenly demons nor non-Buddhists can destroy, and which the Buddhas of the three periods of time cannot alter. For this reason, it is named the 'real dharmatā.' Yet it is neither three nor one, without person and without dharma, with nothing whatsoever to be attained; such correct contemplation is precisely named the real, ultimate Ekayāna. Why is this so? Because for all who have something to be attained, there is no path, no fruit, no motion, and no exit. Therefore one knows that, as [stated] before, it is neither three nor one. The characteristics of persons and dharmas, both those who can ride and what is ridden, do not go beyond the four propositions, and this is having something to be attained. How can this be called the real dharmatā?
Explanation: This statement is incorrect. Why is that? If one says that 'neither three nor one' does not go beyond the four propositions, and therefore has something to be attained and is not ultimate, then taking attainment as wrong and non-attainment as right also enters the four propositions; therefore it has something to be attained and is also not correct contemplation. If one says that one borrows words to speak of non-attainment, but does not grasp at non-attainment according to words, and therefore non-attainment does not enter the four propositions, then the other party also borrows words to provisionally speak of the Ekayāna, but does not grasp at the Ekayāna according to words; therefore the Ekayāna also transcends the four propositions. Hence one should know that following the words both are wrong, but not grasping according to words, the two explanations do not differ.

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