觀音玄義記 2.17

2.17

九、緣了，三：初、標示名義，三：初、示名義。此之名義，修性皆然。二、「了者」下，辯流類。類至極果，節節名異，其體不殊。三、「大論」下，引論釋。緣了之相實同耘種，非此二力性田不豐。二、「通論」下，依教解釋，二：初、諸教皆具。藏通義立全乖性種，別教雖有初心別修，唯有圓教修性不二。雖云皆具，須辯此殊。二、「今正」下，剋就圓論，二：初、剋辯二因，二：初、明二種因果。此中二因且在修類。二、「原此」下，討二種根本，三：初、總明性德。前之因果猶在修中，今窮其源，性具緣了。《淨名》云「一切眾生本涅槃相，不可復滅；本菩提相，不可復得。」《起信論》明真如二德，謂如實空、如實不空。當宗明三千即空、三千即假，皆是性德緣了文也。二、「大經」下，別引文釋，二：初、證釋了因。不明三千，徒消一切；非空假中，莫辯自空。如實空性與一切染本不相應。一切染者不出三惑，自非本性即空假中，豈能不應一切染邪？乃畢竟空為了因性。「亦用」等者，全性起修，方見本空。二、「又云」下，證釋緣因。經云「眾生即菩提相及涅槃相」，或謂理中獨具佛德。今文眾生有初地味禪及滅盡定，豈非性具天法、聲聞法邪？既具此二，餘諸法界那不具邪？又具二定者，從二習果及報果說，豈不各具性相等邪？不以理具而消此文，如何欲散便是滅定？性德緣因於茲驗矣。三、「以此」下，依性立修。「以此二種」者，性種也。「方便」等者，智行也。「毫末」者，類種也。由斯性類，修成智行乃至二嚴。二、「此一」下，不論六即。此科正意但明理即，非論五位。三、「前問」下，結指經題，二：初、指經文。明今二嚴必有其本，故從二種受名。二、「故知」下，結題目。

Ninth, conditional and revealing [causes], in three parts: first, indicating the name and meaning, in three parts: first, indicating the name and meaning: this name and meaning apply equally to both cultivation and nature. Second, from "The revealing is" onward, discerning their continuing categories: their categories reach up to the ultimate fruit, their names differing at each stage while their substance is not distinct. Third, from "The Great Treatise" onward, citing a treatise to explain: the marks of the conditional and revealing are truly like weeding and planting; without the power of these two, the field of nature will not be bountiful. Second, from "Generally discussing" onward, explaining according to the teachings, in two parts: first, all teachings possess them: the definitions established in the Tripiṭaka and Common teachings are entirely contrary to the seed of the nature; the Separate Teaching, though possessing it, cultivates it separately from the initial resolve; only the Perfect Teaching holds non-duality of cultivation and nature. Although it is said that all possess them, this distinction must be discerned. Second, from "Now directly" onward, discussing strictly according to the Perfect Teaching, in two parts: first, strictly discerning the two causes, in two parts: first, elucidating the two kinds of cause and effect: the two causes here pertain for now to the category of cultivation. Second, from "Tracing the origin of this" onward, investigating the two kinds of root, in three parts: first, generally elucidating inherent virtue: the former cause and effect still belonged to cultivation; now tracing their source, the nature inherently includes the conditional and the revealing. The Vimalakīrti says: "All sentient beings are originally of the mark of nirvāṇa, and cannot be further extinguished; they are originally of the mark of bodhi, and it cannot be further attained." The Dacheng qixin lun elucidates the two virtues of tathatā, namely truly empty and truly not empty. Our school's elucidation of the three thousand as identical to emptiness and the three thousand as identical to the conventional are both texts on the conditional and revealing of inherent virtue. Second, from "The Great Sūtra" onward, separately citing texts to explain, in two parts: first, proving and explaining the revealing cause: if one does not understand the three thousand, it is in vain that one interprets "all"; if not for emptiness, the conventional, and the middle, one cannot discern self-emptiness. The nature of true emptiness is originally unassociated with all defilements. "All defilements" do not go beyond the three delusions; if the original nature were not itself identical to emptiness, the conventional, and the middle, how could it be unassociated with all defilements? Thus ultimate emptiness is the nature of the revealing cause. As for "also using," and so forth: only by arousing cultivation entirely based on the nature does one see original emptiness. Second, from "It also says" onward, proving and explaining the conditional cause: the sūtra says, "Sentient beings are identical to the mark of bodhi and the mark of nirvāṇa"; some might claim that Buddha-virtues are uniquely included within the principle alone. In the present text, sentient beings possess the defiled dhyāna of the first stage and the cessation absorption; is this not inherent inclusion of the dharmas of devas and the dharmas of śrāvakas? Since they possess these two, how could they not possess the other dharmadhātus? Furthermore, that they possess the two absorptions is spoken from the perspective of the two habitual effects and retributive effects; how could they not each possess the nature, marks, and so forth? If one does not interpret this text through inherent inclusion in principle, how could the desire for dispersion itself be the cessation absorption? The conditional cause of inherent virtue is verified herein. Third, from "By means of these two" onward, establishing cultivation on the basis of the nature: "By means of these two kinds" refers to the seed of the nature. "Skillful means," and so forth, refers to wisdom and practice. "The tip of a hair" refers to the categorical seed. Arising from these nature and categories, wisdom and practice are cultivated to completion, up to the two adornments. Second, from "This one" onward, not discussing the six identifications: the primary intent of this section is only to elucidate the identification in principle, not to discuss the five stages. Third, from "The previous question" onward, concluding by referring to the sūtra's title, in two parts: first, pointing to the sūtra text: elucidating that the present two adornments must have their root, they therefore take their name from these two kinds. Second, from "Therefore we know" onward, concluding with the title.