觀音玄義記 2.20

2.20

四、料簡，二：初、別料簡，十：初、簡人法，二：初、問。彼經具明十法王子，觀世音法王子外，自有普門法王子；既以普門而名於人，今釋普門那定屬法？二、答，二：初、立句，二：初、泛立四句。句雖有四，義實唯二，不出相非及相即故。如此二義皆通大小，今意在大而論小乘即離句者，欲示名言須將理定。所辯人法，若其不以二諦中道甄其權實，但言即離，何能的顯今之相即？二、「若約」下，以部對句，二：初、明諸部人法即離，四：初、華嚴。彼經別教，緣實相法修次第行，未能即以實相之法為觀行人是故人法互不相即。圓觀不次，即以實相為觀行人，是故人法更互相即。別則證道方即，圓則始終不二。二、三藏。此教有門，人如兔角故無、陰有生滅故實，此唯非句。空門兩向，攬實為假，假實不同，名互非句。既不相離，復名互即，此教兩門雖談即離，人之與法俱非中道。三、方等。四教並談，藏通唯二諦、別圓同華嚴。四、「般若」下，例餘。般若蕩相，鈍謂但空，同前二諦；利分二種，同前別圓。涅槃四教雖俱知常，初心用觀不無差別，藏通且須順於二諦，別初心人未即圓法。二、「今方」下，明難屬方等即句。

Fourth, Critical Assessment, in two: first, specific critical assessment, in ten: first, assessing person and dharma, in two: first, question. That sūtra fully explains the ten Dharma princes; besides the Avalokiteśvara Dharma Prince, there is naturally a Samantamukha Dharma Prince. Since Samantamukha is used as a name for a person, why does the present explanation of Samantamukha definitively assign it to a dharma? Second, answer, in two: first, establishing the propositions, in two: first, generally establishing the four propositions. Although there are four propositions, their meaning is really only two, not going beyond mutual negation and mutual identity. Because these two meanings both apply to the Great and Small [Vehicles], now, while our intent lies in the Great Vehicle, we discuss the propositions of identity and separation of the Small Vehicle to show that names and words must be determined by principle. As for the person and dharma discussed, if one does not evaluate the provisional and real through the two truths and the Middle Way, but merely speaks of identity and separation, how could one definitively reveal the present mutual identity? Second, from "if in terms of" below, matching the propositions to the scriptural sections, in two: first, clarifying the identity and separation of person and dharma across the sections, in four: first, Avataṃsaka. The Separate Teaching of that sūtra contemplates the dharma of the true mark to cultivate gradual practice, not yet able to immediately take the dharma of the true mark as the practitioner of contemplation; therefore, person and dharma are mutually non-identical. The perfect contemplation is non-gradual, immediately taking the true mark as the practitioner of contemplation; therefore, person and dharma are mutually identical. In the Separate Teaching, they are identical only upon witnessing the path; in the Perfect Teaching, they are non-dual from beginning to end. Second, Tripiṭaka. The gate of existence of this teaching regards a person as like a rabbit's horn, hence non-existent, and the skandhas as having arising and ceasing, hence real; this is purely the proposition of negation. The gate of emptiness has two aspects: gathering the real into the provisional; the provisional and the real being different is called the proposition of mutual negation. Since they are not separate, it is also called mutual identity. Although these two gates of this teaching speak of identity and separation, neither person nor dharma is the Middle Way. Third, Vaipulya. It expounds all four teachings simultaneously: the Tripiṭaka and Shared teachings are only the two truths; the Separate and Perfect are the same as the Avataṃsaka. Fourth, from "Prajñā" below, exemplifying the rest. Prajñā washes away marks; the dull take it as mere emptiness, identical to the previous two truths; the sharp are divided into two kinds, identical to the previous Separate and Perfect. In Nirvāṇa, although all four teachings know the eternal, the practice of contemplation at the initial mind is not without difference: the Tripiṭaka and Shared teachings must for now accord with the two truths, and the person of the initial mind in the Separate Teaching has not yet identified with the perfect dharma. Second, from "now the Vaipulya" below, clarifying that the objection belongs to the proposition of identity in the Vaipulya.