觀音玄義記 2.21

2.21

Second, under "Now to explain," he resolves the objection, with three [points]: first, he directly resolves the objection in terms of the proposition of identity. In the present chapter, the previous question and answer assign Avalokiteśvara to the person; but how could that which contemplates and that which is contemplated not be Dharma? If the subsequent question and answer already take the Universal Gate as the Dharma realized, how could this Dharma lack a person who realizes it? Since the Vaipulya already uses the Universal Gate to designate a person, how could that which designates the Universal Gate not be Dharma? To discuss its general meaning, both Avalokiteśvara and the Universal Gate are Dharmas of the Middle Way; depending on the benefit of the siddhāntas, what should be used to designate the person? It is only that from beginning to end, the Perfect [Teaching] directly takes the real mark to be the nominal person. Second, under "For example," he draws collaterally upon persons and things to illustrate by analogy, with two [points]: first, he illustrates through persons. Second, under "It is like," he adduces things as an analogy.