觀音玄義記 2.23

2.23

Second, discerning kindness and compassion, with two [parts]: first, discerning the names and marks of kindness and compassion, with three [points]: first, explaining identity and difference in bestowing and relieving, with two [subpoints]: first, the question on bestowing and relieving being mutually inclusive. When suffering is eliminated, joy immediately follows, just as when night ends, daybreak arrives; when joy arrives, suffering is eliminated, just as when a lamp comes, darkness is extinguished. Mentioning either one immediately entails both functions; why are kindness and compassion divided into two Dharmas? Second, under "Answering comprehensively," the reply that bestowing and relieving do not occur together. One function includes two; this is spoken comprehensively with respect to generating the [compassionate] mind towards the object, but they must indeed be stated separately, and so two analogies are presented to clarify their distinct marks. Second, explaining the omission or inclusion of sympathetic joy and equanimity, with two [subpoints]: first, the question. Second, the reply, with two [points]: first, non-duality is equanimity. Among the four immeasurable minds, equanimity has no separate essence. Since the essence of śamatha contemplation is concentration, concentration can bestow joy; since the essence of vipaśyanā contemplation is wisdom, wisdom can relieve suffering. The non-duality of the two contemplations is upekṣā, also called impartial equanimity; therefore, non-dual yet dual, kindness and compassion are established; dual yet non-dual, it is precisely equanimity. Now, since kindness and compassion are explained as non-dual, equanimity is already contained [within them]; therefore, it is not established separately. Second, under "As for sympathetic joy," joy is lacking because suffering still exists, with two [points]: first, explaining in terms of Dharma. Kindness and compassion as explained now are the setting up of vows to exercise kindness to bestow joy; since sentient beings' suffering is heavy, one must exercise compassion; when neither has yet been accomplished, what joy could there be? Only when merit and wisdom are fulfilled and the work of the medicine and jewel is complete does one give rise to celebratory joy with sentient beings. Second, under "Like Aśoka," he cites a historical event as an example. King Aśoka [here refers to] the brother of King Aśoka, who did not take refuge in the Three Jewels; seeing his elder brother feed monks, he gave rise to resentment and slander. King Aśoka, feeling pity, devised a plan to exhort him. The king entered the bathhouse, had it falsely proclaimed that he had died, and urged him to succeed to the throne. Just as he ascended the royal seat, King Aśoka came out in anger, declared that his crime deserved death, and then ordered that for seven days he be allowed to enjoy the five desires of a king, making a caṇḍāla proclaim each day [the number of days until] his execution. When this passed, the king asked, "Did you experience pleasure?" He replied, "Hearing that I would be executed on a certain day, there was only suffering and no pleasure." The king said, "Śramaṇas contemplate momentary arising and ceasing; though they receive offerings, how could they have attachment in mind?" Aśoka, having understood, went forth to cultivate the Way and attained arhatship. A minor agony strips away pleasure; this is verifiable from recent events. Since sentient beings are like this, joy has not yet arisen in the bodhisattva's mind.