觀音玄義記 2.26

2.26

Second, under "Question: merit," he debates the identity, difference, correctness, and incorrectness of merit and wisdom, with two [parts]: first, an objection in terms of separation and difference. Fully citing their mutual assistance, he objects to their present separation and difference. Second, under "Naturally there are," the reply in terms of the biased and the perfect, with two [points]: first, establishing the four propositions of identity and separation. Both Hīnayāna and Mahāyāna have four, so we know that while the terms "identity" and "separation" are the same, their meanings differ. Second, under "As the six," he applies them to the biased and perfect teachings, with two [points]: first, explaining that in the three teachings identity and separation are both incorrect, with two [points]: first, explaining the Small and Great [Vehicles], with two [subpoints]: first, the Tripiṭaka [Teaching]. The bodhisattva stage obtains the two propositions of identity; the arhat and the white elephant obtain the two propositions of separation. Although there are identity and separation, they belong alike to the Tripiṭaka [Teaching]. Second, under "As for the Mahāyāna," the Mahāyāna. Discussing the four propositions with respect to the stages prior to the grounds in the Separate [Teaching], at first, taking active practice in contrast with wisdom practice as merit and wisdom, since they do not break ignorance, both are named merit. These very two merits, being able to break attachment to marks, again receive the name of wisdom. Thus this merit and wisdom correspond to the two propositions of identity. Furthermore, in merit and wisdom prior to the grounds, ignorance remains entirely, so both are named merit; in merit and wisdom upon the grounds, ignorance is broken in part, so both are named wisdom. This merit and wisdom correspond to the two propositions of non-identity [and non-separation]. Therefore, these two sets of four propositions are not the merit and wisdom spoken of here. Second, under "Vaipulya," he takes the two periods as an analogy. Second, under "Now here," he explains that in the Perfect Teaching opening and combining are both correct, with two [subpoints]: first, the explanation, with two [points]: first, dual yet non-dual, with three [points]: first, explaining mutual identity. The three cessations in a single thought are merit, and the three contemplations in a single thought are wisdom; from the rational nature at the beginning to the ultimate fruition at the end, concentration and wisdom are non-dual—this is what is meant here by the two identities. Second, under "Therefore the Great," he explains mutual inclusion. Since prajñā is seen by venerable and marvelous persons, this proves that wisdom includes merit. "Venerable and marvelous" refers precisely to superior concentration. The treatise is the Mahāprajñāpāramitā-śāstra; it translates Śūraṅgama as "heroic aspect." Since samādhi can crush strong adversaries, this proves that merit includes wisdom, for the strong adversary is precisely ignorance. Third, under "The Great Sūtra," he explains the different names. Among the five names, prajñā and Lion's Roar are wisdom; Śūraṅgama and Diamond are concentration; Buddha-nature is the common name. Since they are different names, this highlights all the more the unity of essence; therefore, these five are all designations that possess both. He further concludes their non-duality by stating that dhyāna and wisdom do not obstruct each other. Second, under "Non-dual," non-dual yet dual. Although the Dharma is non-dual, there is no harm in dividing into categories to assign names and numbers for the sake of explanation. Second, under "This is," the conclusion. Although the treatise explains by dividing into categories and distinct marks, one must understand that dhyāna and wisdom are ultimately non-dual.