華嚴經探玄記 13.51

13.51

二約厭離有為中世諦觀六門中，此當第六名深觀。此深觀中攝後三門，合成四句：一不自生、二不他生、三不共生、四不無因生。釋此四句，諸論不同，略有五說：一約破外道，謂諸法不從冥諦自性生，故云不自生；二不從梵天自在天等生，故云不他生；三亦非微塵大種和合生，故云不共生；四亦非無因自然而起，故云不無因生。二約破二乘：一謂諸法不定從自同類因生，故云不自生；二不定從彼異熟因生，故云不他生；三又亦非彼俱有因生，故云不共生；四小乘中許無明支前不正思惟託虛而起，似若無因，今亦不爾，故離無因。三約法顯空：一果不自起，名不自生；二自既不立，對誰辨他？又他亦各自，皆不成自，云何他生？故云不他生；三自他因果既各不成，故云不共生；四離因緣外無別果法，故云不無因生。此上三重，如《般若燈論》及《中論》等說。四約因緣形奪，《對法論》云「自種有故不從他，待眾緣故非自作，無作用故不共生，有功能故非無因。」凡諸緣起，亡雙二句已為甚深，況總亡四句，是故緣起最極甚深。五約緣起無礙門，但因緣生果。因緣相望各有二義：一全有力、二全無力。謂因望於果有全不生、緣必全生故，云因不生緣生故；二緣望於果亦全不生、因必全生故，云緣不生自因生故；三二力不俱故不共生；四二無力亦不俱故不無因生。此門有二義：一據力具有不有義故令相入，謂因有力時緣必無力，是故由因有力故能攝他，由緣無力故能入他。會彼緣力總歸因力，名不他生。雖言不他，反顯自生。因力歸緣，不自亦爾，反前思之。以二力二無力各不俱故，無彼不相入；一力一無力相歸故，恒時相入；以不相障礙增上緣寬故，一切諸法無不相入。〈十忍品〉云「菩薩善觀緣起法，於一法中解眾多法，眾多法中解了一法。」良由此門故也。二據體有空不空義故有相即，謂非直因力歸緣明其相入，亦乃因體由緣顯因性空攝同於緣。何者？謂若無緣則無因，故以生果名因。無緣果不生，是時不名因，明知此因會歸彼緣為不自生，是故緣是有義，無不能攝；因是空義，無不受攝。因受攝故，廢己同緣；緣能攝故，攝因同己。餘因攝緣受等，並準思可知。由此義故，諸法相即無所障礙。上文云「知一即多、多即一」等皆此義也。是故無盡大緣起法無礙自在，皆從此門而開現矣。此中言因無明諸行生者，論經云無明因緣行生者，彰因起果，明非他作。言因緣能生行者，明果由因，顯非自作。又以無明是行自因，故非他作。亦先無行體在無明中，後還生行，故非自作。餘亦如是，準思可見。此一門中，論主開為不自不他二句也。

Second, regarding the six gates of contemplation of conventional truth within revulsion toward the conditioned, this corresponds to the sixth, termed the 'profound contemplation'. Within this profound contemplation, the latter three gates are subsumed, together forming the four propositions: 1. not produced from self, 2. not produced from other, 3. not produced from both, and 4. not produced without cause. In explaining these four propositions, the treatises differ, having roughly five explanations. First, regarding refuting non-Buddhists: it means that phenomena are not produced from the primordial nature (pradhāna/prakṛti), hence 'not produced from self'; they are not produced from Brahmā, Īśvara, and so forth, hence 'not produced from other'; nor are they produced from the combination of atoms and great elements, hence 'not produced from both'; nor do they arise spontaneously without cause, hence 'not produced without cause'. Second, regarding refuting the two vehicles: first, phenomena do not definitely arise from their own homogeneous cause (sabhāga-hetu), hence 'not produced from self'; second, they do not definitely arise from that heterotypic cause (vipāka-hetu), hence 'not produced from other'; third, nor do they arise from that coexistent cause (sahabhū-hetu), hence 'not produced from both'; fourth, within the Hīnayāna it is admitted that prior to the branch of ignorance, improper attention arises depending on falsehood, seeming as though it lacks a cause; now it is also not so, hence free from being uncaused. Third, regarding phenomena revealing emptiness: first, the fruit does not arise by itself, which is called 'not produced from self'; second, since the self is not established, against what could 'other' be discerned? Moreover, the other is also each a self, and none are established as a self, so how could there be production from other? Hence 'not produced from other'; third, since self, other, cause, and fruit are each not established, hence 'not produced from both'; fourth, apart from causes and conditions there is no distinct phenomenon of fruit, hence 'not produced without cause'. These preceding three levels are as explained in the Prajñāpradīpa-śāstra, Mūlamadhyamakakārikā, and so on. Fourth, regarding the mutual prevailing and relinquishing of causes and conditions, the Abhidharmasamuccaya-bhāṣya states: 'Because its own seed exists, it is not from another; because it depends on multiple conditions, it is not made by self; because there is no agency, it is not produced from both; because there is efficacy, it is not without cause.' Generally, for all dependent origination, to negate the two pairs of propositions is already extremely profound; how much more so to negate all four propositions altogether! Therefore, dependent origination is the most profoundly deep. Fifth, regarding the gate of the unimpededness of dependent origination: it is only causes and conditions that produce fruits. Cause and condition with respect to each other each have two senses: 1. completely powerful, and 2. completely powerless. That is, with respect to the fruit, the cause has complete non-production while the condition must completely produce; therefore, it is said that the cause does not produce and the condition produces. Second, with respect to the fruit, the condition also has complete non-production while the cause must completely produce; therefore, it is said that the condition does not produce and its own cause produces. Third, because the two powers do not exist together, it is not produced from both. Fourth, because the two powerlessnesses also do not exist together, it is not produced without cause. This gate has two senses: First, based on power having the sense of existing or not existing, it causes mutual entry: that is, when the cause is powerful, the condition must be powerless; therefore, because the cause is powerful it can subsume the other, and because the condition is powerless it can enter the other. Integrating the power of that condition to completely return to the power of the cause is termed 'not produced from other'. Although saying 'not from other', it conversely reveals 'produced from self'. When the power of the cause returns to the condition, 'not from self' is also like this; consider it reversely to the former. Because the two powers and two powerlessnesses each do not exist together, there is no non-mutual entry; because one power and one powerlessness mutually return, there is constant mutual entry; because they do not obstruct each other and the sovereign condition is expansive, there are no phenomena that do not mutually enter. The 'Ten Forbearances Chapter' says: 'The bodhisattva skillfully contemplates the phenomenon of dependent origination; within one phenomenon he understands manifold phenomena, and within manifold phenomena he fully understands one phenomenon.' This is truly due to this gate. Second, based on the essence having the sense of empty and non-empty, there is mutual identity: that is, not only does the power of the cause return to the condition to clarify their mutual entry, but also the essence of the cause, through the condition, reveals that the nature of the cause is empty, subsumed to be identical with the condition. Why so? Because if there were no condition, there would be no cause; it is named 'cause' on account of producing the fruit. Without conditions the fruit is not produced, and at that time it is not named 'cause'; clearly know that this cause converging and returning to that condition constitutes 'not produced from self'. Therefore, the condition has the sense of existence, and there is nothing it cannot subsume; the cause has the sense of emptiness, and there is nothing it does not receive subsumption from. Because the cause receives subsumption, it relinquishes itself to be identical with the condition; because the condition can subsume, it subsumes the cause to be identical with itself. The remaining cases of the cause subsuming the condition, receiving it, and so forth, can all be understood by considering accordingly. Due to this meaning, all phenomena are mutually identical without obstruction. The earlier text stating 'knowing one is precisely many, many is precisely one' and so forth are all this meaning. Therefore, the inexhaustible great dharma of dependent origination is unobstructed and sovereign, all opening and manifesting from this gate. Here, stating that formations are produced due to ignorance, the treatise sūtra states that formations are produced with ignorance as cause and condition, manifesting the cause giving rise to the fruit to clarify that it is not made by another. Saying that causes and conditions can produce formations clarifies that the fruit depends on causes, revealing that it is not made by self. Moreover, because ignorance is the own cause of formations, it is not made by another; nor is there an essence of formations previously existing within ignorance which later again produces formations, so it is not made by self. The rest are also like this, as can be seen by considering accordingly. In this one gate, the treatise master opens it into the two propositions of 'not from self' and 'not from other'.