華嚴經探玄記 3.10

3.10

第三四悉檀者，《智論》第一云「有四悉檀，總攝一切十二部經、八萬四千法藏，皆悉是實，無有相違。一世界悉檀者，有法從因緣和合故有，無別性。譬如車轅軸輻輞等和合故有，無別車。人亦如是，五眾和合故有，無別人。若無世界悉檀者，佛是實語人，云何言『我以天眼見諸眾生隨善惡業，死此生彼。』當知是人以世界悉檀故，非第一義悉檀。二者各各為人悉檀，觀人心行而為說法，於一法中或聽或不聽。如為斷見人說雜業故，雜生世間，得雜觸、得雜受。如為常見人說無人得觸、無人得受。如是等。三對治悉檀者，對治則有、實性則無，如酸醎等，於風病名藥，餘病非藥。不淨等，於貪等亦爾，准之。四第一義悉檀者，一切法性、一切言論差別，皆悉平等一味。」解云：或約世界說有、勝義為無，如第一說。或勝義為有、世界為無，如第四說。或對異機說有、對餘機說無，如第二說。或治此病為要、於餘病為非，如第三說。皆須得其本意，法悉有用；隨言混取，失意成謗。

Third, as for the four siddhāntas: The first fascicle of the Dà zhìdù lùn states: 'There are four siddhāntas that collectively encompass all twelve divisions of scriptures and eighty-four thousand Dharma stores; all are completely true without mutual contradiction. First, the worldly siddhānta: there are dharmas that exist because of the combination of causes and conditions, without a separate nature. For instance, a cart exists because of the combination of shafts, axles, spokes, rims, and so forth, without a separate cart. A person is also like this: they exist because of the combination of the five aggregates, without a separate person. If there were no worldly siddhānta, then the Buddha being a speaker of truth, why would he say: "With my divine eye I see sentient beings following good and bad karma, dying here and being born there"? You should know that this refers to a person according to the worldly siddhānta, not the ultimate truth siddhānta. Second, the individual siddhānta: observing the mental dispositions of people to teach the Dharma for them, permitting or not permitting with respect to a single dharma. For instance, for one holding the view of annihilationism, he taught mixed karma, whereby they are born in the world in a mixed manner and obtain mixed contact and mixed feeling; whereas for one holding the view of eternalism, he taught that no person obtains contact and no person obtains feeling, and so forth. Third, the antidotal siddhānta: it exists as an antidote, but does not exist in real nature. For instance, sour and salty [tastes] are called medicine for wind disorders, but are not medicine for other disorders. Impurity and the like are also like this with respect to greed and the like, to be understood accordingly. Fourth, the ultimate truth siddhānta: the nature of all dharmas and all distinctions of discourse are entirely equal and of one taste.' The explanation says: Either existence is stated in terms of the worldly and non-existence in terms of the ultimate, as in the first exposition; or existence is in terms of the ultimate and non-existence in terms of the worldly, as in the fourth exposition; or existence is stated for a person of a different capacity and non-existence for another capacity, as in the second exposition; or it is essential for curing this disorder while not so for other disorders, as in the third exposition. In all cases one must attain the original intention, and then the teachings will all have their function; if one conflates them according to the mere words, losing the intention, it turns into slander.