華嚴經探玄記 6.117

6.117

第五多聞藏，釋內二，先所學之法，後「摩訶薩」下明其學意。前中亦二：先開十章、後次第釋。十中，初四約十二緣生（檢《瑜伽》）。理實出世間亦有無取五蘊，今是取蘊擔苦積集，故是世間。又約小乘亦得。又五分法身翻前五蘊，故為出世。又理實有為更通餘位，今取三界及眾生並是惑業之所為，故是有為。於無為法中，一開合者，或唯說三，謂虛空、擇滅、非擇滅，此約小乘。或說四，加真如，如《掌珍論》說。或說六，加不動是第四禪，及滅定，如《百法論》等說。此二約初教初說。或說八，於真如中開善法真如、不善法真如、無記法真如，如《瑜伽》、《對法》說。此約初教終說。四中擇滅有二義：一滅惑障名擇滅，滅定障名不動及滅定，是故總攝在擇滅中也。八中欲漸展一切法悉真如故，開善等三性詮門顯示。二假實者，唯真如無為是實，餘並是假，以於如上假建立故，如《佛地論》說（云云）。又真如中亦二：一安立，是相分故；二非安立，非識現故。初假、後實。三轉異義者，如此文六無為：一事無處名虛空。二性淨之果名涅槃。三無間道數斷結所得名數緣滅。四餘緣不起名非數緣。五十二因緣是無為者，依《俱舍論》，僧祇部犢子部並說十二因緣是無為法，以如來出世若不出世此法常住故。經部師破，如彼說。又遠法師引《涅槃經》釋，就人論三世流轉是其有為，廢人談法法相常定故曰無為。如十二因緣，陰界入等一切皆然，如《涅槃經》說。今釋：以此緣起各無自性、各無造作，故名無為。《涅槃》云「十二因緣則是佛性。」又《大品》云「菩薩觀十二因緣猶如虛空不可盡等。」六法界者，是如來藏體，實不生滅，故是無為。又於一真如義立此六：一無相義、二所證義、三惑盡義、四性淨義、五隨緣義、六不變義，亦是為因義。有記中四諦等者，約順理善有可記錄故。上來多是小乘法。下無記中，虛妄法不可記錄故也。《智論》說十四難，此中十六種。《俱舍論》有外道名郁胝歌，此云能說，問佛世間有邊無邊等四，此約始終為問；常無常等四，約斷常問。所以不答者，若彼執我為世間，已我無故，答不應理。若執一切生死名世間，四答亦不應理。若世間常住者，無一人得涅槃；若非常住，即一切皆斷滅自然涅槃。若具二，必定一分不得涅槃、一分自然涅槃。若非常非非常者，應非得涅槃、非非得涅槃。問：若自得涅槃，有何失？答：若自然得者，由涅槃至，得隨屬道故，如尼乾雀握，不可定答也。如來有異死等四問，此約縛解問。以外執梵王及己師已得解脫名如來，由觀問人意，故佛不答。以彼執已解脫我名如來，既執有我，故佛不答。餘檢《智論》第二第十七、《瑜伽》、《俱舍》、《舍利弗阿毘曇》并正疏總計會具作之。第三四句中如去不如去等四中，如來者如從前來，向後亦爾，故云如來，非是佛。四句何別？有人計神我與陰一，陰滅我亦滅。若言還如來時去，此語不受。二計我與陰異，陰滅我不滅。若言不如來時去，此亦不受。三計我體常，如虛空，說有來去俱不受。四執我有麁細，說無來去亦不受。謂麁我與陰一，同滅故如去，細我與陰異，不同滅故不如去，不受。第四四句中，我是體，眾生是用，由我有眾生，依體有用。二反此。三雙存。四雙反。餘文可知。大況上來所學之法，並小乘及外道等法，為知故、為欲因此攝眾生故。下明學意可知。

In the fifth, the storehouse of extensive learning, within the explanation there are two: first, the dharmas that are studied; and later, from “the mahāsattva” onward, explaining the intention behind the study. Within the former there are also two: first, setting forth the ten sections; and second, explaining them in sequence. Among the ten, the first four are explained in terms of the twelve links of dependent origination (examine the Yogācārabhūmi). In terms of actual principle, the supramundane also has uncontaminated five aggregates; here, [the text means] the aggregates with appropriation that accumulate the burden of suffering, and thus they are mundane. Alternatively, they can also be understood according to the Hīnayāna. Furthermore, the fivefold Dharma-body inverts the preceding five aggregates, and thus is supramundane. Also, in terms of actual principle, the conditioned further extends to other stages; here it takes the three realms and sentient beings as entirely produced by afflictions and karma, and thus they are conditioned. Among unconditioned dharmas, first, regarding their division and combination: sometimes only three are taught, namely space, analytical cessation, and non-analytical cessation; this is according to the Hīnayāna. Sometimes four are taught, adding suchness, as stated in the Karatalaratna. Sometimes six are taught, adding the unmoving, which is the fourth dhyāna, and the cessation of ideation and feeling, as stated in the Treatise on the Hundred Dharmas and elsewhere; these two [classifications] are stated according to the initial stage of the preliminary teaching. Sometimes eight are taught, dividing suchness into suchness of wholesome dharmas, suchness of unwholesome dharmas, and suchness of indeterminate dharmas, as stated in the Yogācārabhūmi and the Abhidharmasamuccaya; this is stated according to the final stage of the preliminary teaching. Among the four, analytical cessation has two senses: 1. cessation of the affliction-hindrance is called analytical cessation; cessation of the meditative hindrances is called the unmoving and cessation [of ideation and feeling], and for this reason they are subsumed entirely under analytical cessation. Among the eight, desiring to gradually reveal that all dharmas are completely suchness, the three nature-portals of wholesome and so forth are opened to display it. Second, regarding conventional versus real: only the unconditioned suchness is real, while the rest are all conventional, because they are conventionally established upon suchness, as stated in the Buddhabhūmi-vyākhyāna (and so on). Furthermore, within suchness there are also two kinds: 1. the established, because it is an objective aspect (nimittabhāga); 2. the non-established, because it is not an appearance of consciousness. The former is conventional, the latter real. Third, regarding the different variants in meaning: like the six unconditioned dharmas in this text: 1. where things are absent is called space; 2. the fruit of natural purity is called nirvāṇa; 3. that which is obtained by repeatedly severing fetters through the uninterrupted path is called analytical cessation; 4. the non-arising of remaining conditions is non-analytical [cessation]; 5. that the twelve conditions are unconditioned is based on the Abhidharmakośa, where both the Mahāsāṃghika and Vātsīputrīya schools maintain that the twelve conditions are unconditioned dharmas, because whether tathāgatas appear in the world or do not appear in the world, this dharma remains permanently. The Sautrāntika masters refute this, as stated there. Moreover, Master Huiyuan cites the Nirvāṇa Sūtra to explain: discussing the transmigration of the three times with respect to persons is conditioned; setting aside persons and discussing the dharma, the characteristics of the dharma are eternally fixed, and therefore it is called unconditioned; just as with the twelve conditions, the aggregates, dhātus, and āyatanas are all like this, as stated in the Nirvāṇa Sūtra. Now I explain: because these dependently originated [factors] each lack self-nature and each lack fabrication, they are called unconditioned. The Nirvāṇa [Sūtra] says: “The twelve conditions are none other than Buddha-nature.” Furthermore, the Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā says: “The bodhisattva contemplates the twelve conditions as like space, inexhaustible, and so forth.” 6. The dharmadhātu is the substance of the tathāgatagarbha, which truly neither arises nor ceases, and therefore is unconditioned. Furthermore, based on the meaning of the single suchness, these six are established: 1. the meaning of signlessness; 2. the meaning of that which is realized; 3. the meaning of the exhaustion of afflictions; 4. the meaning of natural purity; 5. the meaning of following conditions; 6. the meaning of non-alteration, which is also the meaning of serving as a cause. In the determined, the four truths and so on: according to wholesome [states] that conform to the principle, they can be recorded. What has preceded is mostly Hīnayāna dharmas. In the undetermined below, illusory dharmas cannot be recorded. The Dà zhìdù lùn speaks of fourteen unanswerable questions; here there are sixteen kinds. In the Abhidharmakośa, there is a heterodox wanderer named Utthika (which means ‘able to speak’), who asked the Buddha four questions on whether the world is finite or infinite, etc., which question in terms of beginning and end; and four questions on permanence and impermanence, etc., questioning in terms of annihilation and permanence. As for why they were not answered: if he grasped the self as the world, since the self is already non-existent, an answer would not be in accord with the principle; if he grasped all saṃsāra as the world, the four answers would also not be in accord with the principle. If the world were eternal, not a single person would attain nirvāṇa; if it were not eternal, then all would be annihilated and spontaneously attain nirvāṇa. If it possessed both, then definitively one part would not attain nirvāṇa and one part would spontaneously attain nirvāṇa. If it were neither eternal nor non-eternal, it would be neither attaining nirvāṇa nor not attaining nirvāṇa. Question: If one spontaneously attains nirvāṇa, what fault is there? Answer: If it were attained spontaneously, since nirvāṇa arrives, it would be attained as subordinate to the path; like the Nirgrantha holding a sparrow in his grip, a definitive answer cannot be given. The four questions on whether the Tathāgata exists or is different after death, etc., question in terms of bondage and liberation. Because heterodox outsiders grasp Brahmā and their own teachers as having already attained liberation and call them ‘tathāgata’, by observing the inquirer’s intention, the Buddha did not answer. Since he grasped a liberated self as a tathāgata, and thereby grasped an existing self, the Buddha did not answer. For the rest, consult the Dà zhìdù lùn, fascicles two and seventeen, the Yogācārabhūmi, the Abhidharmakośa, the Śāriputrābhidharma, and together with the main commentary, collate and comprehensively compose it. In the third set of four propositions, on ‘arriving thus’ (tathāgata), ‘not arriving thus’, and so forth, ‘tathāgata’ means arriving from before as it is, and proceeding forward in the same way, hence called ‘tathāgata’, not the Buddha. What is the difference among the four propositions? Someone conceives that the spiritual self is identical with the aggregates; when the aggregates cease, the self also ceases. If one says that it departs just as it arrived, this assertion is not accepted. Second, someone conceives that the self is different from the aggregates; when the aggregates cease, the self does not cease. If one says that it does not depart as it arrived, this is also not accepted. Third, someone conceives that the self’s substance is eternal, like space; assertions that there is coming and going are both not accepted. Fourth, someone grasps that the self has coarse and subtle aspects; asserting that there is neither coming nor going is also not accepted: that is, the coarse self is identical with the aggregates, and because it ceases along with them, it ‘departs thus’; while the subtle self is different from the aggregates, and because it does not cease along with them, it ‘does not depart thus’—this is not accepted. In the fourth set of four propositions, ‘self’ is the substance, and ‘sentient being’ is the function; because of the self there are sentient beings, based on substance there is function. The second is the reverse of this. The third posits both. The fourth negates both. The rest of the text is easy to understand. In general, the dharmas studied above are all the teachings of the Hīnayāna and heterodox traditions, [studied] for the purpose of knowing them and intending thereby to gather sentient beings. The subsequent explanation of the intention of learning can be understood accordingly.