大方廣佛華嚴經疏 17.24

17.24

第三西方勝慧，以解佛勝智，隨空心淨，故以為名。頌意為顯欲令菩薩智慧明了，即大智了如及佛性故。十頌分四：初一讚智為迷悟本、次四正顯迷悟、次四喻前得失、後一推功有在。今初，由難思故，迷難則容有，思者故有悟。次四迷悟中，初二迷、後二悟。迷中，初一心外取境生想違理，故不能見無相之佛。後偈取蘊內相、不了蘊性，故不見心佛。亦是愚法小乘，故名無知者。後二迷中，前明倒想，內外俱妄；今有了因，內外皆悟。初偈翻前外取，謂了一切法即心自性，性亦非性，情破理現則見舍那，稱於法性無內外也。後偈翻前內取，了蘊性相，則見自心之佛，與盧舍那非一非異，故難思議。然此一偈，文含多意：一但是蘊縛無有我人，則破前凡夫取我相也；二前後因依相續無性，則破凡小取法相也。此性即第一義空，第一義空即是佛性。又上性無所有，正因性也。前解此了，皆了因性。此蘊相續，即是正因，亦名生因。言正因者，是中道義，中道即是佛性。謂現在陰滅、中陰陰生，是現在陰終不變為中陰五陰，故現陰非常。如種生牙，種不至牙，雖不至牙而能生牙。此現在陰雖不至後，而能生後，則現陰非斷。而中陰五陰亦非自生、不從餘來，因現五陰生中陰陰。斯則後陰非無因，故後陰非常；既能續前，故後陰非斷。非斷非常是中道義，正因性也。能生佛果，故曰生因。眾生佛性有二種因：一者正因、二者緣因。正因者謂諸眾生，是故五陰即正因也。緣因者謂六波羅蜜，非蘊相生，名緣因也。今以了因了彼正因，故曰於此性了知。了即般若，亦緣因也。第三四偈喻前得失者，前三喻失、後一喻得。前中二：初二喻內取失。於中，初一顯無緣了不見正因。闇中寶者，正因性也。圓滿可貴，所以稱寶。居於無明五陰室內，如在闇中。燈喻緣了之因。下半法合。無人說者，闕於緣因，雖慧莫了。義含二意：一慧即正因，合上寶也。闕於緣因，故不能了。二佛法即寶，以闕緣因，雖內有慧不成了因，不見真性。然則緣因即是了因，了因未必是於緣因，有親疎故。善友是於緣因，而必是了。佛性名為了因，未必是緣，此約智慧性故。若以第一義空為佛性者，唯是正因而非了因，但為了因所了，而非生因所生。若以智慧為佛性者，即是了因。若以五蘊為佛性者，名為正因亦名生因。然復生必對了、正必對緣。今燈一喻雙喻緣了，闇中之寶雙喻正了，義意包含，具如《涅槃》二十六七所辨。又上燈喻既是正義，何以《涅槃》師子吼立，佛不許耶？故師子吼言：「一切眾生有佛性，性如乳中酪。以有性故，要須緣因。何以故？欲明見故。緣因者即是了因，譬如闇中先有諸物，為欲見故以燈照了。若本無者，燈何所照？」故佛難言：「若使乳中定有酪性即是了因，若是了因，復何須了？又善男子！一切眾生有佛性者，何須修習無量功德？若言修習是了因者，已同酪壞。」結正義云：「乳有酪者，以定得故，佛性亦爾。眾生有者，以當見故。」然上諸義總有二意：一燈了於寶為正義者，約因性故，師子吼立；佛不許者，約果性故。二者燈喻正者，約其體性與有不異；佛不許者，約其現惑與無不殊。故知若言定有，名為執著；若言定無，是則妄語，應言眾生佛性亦有亦無。然眾生智慧是佛性因，菩提涅槃是佛性果，然則佛性非因非果。今此經宗宗於法性，故以法性而為佛性，則非內非外，隨物迷悟強說升沈。佛性要義不可不知，廣如別章，及《涅槃．師子吼品》等說。後偈目有翳者，此喻了因與惑俱故見不清淨，以不淨故不見佛法。佛法即見佛性，故《涅槃》云「佛性二種：一者是色、二者非色。色者諸佛菩薩，非色者一切眾生。色者名為眼見，非色者名為聞見。佛性者非內非外，雖非內外然非失壞，故名眾生悉有佛性。」二一偈，喻上外取之失。瞽謂全無於目，如鼓皮故，則全不見佛。無垢障為明淨目，取相是識，非智慧眼，故不見也。三一偈，喻前悟中抉去取相之翳，捨於空華之像，絕見契如則見如佛。第四一偈，推功有在，準上可知。

Third, Superior Wisdom (Varabuddhi) of the western direction: he is named so because he understands the superior wisdom of the Buddha and, in accord with emptiness, his mind is purified. The intention of these verses is to show the desire that the bodhisattva's wisdom be made luminous and clear—that is, because through great wisdom one understands tathatā and the buddha-nature. The ten verses are divided into four parts: first, one verse praising wisdom as the basis of delusion and awakening; next, four verses directly showing delusion and awakening; next, four verses using analogies for the preceding gain and loss; and last, one verse attributing the achievement to its source. Now, as for the first: because it is difficult to fathom, it is possible for delusion to occur; one who contemplates it therefore awakens. Among the next four verses on delusion and awakening: the first two concern delusion, and the later two concern awakening. Within delusion: in the first, grasping objects outside the mind gives rise to conceptual thought, which contravenes the noumenon; hence one cannot see the Buddha devoid of marks. The subsequent verse grasps the internal marks of the aggregates and does not understand the nature of the aggregates; thus one does not see the Buddha of the mind. This also refers to the Hīnayāna who are foolish regarding phenomena; hence they are called "the ignorant." In the latter two on delusion [and awakening]: the preceding explained inverted conceptualizations wherein internal and external are both false; now, possessing the revelatory cause (saṃvyaktikāraṇa), internal and external are both awakened. The first verse reverses the prior external grasping, meaning that understanding all phenomena to be the inherent nature of mind, that this nature is also devoid of nature, and that emotional grasping being shattered allows the noumenon to become manifest—one then sees Vairocana, according with the dharmatā where there is neither internal nor external. The latter verse reverses the prior internal grasping: understanding the nature and marks of the aggregates, one then sees the Buddha of one's own mind, which is neither one with nor different from Vairocana; hence it is difficult to conceive. Yet this one verse contains multiple meanings in its text: first, there is only the bondage of the aggregates and no self or person, which refutes the ordinary person's grasping at the mark of a self; second, prior and subsequent causes rely on each other in continuity without intrinsic nature, which refutes ordinary persons and followers of the Small Vehicle who grasp at the marks of phenomena. This nature is precisely the emptiness of ultimate reality (paramārtha-śūnyatā), and the emptiness of ultimate reality is precisely the buddha-nature. Moreover, that the aforementioned nature has nothing possessed is the nature as the primary cause (janakakāraṇa). The prior understanding and this comprehension are both the nature of the revelatory cause (vyañjanakāraṇa). This continuity of the aggregates is precisely the direct cause, also called the generative cause. That which is called the direct cause is the meaning of the middle way, and the middle way is precisely the buddha-nature. That is to say, when the present aggregates cease and the aggregates of the intermediate existence (antarābhava) arise, the present aggregates never transform into the five aggregates of the intermediate existence; therefore, the present aggregates are not eternal. Just as a seed generates a sprout, the seed does not arrive at the sprout; though it does not arrive at the sprout, it is capable of generating the sprout. Although these present aggregates do not arrive at what comes after, they are capable of generating what comes after; therefore, the present aggregates are not annihilated. Furthermore, the five aggregates of the intermediate existence do not generate themselves, nor do they come from elsewhere; relying on the present five aggregates, the aggregates of the intermediate existence arise. Thus, the subsequent aggregates are not without cause; hence the subsequent aggregates are not eternal. Since they can continue the prior ones, the subsequent aggregates are not annihilated. Neither annihilated nor eternal is the meaning of the middle way, which is the nature of the direct cause. Because it can produce the fruit of Buddhahood, it is called the generative cause. The buddha-nature of sentient beings has two kinds of causes: first, the direct cause; second, the conditioning cause (pratyayakāraṇa). The direct cause refers to sentient beings; therefore, the five aggregates are precisely the direct cause. The conditioning cause refers to the six pāramitās; that which does not arise from the mutual generation of the aggregates is called the conditioning cause. Now, by means of the revelatory cause one understands that direct cause; hence it says "one understands this nature." Understanding is prajñā, which is also a conditioning cause. Regarding the third section of four verses using analogies for the preceding gain and loss: the first three use analogies for the loss, and the last one uses an analogy for the gain. In the former, there are two: the first two analogize the loss of internal grasping. Within this, the first shows that lacking conditioning and revelation, one does not see the direct cause. The jewel in the dark is the nature of the direct cause. Complete and precious, it is called a jewel. Residing within the chamber of ignorance and the five aggregates, it is like being in the dark. The lamp analogizes the causes of conditioning and revelation. The lower half matches the analogy to the Dharma: "if no one speaks of it," one lacks the conditioning cause, so even with wisdom, one cannot understand it. This meaning holds two implications: first, wisdom is the direct cause, matching the jewel above; lacking the conditioning cause, one cannot understand it. Second, the Buddha-Dharma is the jewel; because one lacks the conditioning cause, even if wisdom is present within, it does not become the revelatory cause, and one does not see the true nature. Yet, the conditioning cause is precisely the revelatory cause, while the revelatory cause is not necessarily the conditioning cause, as they have relations of proximity and distance. A good friend (kalyāṇamitra) is a conditioning cause and must be a revelatory [cause]. The buddha-nature is called a revelatory cause, but it is not necessarily a conditioning [cause]; this is stated with reference to the nature of wisdom. If one takes the emptiness of ultimate reality to be the buddha-nature, it is only the direct cause and not the revelatory cause; it is merely that which is revealed by the revelatory cause, not that which is produced by the generative cause. If one takes wisdom to be the buddha-nature, it is precisely the revelatory cause. If one takes the five aggregates to be the buddha-nature, it is called the direct cause and also called the generative cause. However, generation must correspond to revelation, and the direct must correspond to the conditioning. Here, the single analogy of the lamp simultaneously analogizes the conditioning and revelatory [causes], and the jewel in the dark simultaneously analogizes the direct and revelatory [causes]; the meaning and intent are all-encompassing, fully as analyzed in fascicles twenty-six and twenty-seven of the Nirvāṇa Sūtra. Furthermore, since the above analogy of the lamp is the correct meaning, why is it that when Siṃhanāda established it in the Nirvāṇa Sūtra, the Buddha did not accept it? For Siṃhanāda said: "All sentient beings possess the buddha-nature, its nature being like curd in milk. Because the nature exists, it necessarily requires a conditioning cause. Why is this? Because one desires to see it clearly. The conditioning cause is precisely the revelatory cause. For example, just as things already exist within the dark, in order to see them one uses a lamp to illumine and reveal them. If they were originally absent, what would the lamp illuminate?" Therefore, the Buddha objected, saying: "If the nature of curd definitely exists within milk, it would itself be the revelatory cause; if it were the revelatory cause, why would it still require revealing? Furthermore, good son, if all sentient beings possess the buddha-nature, why would they need to cultivate immeasurable meritorious qualities? If you say that cultivation is the revelatory cause, it would already be ruined just like curd." Drawing the correct conclusion, [the sūtra] says: "That milk contains curd is because it is definitely attained; the buddha-nature is also like this. That sentient beings have it is because they will see it in the future." Now, the above meanings generally have two intentions: first, that the lamp revealing the jewel is the correct meaning is stated in terms of the causal nature, which Siṃhanāda established; that the Buddha did not accept it is stated in terms of the resultant nature. Second, that the lamp analogy is correct is stated in terms of its essential nature being not different from existence; that the Buddha did not accept it is stated in terms of present delusion being no different from nonexistence. Therefore, one should know that if one says it definitely exists, this is called grasping; if one says it definitely does not exist, this is false speech. One should say that the buddha-nature of sentient beings both exists and does not exist. However, the wisdom of sentient beings is the cause of the buddha-nature; bodhi and nirvāṇa are the fruits of the buddha-nature; yet the buddha-nature is neither cause nor fruit. Now, the principal tenet of this sūtra takes the dharmatā as its principle; therefore, taking the dharmatā as the buddha-nature, it is neither internal nor external, and in accordance with beings' delusion or awakening, one arbitrarily speaks of ascent and descent. The essential meaning of the buddha-nature cannot be ignored; it is extensively explained in a separate chapter and in the "Siṃhanāda Chapter" of the Nirvāṇa Sūtra. The subsequent verse on the clouded eyes analogizes the revelatory cause accompanying defilement, so that vision is not purified; because it is not pure, one does not see the Buddha-Dharma. The Buddha-Dharma is precisely seeing the buddha-nature. Hence the Nirvāṇa Sūtra says: "The buddha-nature is of two kinds: the first is material form, and the second is non-material form. Material form refers to the buddhas and bodhisattvas; non-material form refers to all sentient beings. Material form is called seeing with the eye; non-material form is called seeing through hearing. The buddha-nature is neither internal nor external; although it is neither internal nor external, it is not lost or ruined; therefore it is said that all sentient beings possess the buddha-nature." Second, the one verse analogizes the loss of the aforementioned external grasping. Blindness means completely lacking eyes, like the skin of a drum; thus one completely fails to see the Buddha. Being without defilements or obstacles constitutes clear and pure eyes; grasping marks belongs to consciousness and is not the eye of wisdom, which is why one does not see. Third, the one verse analogizes, within the preceding awakening, removing the cataract of grasping marks, abandoning the appearance of sky-flowers, and terminating views to tally with tathatā, whereupon one sees the Buddha as such. Fourth, the one verse attributing the achievement to its source can be known by analogy with the above.