大方廣佛華嚴經疏 18.8

18.8

第三修行住。釋中先明自分，是護煩惱行；後明勝進，是護小乘行。前中，然此十無常大同三地，彼論具釋。引《中邊》釋已見〈問明〉。既文義包含，略舉一兩。論云「命行不住總名無常」，此總句也。然復有二：一者念念無常、二者一期無常。於何無常？依五盛陰逼迫相故苦也。《瑜伽》三十四云「由無常行，作意為先，趣入苦行。由苦無所得行，趣入空行，空故不自在。由不自在，趣入無我。」此四即苦下四行相也。五無作者，但緣有故。由念念無常故無造作，由皆苦故無有樂味，但於下苦中橫生樂想。即一切世間不可樂想，以彼空故萬法無體，物無當名之實。以無我故無有處所，非在色中乃至識中。無分別者，觀能取也。無堅實者，觀所取也。問：《涅槃》比丘作無常想，佛呵倒惑，云何入住作無常觀？答：彼但得名，不得其義。以無常等該涅槃故，故佛呵之。今但說生死，故無有失。又無常者，未會法身故。苦者，未得涅槃故。空者，無善有故。無我者，未得八自在故。則前四句自說生死。次無作等四，自說涅槃。常故無作、樂故無味、我故不如名、淨故無處所。然二理不偏照與之符，猶懸鏡高堂萬像斯鑑。又初四句則因緣生滅是無常義等，次四則不生不滅是無常義故云無作。五受陰洞達空無所起是苦義。因起有苦，起即無起，故無味也。諸法畢竟無所有是空義人法二空，空亦空故，故不如名。於我無我而不二是無我義，諸佛或說我、或說於無我，諸法實相中無我無非我，故無處所。故《菴提遮經》說不生不滅是無常義，生滅却是常義等。《瑜伽》四十六云「云何菩薩觀一切行皆是無常？謂觀一切行言說自性，於一切時常無所有，如是諸行常不可得。」若得斯意則入中道。若依《中邊論》約三性說，則初後二性不生不滅是無常義，依他起性則生滅是無常義等。又無作者，非常非無常故。無味者，非苦非樂故。不如名者，非空非不空，言不及故。無處所者，非我非無我，不在生死及涅槃故。無分別者，念想無故。無堅實者，實與不實相待有故。後勝進中是護小乘行，小乘不求種智、不欲廣知故。十中初三是作佛事處，眾生是所度、法界是能度、世界是度處。次四界是起見處，外道計大為諸法本，小乘計大為諸色因，又成身之體。後三界是繫縛處。云何觀耶？一觀其相委細而知、二觀其性甚深平等。三徵意云：但總觀無常，何用廣知。釋意云：觀空不礙，廣有知見，性相兼了，法智增明故。

Third is the Abode of Practice. In the commentary, it first explains the self-division, which is practice guarding against afflictions; later it explains the superior progression, which is practice guarding against the Hīnayāna. In the former part: however, these ten [types of] impermanence largely correspond to the third stage, and that treatise [the Daśabhūmika-śāstra] fully explains them. The citation of the *Madhyāntavibhāga* has already appeared in the 'Questions of the Clear Ones' chapter. Since the text and its meaning are comprehensive, I shall briefly cite one or two. The treatise states: 'The non-abiding of vital activities is collectively called impermanence'; this is the general clause. However, there are further two kinds: first, moment-to-moment impermanence; second, period-of-life impermanence. Regarding what is there impermanence? Relying on the marks of oppression of the five flourishing aggregates, it is suffering. *Yogācārabhūmi* chapter thirty-four states: 'Taking the contemplation of impermanence with attention as precedent, one enters into the contemplation of suffering. From the contemplation of the unobtainability of suffering, one enters into the contemplation of emptiness; being empty, it is non-autonomous. From non-autonomy, one enters into non-self.' These four are precisely the four aspects under suffering. Fifth, 'no agent' is because things only exist through conditions. Because there is moment-to-moment impermanence, there is no agency; because all are suffering, there is no flavor of pleasure—one merely gives rise falsely to the conception of pleasure amidst suffering below. That is precisely the conception of all worldly things as unpleasant; because they are empty, the myriad dharmas lack an essence, and things lack the reality corresponding to their names. Because there is non-self, there is no location, being neither in form nor up to consciousness. 'Non-conceptual' contemplates the grasper. 'Without solidity' contemplates the grasped. Question: In the *Nirvāṇa-sūtra*, the bhikṣus formed the conception of impermanence, and the Buddha rebuked their inverted confusion; why does entering the abode involve cultivating the contemplation of impermanence? Answer: They grasped only the name, not its meaning. Because impermanence and so forth were extended to cover nirvāṇa, the Buddha rebuked them. Here, it speaks only of saṃsāra, so there is no error. Moreover, impermanence is because one has not yet united with the dharmakāya; suffering is because one has not yet attained nirvāṇa; emptiness is because there is no wholesome being; non-self is because one has not yet attained the eight autonomies. Thus the first four phrases speak of saṃsāra. The next four, starting with non-agency, speak of nirvāṇa. Because it is permanent, there is no action; because it is bliss, there is no [craving for sensory] flavor; because it is true self, it is not according to names; because it is pure, there is no location. Yet the two principles are illuminated without bias and tally with it, like a mirror hung in a high hall reflecting the myriad images. Furthermore, in the first four phrases, arising and ceasing through causes and conditions is the meaning of impermanence and so forth; in the next four, neither arising nor ceasing is the meaning of impermanence, hence called non-agency. Completely penetrating the five aggregates of grasping as empty and without arising is the meaning of suffering. When there is suffering due to arising, arising is itself non-arising, hence there is no flavor. All dharmas being ultimately non-existent is the meaning of emptiness: both persons and dharmas are empty, and emptiness is also empty, hence not according to names. Non-duality regarding self and non-self is the meaning of non-self: the Buddhas sometimes speak of self, sometimes of non-self; in the true mark of all dharmas there is neither self nor non-self, hence there is no location. Therefore the *Āṃdīja-sūtra* states that non-arising and non-ceasing is the meaning of impermanence, while arising and ceasing is conversely the meaning of permanence, and so forth. *Yogācārabhūmi* chapter forty-six states: 'How does a bodhisattva contemplate all conditioned phenomena as impermanent? That is, contemplating the verbal nature of all conditioned phenomena as constantly non-existent at all times; thus all conditioned phenomena are constantly unobtainable.' If one grasps this meaning, one enters the middle way. If one explains it in terms of the three natures according to the *Madhyāntavibhāga-śāstra*, then in the first and last two natures, neither arising nor ceasing is the meaning of impermanence, whereas in the dependent nature, arising and ceasing is the meaning of impermanence, and so forth. Furthermore, non-agency is because it is neither permanent nor impermanent. Having no flavor is because it is neither suffering nor pleasure. Not according to names is because it is neither empty nor non-empty, since words cannot reach it. Having no location is because it is neither self nor non-self, not being in saṃsāra or nirvāṇa. Non-conceptual is because thoughts and ideations are absent. Having no solidity is because real and unreal exist relatively. In the later superior progression, it is practice guarding against the Hīnayāna, because the Hīnayāna does not seek the knowledge of all aspects and does not wish for broad knowledge. Among the ten, the first three are places where Buddha-work is performed: sentient beings are what is to be liberated, the dharmadhātu is that which liberates, and the worlds are the places of liberation. The next four realms are places where views arise: non-Buddhists posit the elements as the root of all dharmas, and the Hīnayāna posits the elements as the cause of all forms, as well as the substance constituting the body. The last three realms are places of bondage. How does one contemplate? First, contemplate their marks and know them in minute detail; second, contemplate their nature as extremely profound and equal. Third, the meaning of the inquiry says: If one merely contemplates impermanence generally, what need is there for broad knowledge? The meaning of the explanation says: contemplating emptiness does not obstruct possessing broad knowledge and vision; because both nature and marks are fully understood, the dharma-knowledge increases and brightens.